Russia's foreign relations during the last half century

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RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

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I

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

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THE LAST HALF CENTURY

BY
BARON S. A. KORFF, D. C. L.

Professor of Political Science, School of Foreign Service, George-
town University, Washington, D. C.
Sometime Professor of Russian Law and History, Universitii of
Belsingfors, Finland, and Women's University of
Petrograd, Russia

ll3eto l^otfe

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1922

AU rights reserved

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COPTRIGHT, 1922,

By the president AND TRUSTEES OP WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

Set up and electrotyped. Published January, 1922.

FEB -b 1922

g)n!.A654549

'Vw I

3^7

10

It is with some hesitation that I gave my con-
sent to the publication of these lectures. It is
extremely difficult to handle such a vast subject
in so short a space, and consequently some of the
questions did not receive the attention they de-
serve. However, the other courses, given at the
Institute of Politics, will help considerably to
elucidate various doubtful problems.

I take this opportunity to express my feelings
of deep gratitude to President H, A. Garfield
and the Institute of Politics for their great kind-
ness and hospitality.

S. A.K.
August 25, 1921.
Williamstown, Massachusetts.

CONTENTS

CHAPTB31 PAGE

I Fkance 1

II England , . 27

III China 54

IV Japan . 75

V AUSTKIA-HUNGARY 93

VI The Balkan States 114

VII Gbkmany 145

VIII Sweden 171

IX Some Items 184

X Secret Diplomacy 190

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

DURING

THE LAST HALF CENTURY

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
DURING LAST HALF CENTURY

CHAPTER I.

FRANCE.

I.

I BEGAN the preparation of my lectures for the Insti-
tute of Politics with some apprehension. In the j&rst
place I felt that we were too far from the most val-
uable sources of information, namely the European
archives of the foreign ojfices, especially the Russian
Foreign Office, that still contain untold historical treas-
ures.

Another difficulty that confronted me is the fact that
the events of the last half-century are too recent, and
it is very difficult to remain absolutely impartial. Yet
the contemporary has one great asset, his personal
observations, and these are particularly valuable in
portraying personal characteristics.

Russia's role during these last decades has been very
important. Little can be understood of the modem
tangle of European affairs if one does not know or
consider Russia's foreign relations.

In analyzing the latter one must keep in mind not
only the social forces that move nations to certain ends

1

2 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

and achieve national aims, but also tbe role played by
the various personalities, the statesmen at the helm of
their countries. It is possible that a time will come
when democracies and public opinion will direct for-
eign affairs, as they govern and influence other do-
mains of public life, but with this great modem prob-
lem I will deal separately later on. At present one must
acknowledge that very much still depends on person-
alities; on the character, the ideals and very often even
on the moods and proclivities of foreign secretaries,
heads of states or ambassadors.

In Russia and eastern Europe this was very much
the case up to the time of the armistice of 1918, and we
cannot yet be sure that this state of affairs has van-
ished forever. Take as an example the role which the
Russian Tsars played in shaping the fate of their
country! How much Russia's foreign policy depended
on the likes and dislikes of her Emperors! We might
instance the strong feelings of dislike of Alexander III
towards Republican France, Bismarck's arrogance or
the tactlessness of Alexander of Bulgaria; the stubborn
lack of understanding of Japan by Nicholas II, hia
alarming weakness when dealing with the Kaiser,
which led first to the Bjorko Treaty in direct contra-
diction to the French Alliance and later to the Great
War; or again his treacherous demeanor toward the
Duma, when he left his ministers to disentangle the
snarled thread of his policy, without his moral sup-
port. The same indictment must be brought against
the ministers of foreign affairs. In a large measure
Russia's fate depended on their personalities. Take
for example Prince Lobanoff and Count Muraviev with

FRANCE 3

their limited intellects and their crass ignorance in
some matters (especially the Far East) ; or Count
Lamsdorff, the typical bureaucrat, with a splendid
French style and no knowledge of Russia; the honest
but weak-minded Iswolsky, who suffered much from
constant intrigue and was no match for foreign diplo-
mats; and finally the erratic and capricious Sazonoff,
acting often as a spoiled child, with no great intellect,
but with clear nationalistic purposes, a seeming liberal
among reactionaries only because he was so very hon-
est and simple.

I do not want to convey the impression that these
men were not fitted for their ofl&ce merely because they
were the devoted servants of dying autocracy. We
know quite well that the Parliamentary regime ipso
facto does not necessarily improve matters and that the
western countries cannot always boast of having in-
tellects of the highest order directing their foreign
affairs. My purpose is simply to point out how much
Russia's fate did depend on the men in power from
the Tsars downward.

In analyzing the history of the foreign relations of
Russia I met with another difficulty well known to all
students of history, from what date to start the narra-
tive. The history of a nation being a continuous evo-
lutionary process, all periods are equally important and
It is hard to make up one's mind to begin with certain
events. Moreover, the history of Russia in the nine-
teenth century does not have clearly defined periods,
dividing the epochs of her social and political develop-
ment.

After some hesitation, I chose for a starting point

4 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

the events of the Berlin Congress of 1878, because of
their disastrous influence on the subsequent foreign
relations of Russia. She entered the following period
deeply disappointed and hurt by the treatment ac-
corded her at the Berlin Congress. After having
achieved great military victories, notwithstanding the
evident shortcomings of her army organization, after
having lost many thousands of lives of her citizens in
order to liberate her Slav brothers in the Balkans from
the bloody rule of the unspeakable Turk, after having
herself lived through a period of national uplift, when
the Slavophile movement had set so many Russian
hearts aglow for the Slav cause, she was now forcibly
thwarted in her national aims, most of her ideals were
shattered and she was thoroughly disillusioned at home
and abroad. Europe did her utmost to muzzle the
Russian bear, and foremost among its enemies stood,
not vanquished Turkey, but glorious and self-reliant
England, led by Beaconsfield, the great comedian.
No wonder Russia came out of the Berlin Congress
discouraged and dissatisfied, cherishing ill feelings
toward the other great powers, England in particular.

It seemed to many Russians at the time that their
country had absolutely failed in her entire foreign
policy. And this feeling of disappointment was
coupled with the realization that Russia's own house
was badly out of order. All through the 70's social
dissatisfaction was constantly gaining in strength, the
government unfortunately not knowing how to meet
it otherwise than by coercion and repression. The
climax came with the assassination of the Tsar in 1881.

His son and successor, Alexander III, for these obvi-

FRANCE 5

ous reasons preferred for Russia a position of isola-
tion, cleverly called by a Russian historian the "cold
storage theory." After the emancipation of her serfs
Russia had tried an expansive and ambitious foreign
policy, fostering the Pan-Slav movement, interfering
in western affairs, spreading her influence into central
Asia, and so forth, and had conspicuously failed. Now,
it was thought, Russian autocracy ought to concentrate
all its attention on internal affairs, dealing exclusively
with the social discontent and leaving Europe to its
own fate.

Yet the plan of Alexander III to keep Russia en-
tirely out of European affairs could never have been
carried through systematically; Russia could not ex-
tricate herself, however much she tried. There were
too many European interests at stake, and further,
the Balkan trouble was not settled, but on the con-
trary, the Berlin decisions were bound to call forth
new complications; we know only too well that the
Balkans remained the storm center of Europe till
1914. Further, Russia could not withdraw her claims
concerning the Straits of the Bosphorus. Finally,
even if Russia could have succeeded in cutting off her
interests westward, the other countries had no intention
of leaving her unmolested. There was first the restless
Bismarck, his watchful eye constantly on his eastern
neighbor; then came France seeking Russia's friend-
ship and willing to pay millions to secure it; and lastly
there was the steadily increasing enmity of England,
suspicious of Russia's activities in central Asia. All
this tended to thwart Alexander's plans for keeping
out of trouble.

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

II.

The relations of Russia towards France during the
first years of Alexander's reign were cool, though not
inimical. Alexander III did not like the French Re-
public, he did not approve of her republican institu-
tions, he hated her growing radicalism and socialistic
influences, and considered republicanism the chief
source of her political weakness and instability. The
character of the French people was not to his taste.
The past history of France's relations towards Russia
also was not conducive to great friendship; for many
years France had been opposing Russia in various
ways. She was Russia's enemy in the Crimean War,
she openly supported the Pohsh aspirations for inde-
pendence, she was not on Russia's side at Berlin in
1878, and finally there existed certain political reasons
for dissatisfaction, for Alexander looked askance at
the French revolutionary sympathies abroad and at
the growth of her socialism at home.

Thus the first years of this reign were a period of
aloofness between the two countries and of ill-dis-
guised suspicions on the part of the Tsar. And in that
atmosphere of suspicions and personal dislikes, the
least incident was bound to be magnified into enormous
proportions. For instance, the rather insignificant fact
of the recall of the French ambassador, General
Appert, from St. Petersburg for purely personal rea-
sons, seemed to Alexander an insult. He Uked Appert,
who was a military man of very conservative views,
whose wife was of Danish extraction and intimate with

«w»

FRANCE 7

the Empress, herself from Denmark. The Tsar be-
came so infuriated at this action on the part of France
that he recalled his own ambassador, Mohrenheim,
from Paris and informed the French that he did not
want any ambassador from them at all. The diplo-
matic representation of both countries remained for
a long time in the hands of secondary charges
d'affaires, and very naturally Germany used this inci-
dent to further her own purposes. Bismarck saw with
joy how these two countries were drifting apart, thus
greatly diminishing the chances of any French ag-
gressiveness against Germany.

The ill feeling of Alexander III was increased at
this time by two other events: first, by the publishing
in France of the law which exiled the Royal princes
and pretenders, Alexander considering it an unwar-
ranted blow to his beloved monarchical principles;
second, by the cases of the two prominent Russian
revolutionaries, Hartmann and Kropotkine. They
were both implicated in plots to assassinate his father,
Alexander II, and had fled to France, where they
found refuge, the French government not being will-
ing to extradite them to Russia notwithstanding the
insistence of the Russian authorities. Kropotkine was
first convicted of murder by the French courts, but
later pardoned by the French, and this act aroused the
Tsar's ire. Alexander took it as a personal offense
against himself and his rule.

This tension, however, was unexpectedly relieved,
notwithstanding Alexander's strong predilections,
which were so characteristic of the man. The great
and noteworthy change, dating from about the year

8 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

1887, was born exclusively of the aggressiveness and
clumsiness of the German policy. Bismarck seem-
ingly misreckoned and counted too much on Alexan-
der's reactionary tendencies. Only the many and con-
secutive mistakes of Berlin can explain the drastic
change of Russia's policies.

It came about through the rapprochement of Ger-
many and Austria, which alarmed Alexander extremely
and caused him to make concessions to France. The
latter country, contrary to the policy of Germany, was
now making every effort to enlist the friendship of
Russia, and took the initiative in making advances.
First came the reestablishment of ambassadorial rela-
tions; Mohrenheim was permitted to return to Paris,
and France on her part sent Laboulaye, a remarkably
gifted man, to St. Petersburg. Then came a Bulgarian
incident. A Bulgarian deputation was travelling in
Europe, enlisting the sympathies of the various gov-
ernments with the cause of Prince Alexander; they
were cordially received in London, but when they came
to Paris, they found to their amazement a very cold
reception, due exclusively to the desire of the French
to please the Tsar, who disliked the Battenberg prince;
this incident can rightly be looked at as one of the very
first landmarks in the path of the Franco-Russian
friendship.

At a later date Flourens, who was at the time for-
eign minister, asserted that the idea of a Russo-French
alliance first originated with him. We overlook his
mistake. When Laboulaye was sent to Russia there
was no idea in France of any possible alliance with
Russia; all the French government could hope for

FRANCE 9

was to reestablish friendly relations. It was very
gradually, after his arrival in St. Petersburg, that
Laboulaye became convinced of the opportunity of
much closer relations with Russia, and only later did
he conceive the possibility of some sort of agreement
as a common defence against Germany. This was due
in great measure to Bismarck's erroneous tactics when
he hoped to force the hand of the stubborn Tsar, and
yet further to the great wisdom and diplomacy of the
French ambassador, who in a short space of time suc-
ceeded in endearing himself to the Russian people and
winning the unquestionable sympathies of the Em-
peror.

By that time the French ministry had changed and
the portfolio of foreign affairs was in the hands of
the able Freycinet, who saw at once the great advan-
tages and new vistas opened to France by her far-
sighted ambassador. Moreover, President Carnot had
succeeded Grevy, and being convinced of the advan-
tages of an understanding with Russia, energetically
seconded the prime minister, Ribot, to bring it about.
Thus we have a number of French statesmen who were
literally grasping the opportunity of approaching
Russia and making her a friend and an ally. There
must have been very serious reasons indeed for Alex-
ander to thus change his policy. As we have seen, his
personal predilections had previously drawn him in
an exactly opposite direction ; he was strongly inclined
towards a friendship with monarchical Germany and
personally disliked the French people and their politi-
cal institutions.

The main cause for this change was the increasing

10 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

arrogance of the German chancellor, whose conduct
antagonized the Tsar. Then too, Alexander gradually
became convinced that the internal troubles of his own
country were not as dangerous as they had at first
seemed, after the assassination of his father. The
police .measures of his government succeeded in driv-
ing the leaders of the revolutionary movement to cover,
and outwardly quiet seemed to dominate. This cre-
ated very serious troubles later on, during the reign
of his son, but Alexander had not the slightest realiza-
tion of it. Finally, much of the success of the French
policy must be attributed to the great skill and tact
of Laboulaye. He worked at it so carefully, paved his
way so cautiously, and approached the Russian govern-
ment so gradually that Alexander might have been
easily fooled, and not have noticed during the first
months that any change was really coming. Certainly
neither his ministers nor the general public realized
such a change.

Least of all did Alexander expect to alter his per-
sonal relations with the old Kaiser; he openly admired
Wilhelm I and loved him as a grandfather, resenting
the brusque way Bismarck was treating his master.
Perhaps this was also a remote cause of the Tsar's
dislike of the chancellor.

There happened in 1887 a very unfortunate per-
sonal incident. The Tsar was returning home in the
autumn of that year, via Berlin, from a holiday trip to
Denmark, and had a stormy interview with the Ger-
man chancellor, during which he violently accused Bis-
marck of interfering with Russian affairs by support-
ing Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, and also of having

FRANCE 11

written a disagreeable letter to the English govern-
ment with which at the time Russia's relations were
strained. This letter proved later a forgery, though itsi
author was never known. The whole incident made
a bad and lasting impression on Alexander, whose
angry feelings towards Bismarck continued unabated
to the end of the Tsar's life.

In 1888 came the death of the old Kaiser, and after
Frederick's reign of three months young Wilhelm II
ascended the German throne. At the beginning of this
reign there was seemingly much sympathy between
Wilhelm and Alexander. Wilhelm tried to be very
respectful and subservient, which pleased Alexander
immensely. Possibly the feelings Alexander had to-
wards Bismarck counted much in the latter's dis-
missal. Alexander's opinion of the autocratic chan-
cellor probably helped to convince Wilhelm that he
ought to rule without such a "nurse" behind his back.
I rather think that this fact does not receive sufficient
attention from the historians of the epoch, especially
from those who deal with Bismarck's resignation.

To sum up the policies of these years — 1886-1890 —
we can say that Germany constantly irritated Russia
— a policy most detrimental, chiefly to Germany her-
self— by the personal methods of Bismarck which an-
tagonized the Tsar, and by her growing friendship with
Austria. The aims of that friendship were never well
disguised and it was known at St. Petersburg that they
were directed primarily against Russia.) Germany was
relying too much on her former friendship with Russia
and the family relations of the two courts. France,
on the other hand, led by clever men, especially

12 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Laboulaye, carefully paved her way to the building
up of an understanding with Russia, clearing away all
former causes of friction. Meanwhile Russia's own
policy, planned by Alexander, was to remain abso-
lutely neutral between France and Germany and to
try to withdraw as much as possible into a position of
isolation, which the Tsar deemed was the best guaran-
tee of peace for Russia.

III.

Thus a sort of equilibrium was achieved in the
mutual relations of these great powers, Russia holding
the balance between Germany and France. In 1918
the German government published some Belgian docu-
ments, which they had taken from Brussels during their
occupation of Belgium (Schwertfeger vol. V). These
documents contain the reports to Brussels of different
Belgian diplomatic agents. They unanimously state
that they knew that Russia during this period was
standing for permanent peace and directed all her
endeavors towards establishing peaceful relations be-
tween France and Germany, notwithstanding the
pressure brought upon her by France.^

This was, however, not at all what France wanted.
She had set her mind on getting Russia on her side.
The next, obstacle that she had to put aside was the
influence of the reactionary surroundings of the Tsar.
Among these there was great discontent, not only

^Schwertfeger, Zur Europaischen Politik, 1885-1914, Berlin, 1918.
Hansen, Ambassade a Paris du Baron de Mohrenheim, Paris, 1907.
Cyon, Histoire de I'Entente franco-russe, Paris, 1895. de Freydnet,
Souvenirs, vol. 1-2, Paris, 1913.

FRANCE 13

with French republicanism in general, but with the
French policy towards the Russian revolutionaries in
particular. The police of the Tsar succeeded in comb-
ing out the revolutionary movement from Russia, but
it became all the stronger abroad for that very reason ;
many of the young Russian revolutionaries found a
haven in Paris, where their circles and meeting-places
were well known to the Russian gendarmes. The reac-
tionaries in Russia constantly urged the government
to take drastic steps and make representations to
France concerning these revolutionaries, and looked
askance at the French for their seeming lack of desire
to support such foolish pretensions. And very natu-
rally this was bound to impede the progress of the
movement towards a closer alliance.

Knowing this the French government opened in
1890 one of the darkest pages of the history of this
alliance by starting persecutions against the Russian
revolutionaries. The first one to take active measures
against these Russians was Constans, then minister of
the interior. This proved to be a terrible mistake, and
remained to the very end the inner cause of weakness
of the Russo-French alliance, for it could not be sup-
ported by the majority of educated and enlightened
Russians as long as it had such foul political motives.
They could not sincerely trust a republican France
upholding an autocratic regime, which they were so
devotedly fighting. Many of the misfortunes of Russia
during the Great War must be ascribed to this potent
cause of decay, that was eating away the very core of
the alliance. It was certainly a heavy price France
paid for Russia's official friendship, not realizing evi-

14 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

dently how much it estranged the bulk of the Russian
educated people.

The Tsar and his government, on the contrary, were
filled with satisfaction and gratitude for such friendly
help on the part of the French. A short while after the
police persecutions against the Russians had started
in Paris and elsewhere, there began the secret transac-
tions between the two governments to reach a definite
agreement.

Just at that time there took place an incident which
broke the ice. At the instigation of the Kaiser, his
mother, the widow of Friedrich, went incognito to
Paris. It is supposed by some that Wilhelm really
hoped for some unfriendly demonstration against the
poor woman. This would have given him his chance
at France. The French government, however, took
all necessary measures to prevent any demonstration.
A possible crisis was thus avoided, but it was the first
practical test of the new poUcy of friendship with
Russia. Would the latter country side with France
in a case of distinct German aggression? The French
did not hesitate to apply the test, and quickly found
that Alexander was wilhng to back them up ; his sense
of justice was deeply hurt by such methods of the
Kaiser and he showed sympathy with France, which
was enough to warn Germany.

Thus the former equilibrium had disappeared and
Russia began to incline to one side.

Events developed rapidly after that. First came
the mission of General Boisdeffre to Russia, where
he was allowed by Alexander to attend the manoeuvers
of the Russian army near St. Petersburg in the pres-

FRANCE 15

ence of German officers only, to the dismay of the
latter. During his visit to Russia Boisdeffre had long
talks with General Obroutcheff, Chief of Staff, con-
cerning the equipment of the Russian army. A short
time previously the Russian army had adopted the
French Lebel rifle and Boisdeffre was anxious to know
if it had proved satisfactory. The order was placed
with the French in 1889 at the time of a visit of the
Grand Duke Vladimir to Paris, where he used to enjoy
himself at the theatres and musicales. This was one of
the most subtle means the French used to give Russia
"friendly" assistance.

Then, on July 25, 1891, came the visit of the French
fleet under the command of Admiral Gervais to
Kronstadt. The reception accorded the French was
quite exceptional, due to the special effort of the Rus-
sian government. The Russian reactionaries beheld
to their horror the Tsar standing at attention and
saluting while the revolutionary Marseillaise was
being played by French and Russian military bands.
This action of the Tsar was afterwards cited by some
as an exceptional token of friendship, and by others
as a terrible mistake; how could an autocratic Tsar
salute a revolutionary hymn, asked the latter?

In August, 1891, during the talks between Gen-
erals Boisdeffre and Obroutcheff, the question of a
possible military convention between the two coun-
tries came up. The first text of an agreement, dated
August 22, 1891, was rather "platonic." However,
this was really the beginning of an alliance.

Next came the visit in the autumn of 1891 of the
Russian foreign minister, de Giers, to Paris, when

16 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

he discussed the same matters, but on a broader plane,
with Ribot the prime minister and Freycinet the
French foreign secretary. Finally in December, 1891,
there took place formal transactions at St. Petersburg
between the French ambassador, Count Montebello,
General Boisdeffre, Colonel Moulin, on the one side,
and the foreign minister, de Giers, the minister of
war. General Vannowsky, the chief of staff. General
Obroutcheff, on the other.

On June 6, 1892, came the visit of the Grand Duke
Constantine to the French President Carnot. He was
magnificently received. A second text of an agreement
is dated August 30, 1892, but the Panama scandal de-
ferred the transactions. (This agreement was the final
text of the military convention, since published by the
Bolsheviki, Paris, 1919.)

In October, 1893, a Russian squadron commanded
by Admiral Avellan paid a return visit to France at
Toulon, and was received most cordially by the French
government. A great effort was made to please the
Russians. Finally, on June 10, 1895, Ribot formally
announced the conclusion of the Franco-Russian
alUance.

IV.

Parallel to her political transactions, France en-
deavored to strengthen Russia's bond of friendship by
other, more subtle means, namely, by loans for her
industrial development. One must remember in this
respect that beginning with €he '80's there was

FRANCE 17

started in Russia a great industrial expansion, two
consecutive Russian finance ministers, Vishnegradsky
and Witte, trying by all sorts of means to foster
and further the industrial development of their coun-
try, and one must say that notwithstanding the fact
that much of it was artificial, unnatural and of hot-
house growth, they still succeeded in achieving very
remarkable results. In two decades (the '80's and
'90's) Russia in that respect was unrecognizable;
towards the year 1900 she possessed a well-developed
industrial movement.

But such development demands capital, and Russia
had none of her own to spare. France and Belgium,
on the other hand, had abundance of surplus money,
the savings of their thrifty populations, ready to invest
in any enterprise that would pay them a fair per-
centage. The statesmen on both sides, realizing these
conditions, set to work to make the supply and the
demand meet to their mutual satisfaction. Their mo-
tives, however, were very different; the Russians
wanted the capital for their young and promising
industries and were quite ready to pay a handsome
percentage; the French and Belgian people simply
looked for a secure investment, whereas the French
government, assuring the people of such a security by
government guarantees, sought political advantages by
establishing financial bonds tying Russia down to an
alliance with France.

Germany was not willing to participate in Russian
loans; all her money in those days was being invested
in her new colonial enterprises.

The French money on the contrary came to Russia

18 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

in great quantities; enormous Russian loans were
floated on the French money market, constantly in-
creasing in size. In 1890 three loans were concluded,
in 1891 two; later other loans succeeded these; 1893,
'94, '96, 1901 and 1904 saw others, and finally in 1906
the largest and politically the most important, which
Witte calls the loan "which saved Russia," or, we may
add, the Russian autocracy. Then government loans
were succeeded by municipal, provincial (the Finland
loans), metallurgic, mining, manufacturing, transpor-
tation loans of various character and qualifications,
amounting to the enormous sum of 12 billions, or
nearly one quarter of all the investments abroad of the
French nation.^

In the early history of the financial policy of France
there took place an incident, little known abroad, but
very characteristic. It was during the negotiations
of the first loan of 1891 ; the banking house of Roths-
childs in Paris suddenly interrupted the transactions
and declined to proceed with them, giving as a pretext
the Jewish persecutions which were then going on in
Russia. As a matter of fact there was more back of
this stand by the bank. These transactions coincided
with the friction that ensued between Paris and Berlin
on account of several incidents. France then inquired
if Russia would uphold her in her policy against Ger-
many. Russia answered that she would certainly come
to the aid of France if Germany attacked her, but not
otherwise. This qualification alarmed the French
government, who forced the Rothschilds to withdraw
from the transactions in order to put pressure upon
*See A. Tardieu, France and the Alliances, N. Y., 1908.

FRANCE 19

Russia. The details of that story are still unknown,
and perhaps there is some exaggeration in it, but the
spirit of it is undoubtedly true. Such was Russia's
position during those years; she would not back any
aggression on either side, and still endeavored to hold
the balance as even as possible. France, on her side,
was working for much more and against the will
of the Russian people, the Russian government, and
especially the Tsar, she forced the alliance upon
Russia, and willingly employed financial means to
exert such pressure.

The real test of the Franco-Russian alliance came
during the Japanese war. One cannot doubt the mo-
tives of France in any way; she was honestly trying
to help Russia in her difficult situation, the more so
because Germany was endeavoring to establish friendly
relations and assist the Russian government, too, as
best she could. There exist many proofs of French
sincerity; her help to Rojdestvensky's fleet at Mada-
gascar and at other ports and her continued financial
support are but a few of the many instances that might
be cited.

There was one thing wrong, however, in the Franco-
Russian alliance, and the events of the Japanese war
ought to have been a warning to France: first, the
Russian army was in no way as strong as the outside
world thought; the organization was poor, the com-
mand was deficient, the system of supplies was not
working well, and what was more the army had not
the whole-hearted backing of the nation; second,
the internal policy of Russia was absolutely un-
satisfactory, for it was undermining her strength and

20 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

creating social discontent, which had already burst
forth in a revolutionary movement in 1905. Seething
with dissatisfaction and revolution, Russia could not
give France the support she expected from her. There
came a moment when France ought to have realized
this, namely, 'in the spring of 1906 when Witte was
conducting the transactions concerning the loan "which
saved Russia*" but that really only helped to defer the
revolution for another ten years. The factors for
this last huge loan from France were as follows:
For the loan were the already j5rmly established
alliance and the strategic plan of the two countries,
bound to each other, France depending absolutely on
the military assistance of Russia; the mercantile hopes
for profits on the part of French investors, who were
expecting big percentages on their investments, the
French government constantly arousing their hopes
by all sorts of artificial means and promises; and some
elements of the ruling classes on both sides, hoping
to find support from such a policy of backing Russia
and her autocratic government, though one cannot
say that it was the whole of these classes, as there were
among them farsighted persons who realized the pre-
cariousness of the political condition in Russia.

Witte's parleys concerning this loan were started
with the Rouvier government, but the following
winter it fell, and was succeeded by the Sarrien
government, which concluded the negotiations, Poin-
care having unfortunately the finance portfolio, — thus
carrying the heaviest responsibility for the loan, —
while Clemenceau had the portfolio of the interior,
which enabled him to control the police and deal with

FRANCE 21

the question of Russian revolutionaries. These were
the forces that Witte, the Russian government, the
French capitalists and some French statesmen were
relying on to carry the loan.

Against the loan was a formidable array on both
sides. First, political morals or ethics. I realize that
there are many people who deny that ethics play any
role in politics, but I consider this very wrong, and the
present case is the best possible example and proof of
the enormous influence that the moral point of view
can have on political matters. The American-Chinese
relations, especially concerning the Boxer indemnity,
the open door policy, and the Shantung protests afford
other examples. Second, Russian liberal public opin-
ion, which was unanimously opposed to the loan,
considered that France at least ought to have
confronted the Russian government with the request
for constitutional guarantees. It was a brilliant oppor-
tunity for France to stand for constitutionalism and
thus strengthen the Russian liberal movement. This
would have been a tremendous advantage for the
young Duma in her political struggle. Most energetic
action was taken at that time by the leading Russian
political party, the Constitutional Democrats or
Cadets, as they are usually called. They even went
so far as to send a deputation to Paris in order to con-
vince the French of the necessity, if not of refusing
the loan, at least of attaching definite political and
liberal conditions to it. Some of the Cadets were so
strongly of this opinion that they considered the loan
to be a real crime against Russia. (Subsequent events
proved, alas, that they were not far from right.) The

22 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Russian government, on the contrary, naturally con-
sidered these men traitors, not daring, however, to
court-martial and punish them, knowing well that
public opinion all over Russia was backing them
strongly. It is a great pity that the French govern-
ment refused to recognize them and consider their
point of view. Much of the history of Russia and
even of Europe would have been different had they
been recognized by France. Third, whereas the men
in power in France at that time never realized this
chance, there were many statesmen, especially among
her radicals and socialists, who saw clearly enough the
frightful dangers for France in backing a tottering
autocracy. To the lasting shame of the French gov-
ernment of that year and of Witte, the loan was con-
cluded, and the Tsar and his government were saved
from certain defeat at the hands of the liberals. The
first negotiations were conducted by Witte and the
French banker, Neutzlin; to the latter credit must
be given, for at the beginning he was strongly opposed
to concluding a loan without the knowledge and the
sanction of the Duma. Witte, however, succeeded in
persuading him to push through the loan. The Rus-
sian government made the immoral threat to France
of starting a flirtation with Germany in case the
French refused the loan. It was at the time of the
Algeziras conference, and the Russian government
intimated that it would not back France, but would
help Germany to protract the negotiations, which Ger-
many had already done very effectively. It was prac-
tically impossible for Russia to make good the threat,
but it brought France to the point of agreeing to float

FRANCE 23

the loan. That threat was made by Witte. The Rus-
sian liberals requested at least one condition — that the
Duma should be given the opportunity to sanction the
loan, which would have given it the chance to criti-
cize the Russian government and lay bare some of its
shortcomings and mistakes. But the French govern-
ment firmly refused.

It is interesting to note that England took the posi-
tion of counselling moderation to France, and was not
averse to backing the Russian liberals in their demand
to allow the Duma to sanction the loan and criticize
the government. English influence in Paris during
these days was not suflSciently strong, however. A few
English bankers with Lord Revelstoke did take part in
the loan, notwithstanding the fact that the English
government was opposed to it; the Rothschilds de-
clined to take a hand in it.

In only one particular was Witte right in insisting
on the absolute necessity of that loan. Russia was in
dire need of money and could obtain it only in France.
There were many payments due in 1906 from previous
loans; there were the tremendous expenses of the
Japanese war to be paid; there existed a dangerous
tendency for Russian gold to go abroad, thus les-
sening the bullion reserve, which was threatening the
newly established gold standard of the Russian cur-
rency. But contrary to Witte's opinion it must be said
that when the loan was concluded its conditions were
ruinous to the Russian treasury, and its political mean- ■
ing as mentioned above quite disastrous. The amount
of the loan was first fixed at 2,750,000,000 francs, but
later reduced to 2,250,000,000 francs, bearing 6 per

24 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

cent interest, and floated in April, 1906. Germany
absolutely refused to participate in this loan, though at
the start her bankers did take part in the negotiations,
possibly in order to simply keep in touch with what
was going on. As the transactions reached the decisive
point they withdrew, alleging the prohibition of their
government to take part in the actual floating of the
loan. The American firm of J. P. Morgan was also
invited to participate, but withdrew early, though no
political reasons came to the surface at the time.

V.

The history of the French loan of 1906 was the last
warning to France. After that date the two govern-
ments, Russia and France, became closely bound and
had to stand by each other, per fas et nefas.

The aggressiveness of Germany either against France
or Russia called absolutely for the assistance of the
other ally, and no one was better aware of this than
the government of Berlin. And vice versa, if France
or Russia began an offensive policy against any other
nation, the other ally was forced to back such action,
no matter what its own opinion in the matter might
be. This was the case, for instance, in the Morocco
crisis, when Russia stood by France, though she her-
self had no interests at stake in northern Africa. But
the time of greatest trial came when in the summer
of 1914 the conflagration started in the Balkans.
Berlin knew from the very beginning that France
would have to back the Russian stand on the Slav

FRANCE 25

question. London and most of the other capitals
knew it as well.

The only possible break might have been the
Bjorko treaty, a very cleverly laid intrigue of the
Kaiser. For many reasons it was bound however to
fail, thus leaving the Franco-Russian alliance intact.

The great historical meaning of this alliance is not
in doubt at the present day. The victory of the Allies
was the necessary outcome of that strong friendship,
built up between France and Russia. The victory of
the Marne and the resistance on the western front were
due in no mean part to Russia's role in the east, though
at the present time this fact is not always remembered.

The impartial historian, however, is in duty bound
to mention the drawbacks of that alliance and the fatal
mistakes of some of its originators and constructors.
Russia's mistake was of a general political nature, of
not heeding the signs of the time; her reactionary gov-
ernment did not want to make the necessary liberal
concessions up to the moment when it was too late ; the
concessions it did make were always insincere and
insufficient.

France's miscalculation was double. First, the
French statesmen helped much too willingly the
Russian reactionaries in their persecutions of their
political opponents; the exile and imprisonment of
Russian revolutionaries always will remain a dark
page in French constitutional history. Second, when
there came a moment of grave warning, at the time
of the first Russian revolutionary attempt, after the
Japanese war in 1905-1906, France did not heed
this warning, notwithstanding the fact that Russia's

26 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

best liberals were telling her the undisguised truth.
Many eminent Frenchmen understood the situation
very clearly and supported the Russian liberals.
England, too, gave her warning to France, but all
in vain. The money she loaned Russia only helped
to support a decaying and degenerate autocratic
government, which was fated to fall sooner or later.
A constitutional Russia would have been a much
stronger and surer friend and ally to France. Russia
could not prove the strong ally, sincere as she was in
her friendship, and was bound to go to pieces, eco-
nomically, politically and socially.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Stuart, G. H., French Foreign Policy, New York, 1921.
Debidour, A., Histoire diplomatique de I'Europe, Paris, 1917,
Seymour, C., Diplomatic Background of the War, New Haven, 1916.
Daudet, E., L'avant-demier Romanoff, Paris, 1920.
Daudet, E., Histoire diplomatique de I'alliance franco-russe, Paris,

1894.
For further details see bibliography in Debidour,

CHAPTER II.

ENGLAND.

I.

CoNTRAEY to the history of Franco -Russian rela-
tions, which constantly grew closer and friendlier,
our story concerning Anglo-Russian relations starts
with avowed enmity and keeps this character for a
long series of years. For several decades not only did
there not exist any amicable relations between Russia
and England, but on the contrary, it was mostly open
hostility and mutual disHke and suspicion.

The main bone of contention was Turkey, but as
time went on new questions arose, creating further
complications for the statesmen of St. Petersburg and
London. First came the central Asia trouble; later
the Far Eastern quarrel with Japan, in which England
played no small part, and only toward the end of the
first decade of the twentieth century under pressure of
quite extraordinary circumstances did those feelings
of mutual enmity gradually abate, being replaced by
an entente, which grew into an alliance when the
German danger began to loom above the horizon.

When there is so much inflammable material
amassed by long years of mutual suspicions and accu-
sations, new quarrels are bound to increase in number
and intensity, and there always exists great danger of

27

28 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

a sudden explosion and consequent warfare. Several
times during this period were Russia and England on
the very brink of war, saved from it more by good
luck than by good statesmanship.

Our narrative begins with the open enmity that
existed between Russia and England in the '70's of
the last century on account of Turkey and the Balkans.
Each time the Tsar Alexander II tried to put pressure
on the Sultan in order to force him to alter his
atrocious methods of governing the Balkan peoples,
England, in the person of Beaconsfield, heartily sup-
ported by Queen Victoria, backed the Porte and helped
her to evade the Russian demands, thus gradually
bringing about the armed conflict of 1877-1878. All
Europe was clamoring for an end of the Turkish atro-
cities, the English liberals, headed by the great Glad-
stone, not least among those who insisted on such
reforms. At the cost of enormous sacrifices, both in
lives and money, Russia achieved brilliant military
success and liberated the Balkan Slavs. She stood vic-
torious at the walls of Constantinople; the Turks had
capitulated, having signed the armistice of San Ste-
fano; some of the Russian guard regiments had
already received the order to march into the Turkish
capital, as a crowning act of this war, when the Eng-
lish veto put a sudden end to the plan. The Berlin
Congress that followed ruined nearly all of Russia's
achievements. Fortunately, one thing remained,
namely the freedom of the Slavs; but even this was not
without its troubles; the path of liberty, which the
Slavs now began to tread, proved to be a very thorny
one.

ENGLAND 29

One must say, however, to the honor of the British
people, that the defenders of Turkey were in the
minority; the masses were all anti-Turkish; this was
strikingly proved by the election of 1880, which anni-
hilated Disraeli, his policy and ideals, and brought to
the government the liberal leader, Gladstone, a violent
opponent of the Sultan's rule.^

The chief argument of the English conservatives
against Russia and her claims in the Balkans, was that
Constantinople really was the gateway into Asia, the
necessary bulwark of the Suez Canal, protecting the
routes entering Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Egypt and,
further back, the Indian Empire. This idea dates far
back into the time of Napoleon I, when he had his
strife with the Tsar Alexander I, that ended in such a
brilliant victory for the latter.

From the very first these fears of the British im-
perialists were much exaggerated and unduly magni-
fied. Russia could not, even if she wished, achieve
such aggression into the heart of Asia; she was much
too weak internally; then too, one can now prove
historically, that responsible Russian statesmen never
seriously considered such plans. They themselves
would have been frightened had they been obliged
to carry them out. The '70's were a period of great
internal troubles and social discontent m Russia.
The only possible excuse for the British conservatives
of Disraeli's camp, who trembled for their Asiatic pos-
sessions, was their absolute lack of knowledge about
Russia and the Russians; they knew no more about

* Compare Viscount Bryce, Modern Democracies, New York, 1921,
Vol. II, p. 378.

30 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

them than the ancient history of the Aztecs or
Peruvians; the Russian nation remained a constant
riddle to them, unsolved up to the end of the century.

No wonder that in 1879, after the end of the Berlin
Congress, Beaconsfield was boasting of a great diplo-
matic victory, and Gortchakof, on the contrary,
thought that this was one of the darkest pages of Rus-
sian history. These times are long since passed, but
what we have to keep in mind is the fact that it was
this feeling of mutual distrust alone that can explain
the events of the following decade. The intense enmity
that developed in the '80's between Russia and Eng-
land culminated in '85 in the central Asiatic crisis,
notwithstanding the fact that at England's helm stood
for a long time a liberal government, headed by Glad-
stone himself.

We must not minimize the moderating influences of
Gladstone; he at least was never an enemy of Russia
and did his very best to avoid an open conflict. There
were two reasons for this policy of Gladstone: first,
he hated Turkey and appreciated the role Russia
played in liberating the Balkan Slavs, and second, he
was never convinced of the existence of the "Russian
danger" in Asia. On the contrary, in this latter respect
he was even not averse to cooperating at times with
Russia. This was shown, for example, by his assent to
a conference with Russia concerning Greece (1880).

During the '80's Anglo-Russian relations passed
through a double crisis. On the one hand we have the
Bulgarian trouble, and on the other the far more seri-
ous events in this respect in central Asia, south of the
Caucasus,

ENGLAND 31

After the Berlin Congress, England did not want to
see the resurrection of a strong Turkey. England
could not very well stand for the integrity of the Otto-
man Empire, as she herself had occupied Egypt and
meant to retain it. The Porte had to be held down, but
never with the help of Russia. Austria seemed a more
willing and easy ally for such a task. In other words,
England wanted to weaken Turkey, but without any
increase of the influence of Russia. As the latter
country seemed to have established a firm control over
Bulgaria, it was there that England planned- to chal-
lenge her influence, with the willing assistance of
Austria.

Bulgaria at that time had her own troubles. Her
people were striving for more liberty and final eman-
cipation, while the Russian control took the form of
a military and despotic rule of a few uncultivated
generals. Her prince, Alexander of Battenberg, un-
hesitatingly took the side of the people, and with the
help and advice of England stood for a constitutional
government, which only exasperated the Russians,
especially the stubborn and limited Tsar Alexander III.
Things went so far that Russia withdrew from Bul-
garia her representatives and military instructors,
threatened to sever her relations entirely, and showed
in many other ways her open hostility to the Bulgarian
people. The latter succeeded in holding their own only
on account of the united support they received from
Austria and England.^ But, naturally this could not

*It was also due to English help that Bulgaria could retain the
province of Eastern Rumelia, which she annexed, contrary to the
insistence of Russia,

32 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

create any feelings of friendship between Russia and
England.

Germany viewed these intimate relations of Eng-
land and Austria with pleasure, as a counterpart to
Russian strength. In fact Bismarck even miscalcu-
lated in this respect in urging Austria on too much
against Russia, thus spoiling his own relations with
the latter country. As we have seen in respect to
France, this German policy helped very much to bring
about the friendship of Russia with France, frustrat-
ing the former monarchical alliance of the three east-
ern Emperors.

The second crisis of the period mentioned above
concerned central Asia. Russia was slowly but very
steadily moving into central Asia, like a powerful
avalanche, conquering and annexing new territories
and gradually approaching the Indian frontiers. This
last fact was the bugbear of England. The British
government was extremely alarmed by this Russian
expansion, and tried by all sorts of means to put a stop
to it. One of the means they chose was to establish
their own influence over Afghanistan and create out
of the latter a buffer-state between Russia and India.
Russia, on her side, was attempting to spread her influ-
ence all around Afghanistan, in Persia, in Turkestan,
etc. Thus, naturally, a clash of interests became more
or less inevitable. First arose mutual suspicions, then
came accusations of intrigues, flnally, unmitigated
enmity.

Great Britain was not very fortunate in her cen-
tral Asiatic policy either. It was Beaconsfield who
originated the idea of making Afghanistan a buffer

ENGLAND 33

against Russian aggression ; but the Afghans, a wild and
restless people, in no way wanted to lose their inde-
pendence. They fiercely resisted the British intrusion,
murdered some of the English representatives and offi-
cers and declined to have any diplomatic relations with
England. The Afghan war ensued, and General Rob-
erts vanquished them, firmly establishing the English
rule over Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the Russian caravans and merchants
were coming into central Asia, bringing with them not
only Russian goods, but also Russian influences and
policies. Russia consecutively occupied Tashkent,
Samarkand, Krasnovodsk, Khiva, Bokhara, Kokand,
the beautiful oasis of Merv and Murgab and other
minor places. The years 1885-86 were especially
anxious times. Tension between Russia and England
became very great, and at moments it seemed that the
friendly ties would break and war would start. Public
opinion and the press, particularly the conservative
papers, on both sides were full of excitement and hatred
to their opponents, and as usual in such cases, all sorts
of stories and lies were circulated, poisoning the atmos-
phere and making the work of the governments still
more difficult. Reading, in the present day, the
memoirs or papers of those days, one sometimes won-
ders how peace could have been maintained under such
circumstances.

The storm finally blew over, but it left behind it a
very unpleasant, not to say dangerous, aftermath. At
the least provocation from either side, this enmity
flared up again. The feeling of mutual distrust and
hostility developed strong roots, which spread deep

34 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

into the psychology of these two nations; it took $,
verj long while and quite unusual circumstances to
eradicate the enmity between the Russians and the
English. During many succeeding conflicts and dip-
lomatic entanglements do we often find traces of this
national hostility. Germany, with her mechanical
conception of international relations, was strongly
counting on this enmity, when she was diligently pre-
paring for the World War. She was hoping that the
hostility between England and Russia would help her
to detach Russia from the Entente and bring her over
on to the side of the Teutonic powers. One might
judge how strong these feelings of mutual dislike were
at this epoch by the recently published new memoirs of
Prince Kropotkine, the famous revolutionary. No
one would accuse him of being either prejudiced in any
way, or narrow-minded in general. He was then living
in exile in England, but kept up a lively correspond-
ence with some of his friends, in Russia. In one of his
letters he tells us that up to the very end of the cen-
tury there was spread among Russians in England a
rather doubtful legend, about the English policies of
the '80's. It was said that since 1885 England was
working for a coalition against Russia, with the object
of securing Poland and the Ukraine for Austria,
Bessarabia for Rumania plus a part of the Kherson
province including Odessa; Germany was to receive
the Baltic provinces, Sweden was to get Finland, and
England herself the Transcaspian provinces and a
protectorate over the Caucasus. The gossip went, that
it was the French ambassador in St. Petersburg who
told Alexander III about this plan and that that was

ENGLAND 35

the real cause that forced the Tsar to conclude an
alliance with France. Si non e vero, e ben trovato;
we might add, the story is not a true one, but the spirit
of it strikes at the very heart of the relations between
Russia and England, of those days. It explains at
least one phase of the gradual inclination of Russia
toward France.

Most interesting, however, is the fact that just
those ideas concerning the partition of Russia did
actuate repeatedly both England and Germany, and
the influence of some of them is being felt even at the
present day. Speaking once to Kropotkine, Joseph
Cowen asked him : "Will you divide Russia, when you
get a constitution?" "No," said Kropotkine, "we will
have a federation, excepting Poland." "You could see
his disappointment," adds Kropotkine in his letter.
This attitude even of enlightened Englishmen is ex-
tremely characteristic.

The Anglo-Russian hostility of the '80's had only
one unexpected good consequence, namely the
strengthening of the bonds between Russia and
France. The latter country also had several reasons
to dislike the policy of Great Britain. France and
England were by no means friendly, and it was only
natural that the Tsar Alexander III, in order to sup-
port his own anti-English policy and oppose Bis-
marck's aggression, turned finally to France, though
personally he did not like the French people and their
political institutions. In other words, English hostil-
ity unexpectedly was helping the establishment of the
Franco-Russian rapprochement, which later developed
into an alliance.

36 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

II.

in the following decade of the '90's there arose new
and unexpected difficulties, this time on account of the
Armenian massacres (Sassoon, Bitlis, Mush). Euro-
pean public opinion was very much aroused by these
horrors perpetrated at the instigation of the Sultan;
especially in England people were clamoring for pres-
sure to be put on Turkey to make her cease these
persecutions. Unfortunately, the initiative of the
British cabinet met with stern opposition in St.
Petersburg, and I am sorry to say much of this action
of Russia seems to have been based upon criminally
personal motives of Prince Lobanoff, the Russian for-
eign minister. Without the cooperation of Russia,
England certainly could not succeed in forcing the
Porte to make amends and stop the Armenian terror.
It is possibly the best example of the pernicious con-
sequences created in the East by the mutual distrust
and quarrels of the European Powers.

In that same period of the '90's, however, England did
succeed in reaching a measure of understanding with
Russia concerning central Asia. Thus an agreement
was signed in 1893, recognizing the British influence in
Afghanistan, and another one delineating the spheres of
interest in Tibet. For a time it seemed as though the
two powers would be able henceforward to cooperate,
at least in those regions. Consequent events proved,
however, the futility of such hopes. Very soon the
former hostility once more predominated.

At that moment we find the personality of Witte
looming up suddenly and standing far above the other

ENGLAND 37

Russian statesmen, on account of his extraordinary
intellect and wonderful energy.

He started, for instance, in Persia an experiment
which he developed later on a much larger scale in
China; he founded a Russian bank, controlled, financed
and directed by the Russian government. The idea of
the establishment of this Russo-Persian bank was to
spread through its means Russian influence into Persia,
the Persian market, the railroads, etc., a regular plan
of "peaceful penetration," that would carry Russia
through Persia, right to the coast of the Persian Gulf.
Englishmen very naturally became much alarmed.
The bank was also a powerful channel of influence
upon the Persian government, where personal per-
suasion was duly coupled with financial assistance.
We must note in this respect that the policy of Witte,
coincides with a similar policy of Germany, trying
to get a railroad outlet to Koweit, on the Persian Gulf
and link it later with the Bagdad Railroad. There is
all reason to believe that Witte acted with the under-
standing and consent of Berlin; he was constantly in
close touch with the Germans.

The Boer war could not help to improve the relations
between Russia and England. On the contrary, it
was another outburst of the old enmity; no doubt
Germany was much to blame for this. The Kaiser and
his ministers tried their very best to arouse an anti-
British feeling among the Russians. Russia twice
asked the French government to intervene and offer
mediation, but in both cases behind the back of the
Russian government we easily discern Berlin; the
Kaiser repeatedly urged the Tsar to take active steps

38 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

in this direction; the incident with the Kruger tele-
gram is too well known to need description in this
place. France on her side referred Russia to Ger-
many, declining to interfere on their account.

Finally, the last and probably the most dangerous
break between Russia and England came at the time
of the Japanese war. From the very beginning of the
hostilities, the sympathies of the English were with
the Japanese. England was viewing with great dis-
trust and anxiety the Russian expansion into Man-
churia. This was one of the main motives that forced
upon her the Japanese Alliance.

As Kropotkine tells us in his correspondence, Eng-
lish public opinion was whole-heartedly on the side of
Japan and foretold from the first the Russian defeat,
applauding every Russian reverse, as it occurred.

The Dogger Bank incident was the climax of this
hostility ; ^ We certainly were on the very verge of
war. The inexcusable action of the Russian admiral
called forth such a storm of indignation in England
that many contemporaries were quite convinced that a
declaration of war would follow within a few days.^

^ The Dogger Bank dispute was settled by a declaration dated
November 25, 1904.

^Though no excuse exists for Rojdestvensky's action, there is an
explanation for his foolishness. During the war there existed an
active Japanese propaganda among the Russian revolutionaries,
directed toward the disruption of the Russian Empire; the Japanese
paid Russian revolutionaries, Finns, and others, substantial sums
in order to weaken Russia by their revolutionary activities, a
method very successfully used by the Germans ten years later.
The Japanese also had numerous agents in Scandinavia, who sent
out alarming messages to the Russian fleet proceeding to the Far
East, in order to scare the commander and give the impression that
Japan had torpedo-boats in the North Sea, awaiting the passage
of the Russian squadron; it was these messages that fooled the
overstrained admiral and made him fire at defenseless English
fishermen.

ENGLAND 39

We can easily recognize in this case the resurrection
of the old hostility between the two people, which had
back of it so many years of mutual suspicions and
distrust.

Two factors, however, saved the situation at the
eleventh hour; the Anglo-French entente, which was
then just crystallizing, and the fear on the part of
England and France of a Russo-German alliance; the
latter was very strongly urged upon Russia by the
Kaiser, whose feelings at the time were highly anti-
British; he did his best to convince the Tsar that
England was their common enemy and that the only
salvation would be a strong Russo-German agreement.^
France was terribly afraid of this, rightly considering
that it was a menace to her and to the Franco-Russian
alliance, which might easily fall to pieces. Wilhelm,
on the other hand, was surely considering such an
eventuality! This actuated the French government,
just then so ably counselled by their foreign minister
Delcasse, to make every possible effort and exert
strong pressure upon England in order to avoid an
open break between that country and Russia. Arbi-
tration in such a case was the only possible means,
and as is well known, France was entirely successful.
As soon as England consented to arbitrate the Dogger
Bank case, the danger was over and the future Entente
thus was made possible.

The storm had blown over and for a long while
enmity between Russia and England had disap-
peared.

^This feeling of a common danger from Great Britain had its
repercussion in the Bjorko agreement, having personally influenced
the Tsar when he gave his consent and signature.

40 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

III.

This great diplomatic and peaceful success achieved,
France set herself to slowly building up the long de-
sired entente between the three countries and against
Germany. It was at that time that the French found
a staunch friend in unexpected quarters. We mean
the personality of King Edward VII.^ Very shrewd,
subtle in his ways, agreeable and polite in his manners,
Edward proved to be a great factor in European diplo-
macy of those years. He was constantly travelling
about, seeing the crowned heads of states, interview-
ing the prime ministers and himself steadily moving
in one direction, having in view one object, the cur-
tailment of German aggression and creation of such
conditions as would thwart the ambitions of his
nephew, the Kaiser. Whatever one might think of
Edward personally, no one can deny his great diplo-
matic skUl, as well as his foresight. He evidently
realized from the very first the dangers that were con-
cealed in the imperialistic plans of Berlin, and he
subtly set himself to destroy them at their very source
and inception. This is the policy that the Germans
have called the "Encirclement of Germany" ^ and that
was a menace, not to the German nation, but exclu-
sively to the Kaiser's plans for imperialistic expansion.

King Edward and his government could well con-
sider at that time that the Russian danger or imperial-

* Queen Victoria died in January, 1901.

* King Edward VII's authorship of the encirclement theory, is ques-
tionable, but he took a very active part in carrying it through.
See Sidney Lee, Article on King Edward in the Dictionary of Nat'l
Biography.

ENGLAND 41

ism was dead or at least fatally crippled, and thus for
England there could only accrue advantage from a
rapprochement with Russia, as against Germany.

Indeed, in the Far East the danger of Russian ag-
gression had vanished with the victory of Japan, ap-
parently for ever. Japan herself was quite willing to
follow England's lead without any protest. In Cen-
tral Asia things had turned all Britain's way : the expe-
dition of Colonel Younghusband assured English in-
fluences in Tibet (Treaty of 1906) ; Afghanistan was
previously secured; in Persia Lord Curzon thwarted
successfully the Persian Gulf plans of Russia. Finally
in the Balkan question, Russia's weakness also dimin-
ished her influence and helped to pacify English fears.
Thus England began to feel her way very cautiously
towards establishing better relations with Russia. She
had to be very careful, however, considering the past
hostility.

The first step in this direction was the letter of Lord
Lansdowne to Sir Charles Hardinge, ambassador at
St. Petersburg (September, 1905), explaining the
Anglo-Japanese alliance as being in no way directed
against Russia; the alliance was meant to be a purely
pacific instrument. The next step was a certain pres-
sure put on Japan during the Portsmouth peace trans-
actions counselling moderation and letting Russia
know about this.

Further, in Algeziras both countries supported
France and also cooperated in Constantinople. In
other words, England tried everywhere to show that
she was ready to support the Russian policies.

Later, in the summer of 1907, a Russian squadron

42 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

visited England and was very cordially received. The
same year a convention was signed August 31, 1907,
concerning Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. According
to this agreement, Persia was divided into three zones
of influence, Afghanistan was recognized as being ex-
clusively under English influence, and Tibet was made
semi-independent, the powers promising not to send
to Lhassa any diplomatic representatives and ac-
knowledging the agreement concluded by Colonel
Younghusband. Annexed to this convention was a let-
ter of Sir Edward Grey to Sir Arthur Nicholson, am-
bassador at St. Petersburg, explaining the situation in
the Persian Gulf.

Finally, in 1908, Edward VII went personally to see
the Tsar. On June 10 they met at Reval, both being
accompanied by representatives of their governments,
the Tsar by Iswolsky, the King by Sir Charles Har-
dinge.

This seemed a dangerous setback to Germany, not
only to the Kaiser and his government, who were
very much alarmed, but to many German publicists
too. Maximilian Harden, for instance, wrote fiery
articles in his paper, the Zukunft, about the imminent
danger that was threatening Germany. The Germans
realized for the first time that they were being encir-
cled. The most important immediate consequence of
Edward's visit to Reval was the Turkish revolution,
which in a way was prompted by it and which upset
at once the whole equilibrium of the Balkans.

In other words, gradually and slowly the conviction
was beginning to grow among more far-seeing English-
men that it was Germany and not Russia who was

ENGLAND 43

the real enemy of Great Britain. The policy of
Edward VII helped to spread these ideas. The Ger-
man nation was growing in strength and numbers very
fast; in a short period it increased from 40 to 55 mil-
lions; the German government began to have im-
perialistic designs in Africa, whereas before Germany
seemed very little interested in colonies and colonial
policies, Bismarck even priding himself on not having
any colonial policy; now she started to make her influ-
ence felt both in southwest and southeast Africa.
Then came the Morocco incident. China too was ex-
periencing German interference. Germany was very
successful in acquiring Kiao-chow and partaking in
the Russian aggression in the Far East, urging on the
Tsar in his shortsighted policy. German trade in
China was also prospering and beginning to compete
successfully with the English. Finally in the Balkans,
especially in Turkey, the German hand was now felt
very much and German influences weighed very
heavily; there too, German goods began rapidly to
replace English goods. The trade mark "made in
Germany" was everywhere in evidence, and with it
spread the German political influence at a tremendous
rate. The Bagdad Railroad scheme, the influence of
Germany on the Young Turks, who were educated in
German political and military ideas, the Turkish army
reorganized, armed and instructed by Germans — all
proved the increasing German influence and the re-
markable growth of German authority.

On the other hand it was quite evident to English-
men that Russia was no possible competitor. Politi-
cally she was very weak after the Japanese war, eco-

44 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

nomically she was concentrating all her attention on
her industrial development. She gave way entirely
in central Asia, the Far East was out of the question,
and there remained only the Balkans and Constanti-
nople, where England knew she could reach some
workable understanding with the Russian government.

All this helped to establish the Triple Entente. Its
real start was the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907
concerning central Asia; its practical test came later,
during the Balkan troubles that developed after the
Turkish revolution of 1908, and particularly at the
time of the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913.

The Turkish revolution forcibly opened the eyes of
Englishmen as to the extent -of the German influence
in Constantinople. England, therefore, willingly co-
operated with Russia in the Turkish question, assist-
ing Russia in her endeavors to force reforms on the
Young Turks. Of even greater importance was the
Anglo-Russian cooperation during the Balkan wars,
when this feud was being liquidated in London. Sir
Edward Grey helped immensely in trying to settle the
trouble and worked hand-in-hand with the Russian
government.

The appointment of Delcasse, the creator of the
Anglo-French Entente, as ambassador to St. Peters-
burg (February, 1913), where he was soon to be joined
by General Joffre, the future commander-in-chief of
the French armies, was also meant to strengthen the
Anglo-Russian unity.

France was now sure of her position. Her ambition
was realized ; she had a military convention with Rus-
sia assuring the cooperation of these two countries in

ENGLAND 45

times of war. But Russia was still very weak at sea;
her fleet was much weaker than the German fleet, and
the Baltic in consequence seemed at the mercy of
Germany, who could attack Russia at any moment
from Danzig or from Kiel. In order to strengthen
Russia in this respect France was working steadily for
an Anglo-Russian naval accord that would protect the
Russian interests in the Baltic; English friendship
meant English naval assistance to Russia. These
transactions culminated in the signing, just before the
war broke out, of a naval agreement between Russia
and England, thus crowning the French efforts.

The war necessarily consolidated the Anglo-Russian
friendship; though of such recent date, it seemed, at
that time at least, that this friendship superseded the
former enmity.

After the beginning of the war, Russia pressed upon
England the necessity of coming to a final understand-
ing concerning Russia's claims in Constantinople and
the Straits. With some hesitation, England finally
agreed to sign a secret agreement _MarchJ:.,_^^
simultaneously with the Treaty concerning Italy, the
Dalmatian coast and Fiume. According to this agree-
ment the Ottoman_and Austrian empires were to be
divided as^spoils of war^ Russia receiving Constantino-
ple and the Straits. This promise, however, was never
kept. The first thing the Allies did, when they saw
that Russia was going to pieces, was to repudiate this
part of the understanding of- 1915. Already in the
spring of WIT, when M. Albert Thomas, the French
socialist minister, visited St. Petersburg, he told the
Russian provisional government that the Allies repu-

46 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

diated the imperialistic aims of war, but applying it
exclusively to Russia. The treaty with Italy remained
in force, and so did, for a time at least, the agreement
signed by the Allies in February, 1917, concerning the
right bank of the Rhine. The Russian provisional
government, however, to the very last moment of its
existence did not consider these actions as binding
upon Russia. The question of Constantinople and the
Straits was settled by the Turkish peace treaty without
the participation of Russia.

IV.

We must mention in conclusion ascertain phase of
the Anglo-Russian relations that had special impor-
tance, namely the Persian question. It has from our
point of view aTdouble significaiace, first, because it
illustrates how diplomacy worked during the auto-
cratic regime of Russia and second, on account of its
contemporary consequences. Much of what was hap-
pening in Persia during the years 1906-1912 has had
a decided influence on present day events in central
Asia.

As we have mentioned, the Anglo-Russian agree-
ment was finally reached, after long delays, in August,
1907. For a short time it seemed that Russia and
England had at last^tound a solution of the Persian
question. It also promised mutual help and assistance
in all central Asian matters. Persia was divided into
three zones; the south was to be under English, the
north under Russian influence, and a central strip of

ENGLAND 47

land was to remain neutral, where neither of the two
countries could interfere. It meant that Persia from
then on would be the buffer between Asiatic Russia
and British India. This role had previously been
assigned to Afghanistan, and Persia's position now was
a similar one. Afghanistan had not proved to be a
good* buffer; it was no real protection to the English
against the dreaded Russian aggression, but it did help
to bring disorder into Afghanistan and make it a play-
ground of intrigues, Russian as* well as English. It
was a great temptation to the Afghan rulers and their
supporters to make use of European interference for
their own purposes. The necessary consequences were
internal disorders, misrule and governmental chaos.
Exactly the same thing was now bound to happen in
Persia; the buffer was simply moved a trifle north-
wards; that was really all the difference; the line of
contact between the Russian and English spheres was
drawn right across poor Persia. Thus all the evils of
the competition between England and Russia now fell
upon Persia. No wonder that a few liberal statesmen
and scientists, who were personally interested in the
fate of Persia, were heartbroken and violently attacked
the policies of Great Britain and Russia; Professor
E. G. Browne was most prominent among those who
attacked Sir Edward Grey.

The Russian autocratic government did not possess
the necessary inward cohesion and could not very well
control the eastern policies of its bureaucratic repre-
sentatives. Take for example Witte's policy in Persia,
when he established there the Persian Loan Bank in
order to exploit the Persian market and later to get

48 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

an outlet to the Persian Gulf. It was a policy
of intrusion, of sending first agents and then
small military forces which interfered with the local
administration and tried to influence the local govern-
ment. When the western powers protested, St.
Petersburg promised to withdraw, sometimes actually
ordered the withdrawal, but the Russian agents did
not obey and the whole thing continued, gradually
increasing in strength, until a break somewhere would
release the political pressure.

Just such a role was played in 1908 by a Cossack
Colonel, Liakhof, who commanded a detachment of
Cossacks at the Persian capital, Teheran. The Eng-
lish did not like his presence so near the Persian Court
and repeatedly asked Russia for his.recall; St. Peters-
burg promised the recall, but really did nothing.

Then came the personal clash between the diplo-
matic representatives at Teheran. Both countries had
strong men there, unwilling to yield to their adversa-
ries. The Russian minister was Hartwig, the man who
played such an important role later on in Serbia. The
Englishman was Sir George Barclay, no less energetic
and enterprising. At certain periods, during his ab-
sence, Marling, no less strong, was replacing him.
Both were advised by Major C. B. Stokes, the strong-
est enemy of Russia among them all. Finally in 1911
there appeared on the scene the American Treasurer-
General Morgan Shuster, who by his impatience and
unwillingness to compromise soon brought the crisis
to a head. It was distracted Persia who had to foot the
bill and pay for this diplomatic game.

The trouble became acute in Persia in 1911 mainly

ENGLAND 49

for two reasons, first, due to the Mejlis or Persian
Parliament and second, because of the financial catas-
trophe which was threatening the Persian treasury^

Morgan Shuster had a splendid chance of playing
Bismarck's role of "an honest broker" between the two
contending sides, the Russian and English, if only he
could have handled the situation cautiously and tact-
fully. He started, however, just the other way, by
violently antagonising the Russians. Far be it from
me to defend the Russian standpoint, but I think
one can maintain that there might have been a much
more peaceful solution of the Anglo-Russian tension,
than the one brought about by Mr. Shuster in 1911.
One must say, however, that he was not an oflSicial
representative of the United States; on the contrary,
and this was perhaps unfortunate, he managed the
question singlehanded. The moderating influence
from Washington was absent.

Mr. Shuster started by advising the appointment of
Major Stokes as Chief of the Persian gendarmes, who
were expected to keep order all through the country,
but especially at the capital. This act at once aroused
the anger of the Russian representatives. Then fol-
lowed several incidents of personal friction, so that
when the Swedish Colonel Hjalmarsen was finally
appointed to command the gendarmes, it was too late;
the personal relations were hopelessly spoiled.

During the summer of 1911 a civil war broke out in
Persia, one Persian party backing the Mejlis, the other
standing for unmitigated autocracy and the restora-
tion of all the powers of the Shah. Mr. Shuster and
the English sided with the former, the Russians up-

50 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

holding the latter. The new Russian Minister,
Poklevsky-Kozell, presented an ultimatum and finally
Persia had to yield, to the great displeasure of England.
Late in 1911 Colonel Liakhof attacked and took Tehe-
ran with his Cossack brigade. The Mejlis was dis-
missed, the Shah was returned to power and Mr.
Shuster was forced to leave the country. Russia thus
seemed to have triumphed, but not for long.

It was this situation in 1912, when Russia acquired
a free hand in Persia, that called forth a storm of
indignation among the English liberals, who violently
attacked Sir Edward Grey for his seeming connivance
at Russian successes. This case is often cited as one
of the most glaring examples of the dangers of secret
diplomacy.

The English liberals argued as follows: Had Sir
Edward Grey kept his Persian policy less secret, Eng-
lish public opinion would have backed him and never
allowed the Tsar's government to restore Persian
autocracy. This also would have prevented the massa-
cres of 1912, the dissolution of the Mejlis, the victory
of Liakhof and the dismissal of Mr. Shuster. Further,
the events of 1911 and 1912 were deemed to be the
direct cause of the Russian advance in 1913 into the
"neutral zone," of the gradual spread of Russian influ-
ence all over Persia, and finally of the steady prepara-
tion on the part of Russia for the conquest of the whole
of Asia.

Most of these accusations can be dismissed as great
exaggerations, but one must admit some truth in the
statement. It was on account of the secret diplomatic
methods that the English nation could not understand

ENGLAND 51

the real meaning of the Persian policy; Englishmen
were slow to realize the reason for Great Britain's sud-
den change of front. From a life-long enemy of Russia,
she was now turning to be a devoted friend of Russia
and upholding a very obnoxious policy of the Tsar's
government; Englishmen could not understand this
new element of humoring the Russian government in
central Asia and elsewhere, which was really intended
to consolidate the western Entente. ^

The very same arguments apply to Russia, with this
difference that they are in that case a hundredfold
stronger. If there had been less secrecy about the
Russian foreign policy in the Persian question, for
example, many evil consequences would have been
easily avoided. Unfortunately secret diplomacy was
always one of the most dangerous but very much used
weapons of autocracy. It is certain that liberal public
opinion in Russia would have censured the Persian
policy of the Tsar's government even much more se-
verely than did English public opinion. Russian lib-
erals were much more strongly opposed to it than their
British colleagues.

It seems very unfair to accuse Sir Edward Grey, aa
the British liberals did, of having supported the Rus-
sian autocratic claims and methods of action in Persia.
No man on earth can better stand above such personal
suspicions than Lord Grey; he will remain in history
as one of the greatest idealists of our days. The fault
lay with the unfortunate methods of all European
foreign offices, which worked and planned their policy
constantly in absolute secrecy, never taking the nations
into their confidence.

52 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

But there was more to it; the secretive methods of
Downing Street hid away from the British people the
real motives of that new and strange alliance of liberal
England with reactionary Russia. The English nation
did not understand the full meaning of this rapproche-
ment, nor did it realize at large the growing German
danger and that an understanding with Russia had
become so imperative; the alliance with Russia from
the point of view of an uninformed liberal was pre-
posterous; as Professor Browne exclaimed, "It was a
monstrous conception of a peaceful Russia and a bel-
ligerent Germany!" To him, as to so many English-
men, Russia was still the old enemy and constant ag-
gressor. They simply did not know the inner condi-
tions of Russia, her helplessness and revolutionary dis-
content, considering the Kaiser a peacemaker and Ger-
many too, much abused.

These feelings could have been changed, and, I con-
tend, they ought to have been changed by one possible
means, by public discussion of the foreign policy. It
would have helped Russia immensely in forcing upon
her government constitutional reforms, so very much
needed at that moment. Neither the British nor
the French governments realized sufficiently that
they were backing autocracy and not the Russian
nation. On the part of France there might possibly be
found some psychological excuse for such a policy,
explained by her great anxiety created by the very real
German danger, though even then, personally I have
my doubts. In the case of England no possible excuse
exists for this fatal mistake; it seems so much more
strange, because at the head of the British Empire

ENGLAND 53

there stood a liberal government of avowed humane
and democratic principles and ideals.

In the second decade of the twentieth century, the
Russian nation had forgotten the former enmity
against England. When the war began in the summer
of 1914, the enthusiasm of the Russians was tremen-
dous, when they heard that England would partici-
pate. They felt a peculiar assurance that for that rea-
son alone the war would be won.

CHAPTER III.

CHINA.
I.

Russia's intercourse with China dates from the
early part of the eighteenth century, and these trade re-
lations have always been most amicable. We know of
the Russian religious missions, of the appointment of
consuls and agents, and also of the Russian-Chinese
tea trade. Russia's relations with China might well be
divided into two periods: the first ending about the
middle of the nineteenth century, ever peaceful, with
Russia alone in the north to deal with China; the sec-
ond one, extending from the middle of the nineteenth
century to the present day, during which other powers
appeared, and great competition began.

China's troubles started in the year 1895 with the
conclusion of the unfortunate war with Japan, which
left the young Empire of the Rising Sun the victor.
China was forced to pay a heavy indemnity, with no
money to meet the demand. Her trusted counselor, Sir
Robert Hart, was called in to inform her if there was
any possibility of England coming to her aid by grant-
ing a loan for the payment of the indemnity. Rumors
of this request got noised abroad and the other Euro-
pean powers, afraid that such a loan would give Great
Britain too much influence, at once interfered. Russia,

64

CHINA 55

backed by France, also proposed giving a loan to
China.

After some hesitation China accepted the Russian
offer and on June 24, 1895, the agreement was signed
between the Russian ministry of finance, six French
and four Russian banks and the Chinese plenipoten-
tiaries, granting a loan of 400,000,000 francs to the
Chinese government for thirty-six years, carrying
4 per cent interest.

In order to compete with this arrangement, Ger-
many and England also agreed to grant two loans of
£16,000,000 each, one for thirty-six years at 5 per cent,
the other for forty-five years at 4^^ per cent, both
guaranteed by their respective governments, Germany
and England. All these loans were to be paid from
customs incomes, the tax on salt and the likin.

Thus started the nervous competition between the
great powers, trying to outdo one another in the ex-
ploitation of poor China. Then came the question of
railroad construction. The western powers were also
very eager to build many new railroads to facilitate
their trade and the exploitation of the Chinese market.

At that time the man who had most infiuence in
China was Li-Hung-Chang, a careful and farsighted
statesman, who realized the predicament of his coun-
try, so helpless before the onslaught of European greed-
iness. During his whole life he preferred Russia to the
other countries and always considered Russian sup-
port as the most profitable for China. This policy
called down upon him, from the other powers many
accusations of crimes and immorality, none of which
were ever proved.

56 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

The turning point in China's relations to Russia
came in 1896, when Li was sent by his government as
ambassador extraordinary to attend the coronation of
the Tsar. He later planned a return trip across Europe
and the United States.

Shortly before Li-Hung-Chang left Peking impor-
tant diplomatic conversations took place between
his government and the Russian minister, Count
Cassini, when the whole matter of the Russian rela-
tions, railroad construction included, was discussed
in full detail. A Shanghai newspaper got hold of the
rumor and published an account of a supposed agree-
ment. It subsequently became known as the Cassini
convention, and is often quoted as such by historians
and politicians.^ As a matter of fact there was no
such convention, nor did Cassini sign any agreement
at the time. There took place only preliminary discus-
sions, the conventions being signed later in Europe.
The contents of the article of the Shanghai newspaper,
the China Daily News of March 27, 1896, however,
corresponds somewhat vaguely with what had been
going on in Peking.

The Peking conversations concerned mainly the fol-
lowing points. S. J. Witte, who was then at the head
of the Russian finance ministry, had proposed to
lease a strip of land across Manchuria in order to con-
struct the Siberian railroad in a straight line to Vladi-
vostok, instead of building it in the round-about way
along the Amur River. From the middle of northern

^ Cordier, H., Histoire des relations de la Chine, etc., Paris, 1901-02,
rightly points out that the Shanghai text was vague and inexact.

CHINA 57

Manchuria there was to be built a line south to Port
Arthur, with a branch from Mukden to Shanghaikwan ;
this latter branch to be built by the Chinese, but with
the financial support of Russia. In his Memoirs, pub-
lished in 1921, Witte tells the whole story of these trans-
actions in full detail. His plans were far-reaching and
really meant the peaceful penetration of Russia right
into the heart of China. He considered China a nat-
ural market for Russia and intended to exclude from
it all other competitors. Russia sent a squadron to
Port Arthur, with the consent and support of
France and Germany, to make a demonstration against
Japan and force her to curtail some of her demands on
China. It was Witte who originated the pernicious
idea of taking Port Arthur away from Japan, along
with the Liao-tung peninsula, both of which Japan
had acquired by the Shimonoseki treaty of 1895.^
Witte wanted to prevent the further penetration
of the Japanese into Manchuria and thus eliminate
their competition. He misreckoned, however, in his
calculations, because Russia herself proved much too
weak, economically and politically, to carry on the ex-
ploitation of the Far Eastern market. It led only to
countless complications, for Russia had overreached

* Cordier, loc. cit., seems to think that the initiative was taken by
France, which had addressed a special note to Russia, concerning
Manchuria, a week before the Shimonoseki treaty was signed by
Li Hung Chang, and that Germany at once expressed her consent.
Personally I think Witte is right. These transactions took place
during the whole time of the Shimonoseki treaty negotiations at his
instigation, while Russia was backing Li Hung Chang. It was the
Russian support that gave Li the courage to withstand the Japanese
demands. Russia for example helped to diminish the amount of the
indemnity China was made to pay.

68 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

herself and had thereby created a dangerous enemy for
herself in the nation of Japan, which sooner or later
was bound to take vengeance. Again, in Russia proper,
the Far Eastern plans of Witte created a most unwhole-
some imperialistic development, fostering greed among
all sorts of promoters and adventurers. In his Memoirs
Witte tries to throw the blame of the Russo-Japanese
war on the Russian Court and in particular on General
Kuropatkin and minister von Plehve. Without ex-
culpating them in the least, we must say, however, that
it was much more Witte's own fault, because his "peace-
ful penetration" was in no way less dangerous and also
unavoidably led to a conflict with Japan, which was
bound to disclose Russia's weakness.

Witte, no doubt, was a very clever statesman and
laid his plans very carefully. He realized that the
first attempts of Russia to help China financially with
the backing of French capitalists were insufficient and
in a way incoherent. There was, as we have pointed
out, a great rush at the time for financial assistance to
China. Every power wanted to take part in it. Be-
sides the government loans, there were many private
enterprises ready to start work in China, as for ex-
ample the company of which ex-senator W. D. Wash-
burn was the active head and which failed only be-
cause the State Department declined to back it.

Witte knew of all this and proceeded to work out a
more successful plan. Again with French help he
founded a semi-private, semi-official bank, called the
Russo-Chinese bank, with a capital of 11,250,000 rubles
and 5,000,000 taels. The president was to be a Chinese
figurehead and the active managers, Russians^ work-

CHINA 59

ing under the supervision and direction of Witte's
finance department. It was this bank that was to
build the railroad, exploit the Manchurian market and
carry out Witte's policy of the peaceful penetration of
China. These carefully laid plans of Witte were worked
out in full detail when Li-Hung-Chang reached Russia
in the spring of 1896. Russia had the support of France
and Germany. France looked for a profitable invest-
ment for some of her capital (this was the period of
intensive French financial help to Russia) . The French
were profiting handsomely from their Russian invest-
ments and many of their capitalists were eager to assist
Witte in his policy. Cordier thinks that the starting of
the Russo-Chinese bank was only a natural consequence
of the participation in the loan of French capitalists.
He does not mention, however, that on the Russian side
the bank was a mere tool in the hands of Witte and
that most of the managers and directors were officials
of the finance department and Witte's subordinates.

Germany on her side had other reasons for taking
part in these transactions; her motives were almost ex-
clusively political. She was not averse to seeing Russia
become involved in the Far East question; it was a
sure game for Germany, heads she won and tails Rus-
sia lost. The more Russia became involved in the ques-
tion of China, the less able would she be to take a hand
in the West and support France in her anti-German
policy. Thus Germany looked with a complacent eye
on Russia's new start in the Far East, well realizing the
troubles that were bound to come to her. Most of the
transactions between Witte and Li-Hung-Chang were
known to Berlin.

60 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

While Li was on his way to Russia, some men of
the Tsar's Court, notably the Buriat doctor, Badmaieff,
an irresponsible adventurer, who nevertheless had some
influence with Nicholas, came forward with a project
for building a railroad not across Manchuria, but down
to China across Mongolia (from Kiachta to Peking).
Witte had great difficulties in convincing his govern-
ment of the advantages of the Manchurian line and the
lack of trade through Mongolia. Witte further states
that on account of the foreign minister's absolute lack
of knowledge of the Far East question — Prince Loban-
off was in fact an ignorant man — the Tsar entrusted
him with the whole matter.

Thus it was that Li-Hung-Chang, after his arrival
in Russia had to deal almost exclusively with Witte,
and as a consequence these two men were the ones who
worked out the agreements concerning Manchuria, the
railroad lease (December 16, 1896) and the Russo-
China Bank.

The details of these conventions are well known.
(See W. W. Willoughhy, Foreign Rights and In-
terests in China, 1920.) They created a very complex
international status especially along the railroad line,
where the Russians, though preserving and acknowl-
edging Chinese suzerainty of the leased territory,
yet acquired full rights of government, establishing
their own system of administration, their own courts
of law — mixed tribunals for mixed cases^ — kept their
own police and a special military guard, with the inten-
tion of developing the last named into a regular army
unit.

The visit of Li-Hung-Chang to Russia and all these

CHINA 61

amicable transactions greatly increased the influence
of Russia in China. Shortly thereafter many of the
Englishmen working for the Chinese government (in
the customs service, for example) began to be replaced
by Russians. There appeared new Russian consuls
and vice-consuls, etc. But this was mostly felt in the
dangerous comer of Korea, where Japan had concen-
trated most of her interests. The Korean army was
instructed by Russian oflacers, and the Korean arsenal
was placed under Russian supervision. Li-Hung-Chang
evidently thought that it was profitable for China to
increase Russian influence in Korea in order to oust
the Japanese. However, this line of action proved a
great mistake, for it worked just the other way and
finally lost Korea to China entirely. For a long time
Korea was the storm center in the Far East, just as
in 1894 Korea was the real cause of the Chino- Japanese
war, so was it the cause of the Russo-Japanese war a
decade later. Li-Hung-Chang did not know Russia
as well as he did Japan and was much more afraid of
the latter than he was of Russia's influence. The Rus-
sians seemed to him more genial, more friendly, than
the cold and calculating Japanese, who were for such
a long time China's bitter enemies. This easily ex-
plains why he preferred to depend on Russian help.

II.

During all these years when the European Powers
were trying to outdo one another in getting hold of the
Chinese market and of so much of the Chinese terri-

62 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

tory, the government of the United States alone stood
for the mtegrity of China. America realized that she
could not keep aloof and remain disinterested in what
was going on in the Far East. China was in dire need
of a strong hand to protect her from the invading
foreigners. The assistance of the United States was
consequently more than welcome. It was absolutely
necessary to save China from the encroachments of the
European Powers. The Department of State, ably
led at that time by John Hay, knew quite well that the
only way to save China was by the policy of the so-
called "open door," which alone could restrict Euro-
pean monopolies, b;^ prohibiting secret agreements
forced upon China in order to get from her certain in-
dividual privileges.

The knowledge of what was going on in China was
first brought home to the Americans by Lord Charles
Beresford, who lectured in the United States on his
way home to England, telling them the shocking stories
of the exploitation of China.^ How much official
knowledge there was in London of Beresford's speeches
is not well known, but we may suppose that there was
some at least, for when Secretary Hay issued his famous
note, asking the Powers to recognize and adopt the
policy of the open door for China, England alone
responded. All the other nations contented themselves
with evasive answers, not meaning to stop their ag-
gressiveness. The Russian answer among others was
possibly one of the most unsatisfactory.

This can be easily explained now that we know the

*See Prof. Latane's article in the May number of the World's
Work, 1921.

CHINA 63

history of Russia's plans concerning China in general
and Manchuria in particular. But behind the back of
Russia there loomed the sinister figure of the Kaiser,
urging her on to her foolish effort, for Germany had
nothing to lose.

The fatal years of 1897-1899 saw a further disastrous
step taken by the powers to transform their purely
commercial aggression into military action and occupa-
tion of parts of Chinese territory. Germany was the
first to start the policy, when she suddenly landed a
force, [late in 1897] on the Kwantung peninsula,
without any intention of leaving it there, but simply
for the purpose of egging Russia on. Germany later
assured the powers and China that her force was
merely a surveying party.

Count Muraviev, Russia's very superficial and
ignorant foreign minister, caught at the bait and pro-
posed to the Tsar to secure a naval base for the Rus-
sian fleet, making use of the ports taken away from
Japan in 1895, Port Arthur and Talienwan. In spite
of Witte's protests and the warning of other Russian
statesmen, Muraviev and the Court circles pressed
the Tsar to adopt this project and carry it through to
the great satisfaction of Berlin.

In December 1897 a Russian squadron, commanded
by Admiral Dubassoff, occupied Port Arthur. The
Russian charge d'affaires in Peking informed the
Chinese government that Russia had no intention of
infringing upon Chinese suzerainty, but was there
merely to protect China from the aggression of other
powers (sic!) and that she would willingly withdraw
when the danger was past.

64 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Germany had thus scored a briUiant victory. The
policy of territorial aggression was well started, but
the initiative and moral responsibility fell entirely
upon Russia. This action was bound to weaken Russia
immensely, detract her attention from western Europe
and sooner or later bring her into conflict with Japan.
Germany also exchanged Kwantung for the) much
more advantageous position in Kiaochow, which she
proceeded to occupy. This might be looked upon as
one of the greatest successes of German diplomacy,
though achieved in such a tricky way. Witte alone
among Russians realized how dangerous this step was
and how it involved Russia in unnecessary conflicts,
but even he did not see the whole purport of it. He
was against this policy of the Russian government
mainly because it spoiled his own plans of peaceful
penetration. It altered for instance the whole char-
acter of the Manchurian railroad, which he was con-
structing; it necessarily changed the demeanor of the
Russian officials in China and finally it was bound to
arouse the suspicions of the other great powers. The
Eastern-Chinese railroad was planned by Witte to be
an exclusively peaceful channel of advance, meant for
commerce and culture, without any element of political
aggression. The same could be said about the Russo-
Chinese bank. Now they became the means of supply-
ing military equipment, of transporting troops, and
of financing military enterprises. Even the active di-
rection of the Russian policy in the Far East soon
slipped from the hands of Witte into those of military
leaders like General Kuropatkin.

The act, leasing Port Arthur and Talienwan, in fact

CHINA 65

the leasing of the whole Liaotung peninsula wag
signed and delivered on March 27, 1898, by Li-Hung-
Chang and Chang-Ing-Huan to the Russian charge
d'affaires. The territorial agreement was signed on
May 7. Russia paid a handsome sum to Li-Hung-
Chang and Chang-Ing-Huan for their signatures, and
this fact will always remain a most immoral blot on
the reputations of these famous Chinese statesmen. In
consequence the French occupied Kuangchouwan, May
27, and the English— Wei-Ha- Wei, July 1.

This Russian agreement with China made use of
the same juristic ideas which were laid as a founda-
tion for the Chinese-Eastern railroad line; the terri-
tory leased from China retained nominally the Chinese
suzerainty, the Chinese living on that territory re-
mained Chinese subjects, with allegiance to the gov-
ernment of China and under its laws and courts.
Whereas the Russians were subject to their own laws
and authorities, had their own officials and courts and
were practically the masters of those territories. For
a long time international lawyers did not know how to
construe this new set of facts nor how to fit it into the
general system of international law. The German
jurists with the same problem before them in Kiao-
chow, where similar legal forms were used, created a
special idea of their own, the "public law lease", to
which they really applied the system of the civil law
lease in use in most countries of the civilized world.
This same theory was made^ use of by the Russian
jurists.

Russia, however much as she protested to the con-
trary, was firmly established in these Chinese territories

66 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

and had no idea of withdrawing. It was then that the
comedy was started by promises of withdrawal, which
were not meant to be kept and which deceived no one,
but which proved a powerful argument in the hands of
Russia's enemies. In America especially they created
a very bad impression. It coincided with Hay's pro-
nouncement of the open door policy, which the Ameri-
can people with their usual idealism took very much
to heart; and there was Russia, openly professing to
believe in that principle and promising to foUow it by
withdrawing her troops and releasing the occupied
territories, but as a matter of fact doing the exact op-
posite and establishing her rule more and more firmly.
No wonder Americans were indignant. This explains
the fact that the years, 1898-1905, were the only time
in history that America and Russia were not friends
and Russians were decidedly unpopular in the United
States. This enmity disappeared only after the Rus-
sian defeat by Japan, when Americans realized that
this Far Eastern policy was not the doing of the Rus-
sian nation, but of a very unpopular government,
which lacked the backing of the people.

The shortsighted policy of Russia in the Far East
had another fatal consequence, which still has some
effect even in our days. It was due to Russian aggres-
sion that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded
in 1902.

In 1900 came the frightful Boxer uprising, one of the
most foolish acts of the Chinese Empress-Regent,
which brought upon her and her Empire many dire
complications.

When the uprising was quelled, after much fighting

CHINA 67

and loss of life, the events which followed seemed for
a moment to justify the Russian policy. China was
being torn to pieces by the European powers and the
Russian government was arguing that this was suf-
ficient reason for their own aggression: first, to take
part in the distribution of the spoils and second, to
protect Russian interests along the extensive frontier,
where both countries met. Russia wanted at all costs
to get a free hand in Manchuria and guarantee at the
same time freedom of action in Peking to her friend
and supporter Li-Hung-Chang. The other powers nat-
urally resented this and would not agree. Then began
the game of "grab". Russia succeeded in getting a
concession in Tientsin, occupied Newchwang and
Anshanshan and almost entirely absorbed Manchuria.

Under the pressure of the protests of the powers,
Russia finally concluded a new agreement with China
(the convention of April 8, 1902), by which Chinese
authority was reestablished in Manchuria and Russia
promised once more to withdraw her troops within six
months and to restore the Chinese Eastern railroad to
China, the latter making the necessary reimbursements.
But again none of these promises were fulfilled.

Meanwhile rumors began to spread that Russia was
negotiating new agreements with China, consolidating
her possessions in Manchuria. All through 1903 these
rumors persisted, notwithstanding the energetic pro-
tests of the Russian government. We know now
that the latter was not sincere, and though she did
not sign any specific convention (as the rumors had it),
she certainly did conduct negotiations at Peking with
the view of consolidating her Manchurian acquisitions.

68 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

At that time, however, new developments took place.
The Russian aggression began to spread from Man^
churia into Korea and this called forth the Japanese
opposition. At first Japan seemed to ignore the spread
of Russian influence in Manchuria, but when Russia
began to infringe upon Korea, the Japanese lost pa-
tience and started to prepare for a fight.

There was a period in 1902-1903, when Russia had
full control over Manchuria; her eastern railroads were
just finished and began to show their influence on the
local commerce; Siberia was rejuvenated; the Far East-
em provinces and the Russian Pacific coast were
rapidly developing their trade and so forth. All these
activities were ably supported by the Russo-Chinese
bank, started by Witte. It was probably the most
potent agent in the spread of Russian influence among
the Chinese. It gave them easy and profitable loans,
spread Russian paper currency, which was most popu-
lar among the Chinese, for it not only replaced their
bulky silver money, coins and taels, but also called for
greater confidence and protection from a £:eemingly
very powerful neighbor.

The author had just at that time a chance to wit-
ness personally the effect that the spread of Russian
currency had in Manchuria. It was a deliberate policy
of Witte and was meant to offset somewhat the mili-
tary measures of the Russian government.

Prior to 1903 there is no doubt that at least some
Chinese ofl&cials favored the Russian aggression as an
offset to Japan and England and considered the spread
of Russian influence in Manchuria as an advantage to

CHINA 69

China. Only in 1903 did even they realize that this
policy was creating too much opposition and envy
among the other powers and especially on the part of
Japan. It was only then that Peking became really
alarmed and began to foresee the coming complica-
tions.

It was too late, however. The Russian policy was on
an inclined plane and was bound to run to the bottom.
Japan lost patience and declared war, which brought
upon Russia numerous humiliating defeats, deserved
by her government but disastrous to her people.

After the war the exclusive Russian influence in
China naturally vanished. In her relations with China,
Russia now acted in cooperation with Japan. Only for
a moment did independent Russian action flare up
again in 1912 in the Mongolian question; it died down
finally during the Great War.

Thus in agreement with Japan, Russia consented to
joint action in Manchuria, July 30, 1907. On July 4,
1910 Russia signed a convention with Japan concerning
the improvement of railroad lines and their trafl&c, and
also the construction of a direct railroad from Siberia
to Peking. Then came the secret agreements of 1910
and 1912. The same spirit of cooperation between
Russia and Japan is made still more clear in the agree-
ment between the two Imperial governments of
July 3, 1916. This agreement does not restrict the
understanding solely to Manchuria, but covers on the
contrary the whole of China. This understanding ef-
fectively barred American commerce from Manchuria,
ending the open door policy.

■^

70 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

III.

In recent years the relations between Russia and
China were once more disturbed.

The trouble came through the desire of the Mongol
ruling princes to emancipate themselves from the
Chinese government. Russia at once seized the op-
portunity to establish her hegemony over Mongolia.
On the whole the Mongolian market does not amount
to muchj but there exist very important trade routes
which connect Siberia with inner China. By this route
for example the best tea is imported into Russia from
the Yang-Tse valley.

Mongolia is very sparsely populated, most of its
territory is desert land and only in a few places can
one find inhabited centers. Mongolia is divided into
two uneven parts, the larger one, called Outer Mon-
golia and the smaller southern one, adjoining China,
called Inner Mongolia. The plan of the Russian gov-
ernment was to establish its influence over Outer Mon-
golia and leave Inner Mongolia to the Chinese. In
order to consolidate the Russian influence over this
chosen morsel the government of St. Petersburg was
backing the Mongolian princes and promising them
fuU independence, meaning certainly the separation
from China. These princes, about one hundred and
sixty in all, especially the chief Khutuktu of Urga, were
quite willing to accept Russian dictation, extend their
power and increase their wealth, whereas Peking was
insisting that for centuries Mongolia had been a prov-
ince of the Chinese empire, controlled and governed
by the Chinese.

CHINA 71

In 1881 Russia had signed a very advantageous
treaty with China, securing many privileges along the
Mongolian frontier.^ This treaty was concluded for
ten years and was renewed in 1891 and in 1901 and
was due to be renewed in 1911. Early in 1910 Russia
began to remind China of this treaty and of the neces-
sity to renew it, but the Peking government did not
show great enthusiasm about the matter, nor were any
steps taken in this direction. This annoyed the Rus-
sians and as the time for renewal approached they be-
came more insistent while the Chinese seemed to be-
come more obdurate. In 1911 the Chinese officials be-
gan to levy customs duties in direct opposition to the
provisions of the treaty, which thus seemed to have
lapsed. Then there began riots and disorders among
the Mongolians and the Chinese naturally accused the
Russians of instigating them.

China, however, by this time had her own troubles.
In the province of Szechuen a revolution broke out in
September and in December the Mongolian princes
making the best of this opportunity, at a meeting at
Urga chose the local Khutuktu as the Mongolian Em-
peror, declaring their independence from China. The
Russian officials were certainly in close touch with this
movement.

In 1912 the revolutionary movement became wide-
spread in China and very soon succeeded in overturn-
ing the Imperial government. The Emperor abdicated

^The treaty of 1881 provided, first, that Russia had the right to
have consuls in Mongolia and Turkestan; second, that Russian
merchants were permitted to purchase real-estate, houses, ware-
houses and shops, etc., and third, that a zone should be estabhshed
along the Russo-Chinese frontier within which all imports and ex-
ports were free of duty.

72 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

and a Republic was proclaimed. This was very oppor-
tune for Russia's designs in Mongolia, but even then
the Chinese did not want to give in. The new Chinese
republican government refused to recognize Mon-
golian independence and sanction Russian infringe-
ments upon the sovereignty of China. Russia then de-
cided to use force.

On September 17 the Russian government declared
that they considered the treaty of 1881 still in force and
would act in the future as if the treaty in fact existed.
There cannot be any justification for such highhanded
proceedings. The Russians coolly explained that now
that Manchuria was forever cut off from Siberia by
Japan, nothing remained for Russia but to expand into
Mongolia. This also needs no explanation. There
never existed any serious Russian interests in that field ;
at the best Mongolia was very poor. The policy was
undiluted imperialism, taking advantage of China's
impotence.

At the same time Russia declared that the neutral
zone of 1881 was abolished; this also lacked both legal
and moral justification.

On November 3, 1912, Russia signed a special agree-
ment with "independent Mongolia" pledging Russian
aid for the maintenance of this independence and for
the exclusion of Chinese colonists and troops which
might be sent out by the Peking government. In re-
turn the Mongolians promised all sorts of privileges to
the Russians (freedom of travel and navigation, free-
dom of commerce, extra-territoriality of Russian sub-
jects, consular service, freedom from customs duties,

CHINA 73

and the right to buy and own real estate, along with
many other privileges).

Having reached this agreement with Mongolia, Rus-
sia proceeded to force it upon Japan.

All this took some time, however. A year later, on
November 5, 1913, the necessary exchange of notes
took place betwen Peking and St. Petersburg, recog-
nizing and sanctioning this state of things, certainly
not to the glory of Russia. Yuan Shi-Kai, the strong
man of China, did his best to make the Khutuktu
acknowledge the sovereignty of China, but could not
succeed because of the support Russia gave Mongolia.^
China was thus forced finally to recognize the auto-
nomy of Outer Mongolia.

On September 30, 1914, Russia signed a special
agreement with Mongolia which gave Russia the right
to "advise Mongolia" concerning the building of rail-
roads. As a matter of fact there were no railroads to
speak of in Mongolia.

Finally on June 7, 1915, a tripartite agreement was
signed between Russia, China and Mongolia, provid-
ing a definite legal form for the following conventional
agreements: ^

1. Outer Mongolia, though remaining autonomous,
recognized the Chinese suzerainty over her.

2. The treaty making power remained in China's
hands, although commercial treaties might be nego-
tiated directly by Mongolian authorities.

* China retained her jurisdiction exclusively over the Chinese
residents in Mongolia.

^For details see, the American Journal of International Law,
1916, vol. X, E. T. Williams.

74 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

3. Russia and China recognized the autonomy of
Outer Mongolia, promising to abstain from all inter-
ference with the internal administration of the Mon-
gols.

4. No customs duties exist either on Chinese or Rus-
sian imports into Mongolia.

5. Chinese residents are under Chinese jurisdiction,
Russians under Russian jurisdiction, while special
mixed courts are established for mixed cases, on the
model of the former Russian-Chinese mixed courts of
the Russian-Chinese railroad.

6. China promised to consult Russia on all political
questions concerning Outer Mongolia.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Willoughby, W. W., Foreign Rights and Interests in China, Balti-
more, 1920.

Cordier, Henri, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les Puissances
Occidentaies, Paris, 1901-02.

Hoo Chi Tsai, Bases conventionelles des relations modernes entre
la Chine et la Russie, Paris, 1918.

Amer. Journal of International Law, 1916, vol. X, p. 798.

CHAPTER IV.

JAPAN.
I.

Whereas Russia's relations with China date back
far into the centuries and were mostly of a very peace-
ful character, her relations with Japan are quite recent,
dating back but a few decades and from the very be-
ginning they were exceedingly militant.

The first real contact took place at the time of the
Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and at once hostility was
apparent. Russia was backing Li-Hung-Chang at
Shimonoseki, where the Chino-Japanese peace negotia-
tions were transacted. It was due to Russia's initiative
that the two European powers, France and Germany,
joined with her in partially depriving Japan of the
fruits of her victory, by forcing her to return to China
the Liaotung peninsula and Port Arthur, a splendid
strategic harbor.

In order to understand Russia's action one must re-
member that just at that time she was intent on pene-
trating into northern China in order to take firm hold
on the Manchurian market. Her Pacific Coast plans
were not yet so clear. Japan flushed by her easy vic-
tory over China had also an eye to northern China with
Korea as her immediate objective. If Russia had been
more careful and considerate of her new neighbor, she

75

76 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

could easily have reached at that time at least, a peace-
ful understanding concerning "spheres of influence" at
China's expense. Russia's overbearing attitude towards
Japan in treating the latter as a negligible quantity-
only served to exasperate her and led the Japanese to
increase their claims. The unavoidable result of this
policy was the final clash of arms.

Worst of all for Japan were the events which fol-
lowed the loss of Port Arthur, which alone was an
insult to her pride. Not many months passed before
those very European powers who claimed to stand for
the protection of China began themselves to grab her
territory. And just this same peninsula of Liaotung
and the harbor of Port Arthur were shamelessly an-
nexed (or "leased" as the official documents called it)
by Russia. What could Japan think of European
diplomatic methods after that? And this was the
start of her intimate dealings with Russia, the begin-
ning of a new period and of new relations. No wonder
that these relations from the beginning took the shape
of mutual distrust and dislike. The Japanese are often
accused, especially by Americans, of underhand deal-
ings and diplomatic duplicity but it must be acknowl-
edged that they took their lesson from the European
powers. From the very beginning of her relations with
Europe, Japan found nothing but double play and
trickery and when later during the suppression of the
Boxer uprising she witnessed the looting and robbing
of Chinese homes by Europeans, she must necessarily
have felt grave doubts about the lofty ideals of Euro-
pean civilization. The Chinese riots on the Russian
frontier gave Japan another example of the real atti-

JAPAN 77

tude of Europe; when the riots occurred along the
Amur River the Russian generals there behaved most
cruelly, for not only did they shoot promiscuously all
Chinese in sight, but ordered some of them to be
placed on barges in the river and the barges sunk. A
further example, might be given. Russia first crossed
with Japan concerning Korea in 1895-1896. On Feb-
ruary 10, 1896 Russia even sent marines to Chemulpo
and Seoul; after taking hold of some government
offices, the Russians established themselves in the
Korean capital and obtained a strong influence over
the Korean government. This lasted till the sum-
mer of 1896 when the Lobanoff-Yamagata Protocol
was signed (June 16) defining their mutual interests.
Later on this was confirmed by a similar agreement,
signed at Tokyo by Nishi and Rosen (1898). Both
agreements practically recognized the independence of
Korea.

Thus from the very beginning the relations of Rus-
sia and Japan were marked by a distinct lack of trust
and sincerity. The Japanese knew how to bide their
time and hide their feelings. During those years, Japan
was not yet strong enough to protest vigorously and
unwillingly had to submit.

Then came the Boxer riots, the stupid enterprise of
the Chinese Dowager Empress and the gradual in-
crease of European infringements upon China, her
territories and her markets. Russia especially was very
eager, under the leadership of the clever statesman,
Witte, to establish a firm hold upon Manchuria.
The Russo-Chinese bank, the Chinese Eastern rail-
road and the Siberian expansion all pointed, with un-

78 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

varying clearness, but one way. Japan was bound to
realize that sooner or later Russia would in the Pacific
menace her fondest plans.

With two problems facing her, namely, the seeming
strength, haughtiness, and duplicity of the European
governments on the one hand, and on the other, her
own weakness, which handicapped her in her dealings
even with China, Japan set out to find a friend and an
ally.

Very carefully did she begin to study the complex
situation in Europe, testing the relative strength of
the powers, learning their history, studying their mu-
tual relations and trying to find out future possibilities.
One must acknowledge the great success with which
the task was accomplished. Japan really sized up the
situation extremely well, due to the subtle methods of
investigation she used and to the statesmanlike gifts
of her diplomatic representatives. Baron Hayashi in
this respect ranks foremost among them all, while Mar-
quis Ito was a close second. There existed not nearly
as much absence of teamwork between these two men,
as Mr. Pooley's Memoirs of Hayashi would have us
believe. It was camouflage to a great extent on their
part that made it seem that they were working on
different policies.

Very soon it became evident that Japan's choice
would be England or Russia. France did not count
much in Far-Eastern affairs and Germany did not at
first, seem to attract the sympathies of Japan; much
more likely however Germany was herself not sufficient-
ly interested in the affairs of the Far East. In this
latter respect we might surmise that Berlin purposely

JAPAN 79

tried to confirm this impression of the Japanese; at that
time it was Germany's established policy to push Rus-
sia into the breach and to act exclusively behind Rus-
sia's back.

In 1900 Japan carefully felt her way. In 1901 she
began negotiation^ with England and Russia simul-
taneously ; Hayashi had talks with Lansdowne and Ito
came to St. Petersburg to consult with Witte and Lams-
dorff. Both these Japanese diplomats reported in de-
tail to Tokyo and the Japanese government thus had
a full picture of all the possibilities and contingencies.
Germany was very careful in the role she had chosen ;
between England and Russia she was the tertius gau-
dens. The Secret Memoirs of Baron Hayashi describe
very well how Germany tried to keep in touch with
what was going on in London and at St. Petersburg;
how her representatives called at proper times on the
Japanese diplomats and the local ministers and how
they simulated indignation at being "left out" of the
agreements; how Lansdowne and Lamsdorff tried to
keep the negotiations secret and how the news con-
stantly leaked out. Germany, we think, did not want
to take part in these agreements and much preferred to
have her hands free. The Kaiser was at that time much
too anti-English to enter into an agreement with Great
Britain, and as to Russia, he liked better that the latter
country should pull the chestnuts out of the fire for
him. We can also suppose that the Japanese soon
realized this, but did not care about it one way or the
other. Such lack of desire on Germany's part to be-
come involved in the agreement became quite evident
later on; in February 1902 Komura, then minister of

80 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

foreign affairs, had a talk with the German ambas-
sador at Tokyo, and asked him if Germany would like
to join, but the latter refused.

On the other hand. Marquis Ito found the atti-
tude of the St. Petersburg government much too
haughty, unattractive and overbearing. The Russian
ministers tried to deal with him as they had dealt with
the Chinese ; they treated the Japanese representatives
as inferiors and constantly put forward impossible
claims. In no matter did they want to meet the
Japanese halfway, either in Manchuria, which they
seemed to consider their private property, or concern-
ing Korea, where they wished to have a predominant
influence. There is no doubt that at the beginning
Tokyo would have preferred an agreement with
Russia. Two factors worked strongly in that direction ;
first the idea that Russia was very powerful, and sec-
ond, the conviction that Japan had more in common
with Russia than with England, due to the neighborly
situation in the Far East. An understanding with
Russia would have been so much more natural, even
if it had no moral background of sincerity. Tokyo had
learned not to rely too much on morals when dealing
with Europe. However the Russians spoiled this
chance and the scales began to lean towards England.

Meanwhile Baron Hayashi was cleverly conducting
his negotiations with the British government all
through the summer of 1901. His endeavors were cen-
tered on the question of Korea, which Japan wanted
to secure for herself entirely; she finally succeeded in
doing so.

The treaty of alliance between Japan and England

JAPAN 81

was signed in London, January 30, 1902, by Lansdowno
and Hayashi ; it was to be of ten years' duration.

Hayashi rightly points out the risks of conducting
such double negotiations. It would have been very
embarrassing, for him especially, if Ito had succeeded
simultaneously at St. Petersburg. Personally we think
that Japan would then have dropped the negotiations
with England. Later, however, things changed ma-
terially and Japan was exceedingly happy to have Eng-
land as an ally instead of Russia. From this point of
view the overbearing policy of Witte and Lamsdorff
was certainly a very grave and unpardonable mistake ;
it was however unfortunately in harmony with the
general policy of the Russian government and brought
forth its worst results two years later.

II.

Having secured an ally in Europe, Japan naturally
felt steadier on her feet and began to assert her claims
concerning China and the Far East with much greater
firmness. On her side, Russia showed signs of greater
aggressiveness and less understanding of the Japanese
point of view.

The Russian government refused to take into con-
sideration, even in~-the slightest degree, the Japanese
interests. She was thus proceeding headlong into a
disastrous conflict. The author can speak from per-
sonal experience, for he spent the winter of 1902-1903
in Manchuria, Port Arthur, Shanghai and Peking, and
saw the slow but steady growth of Japanese prepara-

82 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

tions for an armed conflict. The strength of the Japan-
ese was increasing daily and parallel to this was aug-
menting the lack of understanding on the part of Rus-
sian bureaucrats. It was really tragic to return to St.
Petersburg in the spring of 1903 and realize how little
attention was paid there to the Japanese claims and
how little people understood the strength of Japan and
the danger of a conflict with her. In Russia, and this
applies to the government as well as to public opinion
in general, there was nothing but derision towards the
Japanese. No one wanted to take them seriously,
hardly any one ever gave a thought to Far Eastern
events. Russians gave the government a free hand in
these affairs and we know now what a criminal use was
made of this opportunity.

It was during the author's stay at Port Arthur, that
he and his colleagues first heard of the new enterprise
of the Russian government in Korea, the most foolish
and criminal one ever undertaken there.

A few unscrupulous adventurers, a former officer of
the guards, Besobrasoff, an admiral, Abaza, and a few
less known men had succeeded in persuading the Tsar
of the wonderful possibilities of exploiting the natural
resources of Korea. These resources, no doubt, were
of a remarkable financial potentiality, and Japan weU
realizing this wished to acquire them herself, and was
in no way inclined to allow Russia or anyone else to
interfere in Korea. This latter fact was clearly evident
in the Far East, whereas in St. Petersburg not a single
person, except perhaps Witte, paid the slightest atten-
tion to it. The Tsar and several members of his family
invested their personal capital in the Besobrasoff eon-

JAPAN 83

cession on the Yalu River and made the whole enter-
prise a personal affair. This at once became a tempting
bait for unscrupulous bureaucrats and officials, who
thought that they could further their own career by
helping with the concession. An especially ugly role
was played by the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeiev, who was
sufficiently clever to realize the dangers that this enter-
prise implied; living himself in Port Arthur, he could
not but know the complications that were bound to
arise and the protests that were certain to come from
the Japanese. Yet he never thought of protesting vig-
orously, or of tendering his resignation, though the acts
of Besobrasoff on the Yalu were even challenging his
vice-regal prestige. He was the official link between
the Russians and Japanese and was obliged to tell the
Japanese all sorts of stories about the Korean plans of
Russia, which he knew were not true and which he
knew that the Japanese did not believe.

Much heavier blame however falls upon some of the
Tsar's ministers, as well as on himself. Besobrasoff,
Abaza and their men were simply promoters and ad-
venturers and could do their mischief only because they
had such a strong backing in the Russian government
circles, whereas the ministers had no such excuse.

The psychology of the Tsar in this case is explained
by his absolute contempt of Japan, on the one hand,
perhaps even with a tinge of vengeance at the back
of it, for he was wounded in the head by a Japanese at
the time of his visit to the Far East, and on the other
hand, by his conceit and conviction that he, the Lord's
anointed, could do no wrong (especially in dealing with
inferiors). It was also one of the most pernicious influ-

84 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

ences of the Kaiser that told in this case very strongly.
Wilhelm was consciously and cleverly urging the
Tsar on to such a conflict, upholding his conviction of
superiority over the Japanese and flattering him into
complacency. His game was a sure one too ; Germany
could only win, Russia could only lose. However, this
was but a weak excuse for Nicholas; he might have
known better and there are indications that he was not
so averse to war as he wanted people to believe. He
was so sure of himself and of the strength of his army
that he firmly believed in a brilliant and easy victory
over the despised Japanese.

Among the ministers, the chief culprits (because
their policy was nothing short of a national crime)
were General Kuropatkin, the minister of war, and
von Plehve, the minister of the interior. They were
actuated however by different motives. Witte's share
of the blame was less serious. Though he started the
fateful policy of peaceful penetration of Manchuria
and Russian expansion in the Far East, he never, even
for a moment, contemplated any military action, never
planned to spread Russian influence farther than Man-
churia proper and finally realizing very early in the
game to what dangerous consequences the Russian
policy in the Far East wasJeading, he warned the
other ministers and tried to put on the brakes, but
unfortunately it was too late. Kuropatkin was a
typical aggressive general, convinced of the strength
of his army and of the sanctity of the autocratic regime
of his government. Witte, for example, writes in his
Memoirs of how Kuropatkin hailed Russian aggression
in Manchuria, his plan being "to seize that province

JAPAN 85

and turn it into a second Bokhara." He played no
mean role either in the repressive policy against the
Boxers, supporting with joy the "punitive expedition"
that looted China and the Chinese. In the West Kuro-
patkin was not less aggressive ; it was due to him that
the idea started of exerting pressure upon Sweden by
fortifying Finland and making it one with Russia-
It was due to Kuropatkin's counsel that Russia did not
withdraw her troops from Manchuria, and repeatedly
broke faith with the other powers, thus effectively un-
dermining her prestige abroad. In November 1902
Kuropatkin was sent by the Tsar to Japan and the
Far East. Here he became convinced of the strength
of Japan and of the dangers coupled with the Beso-
brasoff expedition and warned the Tsar. It was too
late, however, for these policies were well started and
the Tsar was too firmly convinced of Japan's inferior-
ity. This warning of Kuropatkin does not lessen hig
culpability.

The other culprit, Plehve, played his part also by
urging drastic measures against Japan but for different
reasons. As minister of the interior he had to deal
with the Russian revolutionaries and the constantly
growing social discontent. At that time Russia was
seething with revolution ^-and Plehve conceived the
awful idea of recurring to the Machiavellian princi-
ple : "when troubles threaten at home, start a foreign
war." He told the other ministers that he did not mind
the complications with Japan, that as a matter of fact
he was glad of it: "A little war will help us very much."
The war, however, proved to be neither "little," nor a
"help" to these men.

86 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

It is interesting to note the fate of these three men,
implicated in the Japanese embroglio. Witte was
destined to settle the trouble and sign the peace for a
defeated nation, gaining all that it was possible to gain
under the circumstances, but losing his own standing
and popularity among his people and with his govern-
ment. General Kuropatkin was appointed after some
hesitation, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies
against Japan, had to lead the bad generals of his own
appointment and creation ^ and sustained defeat after
defeat, till he was finally demoted. Plehve was as-
sassinated by revolutionaries, whom he never succeeded
in curbing though he did succeed in demoralizing the
system of his autocratic government.

In the summer of 1903 Japan made the last effort to
settle the trouble amicably by renewing negotiations
with St. Petersburg, but met with the same reluctance
on the part of Russia to give any decisive answer.
Russia's replies were as evasive and unsatisfactory as
they had previously been. Witte describes this in a
striking sentence, "We were headed straight for war
and at the same time we did nothing to prepare our-
selves for the eventuality. We acted as if we were cer-
tain that the Japanese would endure everything with-
out daring to attack us." This was absolutely true,
Russia directly provoked the war by her foolish policy
while not really lifting a finger to prepare for. it.

On January 16, 1904, Japan finally lost patience and

* Though most of the very poor generals sent out to command
the Russian troops in Manchuria were chosen either by the Tsar or
by influences at Court, their promotions depended exclusively on
Kuropatkin, who as minister of war, selected them chiefly for the
pull they had at Court.

JAPAN 87

presented an ultimatum. She was ready to recognize
Russian interests in Manchuria, provided Russia would
recognize her interests, especially in Korea. The answer
was again very unsatisfactory. The Tsar, it was said,
did not want war, the people did not want it and they
did not expect it. In consequence it was a genuine
surprise to the Russian government, when on. the
night of February 8, the Japanese destroyers entered
Port Arthur and fired torpedoes at Russian battleships,
unprepared and unprotected. On the following day
war was declared.

The war was never popular with the Russian na-
tion. From the very beginning Russia was against it,
not even understanding why she was fighting Japan.
Under such conditions defeat was unavoidable. The
people did not back the government in -any way and
instead of bringing with it popular enthusiasm that
would have diminished social discontent and weakened
the revolutionary movement, as Plehve expected, the
war called forth the exactly opposite results — the grad-
ual spread of dissatisfaction among the people, which
rose to a climax in the summer of 1905, when the condi-
tions in the army were at their worst.

The situation became so threatening that in July
the Tsar had finally to give in. He sought peace abroad
and made constitutional concessions at home, all under
the direct pressure of fear. The initiative of the peace
negotiations came, as is well known, from President
Roosevelt. After some hesitation the Tsar appointed
Witte as the chief representative of Russia, probably
her cleverest man, but unfortunately lacking in firm
moral principles.

88 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Witte gives a vivid account, in his Memoirs (Chap.
V) of the Portsmouth Peace Conference and of how he
won a brilliant diplomatic victory, nearly succeeding in
annihilating the Japanese military achievements. At
the same time he also succeeded in another, no less im-
portant task of swinging American public opinion from
open hostility to hearty sympathy. This part of his
story concerning his dealings with the American press
and his personal endeavors in the United States is
most instructive and clearly shows the force of public
opinion in our days. Contrast only his seeming open-
mindedness and civility to the pressmen with the cold
aloofness of the Japanese, enshrined in their dignity,
secluded and secretive, and you will easily understand
the results and consequences! In the space of a few
weeks, American public opinion was entirely on the
side of Russia and against Japan, whereas during the
war and previous to it, while Russia was dickering in
Manchuria, the trend of American feelings was just the
opposite — wholeheartedly back of Japan.

There is no doubt whatever that this change,
achieved among Americans affected the peace negotia-
tions and helped Witte to gain the upper hand.
- Not doubting Roosevelt's sincerity, we can at pres^
ent question his wisdom in forcing this peace upon
Russia. Not that we could have expected a victory
or even military achievements for Russia, but Japan
might have learned a lesson which would have changed
much of the succeeding events throughout the world.
As a matter of fact Russia's condition and the state of
her army could not have become much worse if the war
had dragged on a few months longer. The Russian

JAPAN 89

army would never have been able to show much energy,
but her internal troubles would have increased and
forced the government to grant more reforms, estab-
lishing in a firmer way the principles of constitutional
government, for which she was quite ready, but which
neither the Tsar nor the ruling class were yet ready
to grant. What they did grant they tried to take back
as soon as the social discontent quieted down. Again,
the continuation of the war would have brought im-
portant changes in Japan. Japan at that moment was
at the end of her tether. Roosevelt, in other words,
saved Japan from an economic collapse that might
have called for constitutional reforms in Japan also,
and only the latter could be a reliable guarantee against
the development of imperialism in the Pacific.

III.

The Portsmouth Peace Treaty, September 5, 1905,
returned to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula with Port
Arthur and Talienwan or Dalny, which she had lost
after the peace of Shimonoseki, owing to the "friendly
advice" of Russia, Germany and France. But it gave
Japan much more than that. The Russians had built
up and developed Port Arthur and Dalny ; Port Arthur
became a first class fortress and was a splendidly
equipped harbor for the Japanese navy, while Dalny
became a very convenient port for commercial shipping.
Further, Japan received the South Manchurian rail-
road and could thus spread her influence^ unhampered
all over Manchuria, practically controlling that market

90 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

as she saw fit. From that moment on Japan began to
look upon Manchuria as she formerly looked upon
Korea, as a sphere for her exclusive influence, where no
other power should interfere. To Russia all this meant
pure loss, to the rest of the world it was simply a change
in tenants. Russian domination was now replaced by
Japanese domination, but the door to Manchuria, the
"open door" was tighter closed than ever. In addition
Russia ceded the southern half of the island of Sak-
halin, with its natural resources of no mean value.
On the other hand Witte succeeded in thwarting the
Japanese desire for an indemnity; they asked for six
hundred million dollars, but had to withdraw the claim
before the treaty was signed.

The peace treaty was naturally only the first step in
the adjustment of the Russo-Japanese relations after
the war. China too had to be considered, in some way
at least. There had to follow, consequently, an agree-
ment between Japan and China, which was signed in
December 1905, sanctioning the transfer of territory as
arranged by the Russo-Japanese treaty. The legal
forms of these transfers were similar to the preceding
arrangements with the other powers, viz., the sover-
eignty of China was recognized, but the government
and administration were to be entrusted to Japan on
the model of the civil law lease.

Later followed new agreements between Russia and
Japan, signed during the summer of 1907. One con-
vention (signed June 13) concerned the detailed rail-
road arrangements, junctions, etc., between the East-
ern Siberian railroad and the Southern Japanese sec-
tion. Two other conventions were signed July 28; one

JAPAN 91

concerned commerce and navigation and the other the
fisheries on the Pacific coast, especially in the Behring
and Okhotsk seas. Finally on July 30 Iswolsky, minis-
ter of foreign affairs, and Motono, Japanese ambas-
sador in St. Petersburg, signed a general agreement de-
fining their respective interests in the Far East.

Still later, on the same principle of amicable coopera-
tion between these former enemies and now close
friends, two new conventions were signed July 4, 1910
and July 8, 1912. These conventions concerned the
joint action of Japan and Russia in Manchuria and
were meant to reaffirm the policy of exclusion of the-
other countries. The first confirmed the status quo
ante of reciprocity between Russia and Japan, while
the other related to the railroad lines in Manchuria,
their improvement and expansion. The understanding
of 1910 was, as a matter of fact, an answer to the
American and other inquiries, relating to the open
door policy. The Western powers were asking
whether Japan and Russia were prepared to accept this
principle and give other nations a chance to trade in
the North-China market. The answer was a decisive
refusal, for neither Russia nor Japan was willing to
admit foreign participation in their Manchurian com-
merce. They eagerly combined to shut out any pos-
sible competition.

Finally, in still clearer terms these same principles
of cooperation, of mutual help and of recognition were
stated in the last agreement signed by Russia and
Japan, in the treaty of July 3, 1916. This agree-
ment also mentioned mutual military assistance in
the war against Germany then going on. The worst

92 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

of it in this last case was that it was not restricted,
as the previous arrangements had been, to North-
China and Manchuria only, but on the contrary, cov-
ered the entire field of the Far East.

Thus ended the short feud between Russia and
Japan, passing away as suddenly as it came. If we
now look back at the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1901-
1905 we can easily see its characteristic artificiality. It
was so unnatural and unnecessary and could have been
so easily avoided if each side had been willing to con-
cede a little to its opponent. Especially does this fault
lie with Russia. Her policy towards Japan was the
height of foolishness and political shortsightedness; it
will always remain a terrible indictment against the
Tsar Nicholas and his immediate counselors, and it
will ever be a striking example of the dangers of secret
diplomacy. Had there been more light thrown on the
mutual relations of those two countries, as they were
developing during these fateful years, the danger might
have been avoided or at least lessened.

After the war and the peace treaty of Portsmouth
had become history, Russia soon seemed to forget her
ill-feeling towards Japan and in later years there did
not exist any desire for vengeance, or enmity towards
the Japanese. This fact is best witnessed by the ease
with which the mutual agreements that followed the
Portsmouth peace were reached and approved by the
two nations.

CHAPTER V.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

I.

We now approach one of the most entangled prob-
lems of the European situation, the relations of Rus-
sia towards Austria-Hungary. It is very difficult for
anybody studying the complex policies in the Near
East, with their parallel alliances, criss-cross intrigues
and mutual distrust of the great powers, to get a
straight and coherent story out of them. Much has
been written about these problems, and yet so very
little is known concerning their historic meaning. Most
of the literature is either prejudiced or insincere.

The relations of Russia with the Hapsburg monarchy
fall into three periods: first, from 1878 to 1897 there
existed a decided tension between the two empires,
brought about by the Russian success in the armistice
of San Stefano and the Russian relations with the
Balkan Slavs; second, from 1897 to 1907 this tension
gradually disappears and there ensues a period of rel-
ative friendship, not always sincere, but at least out-
wardly peaceful ; third, beginning with 1908 and up to
the Great War of 1914, the relations between Russia
and Austria-Hungary steadily grow worse, until a final
break became inevitable.

The fate of Austria-Hungary after her defeat of

93

94 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

1867 depended entirely on her relations with Germany
and for a long time it was Bismarck who really inspired
the main principles of her policy ; with few exceptions,
the directives constantly came from Berlin.

After the Berhn Congress of 1878, Bismarck expected
from Austria effective help in case of any new military
conflict, and used the weight of her influence in his
political and diplomatic game in opposing the growth
of the Slav influences. In the last mentioned case he
found a willing friend in the Hungarian nation, be-
cause it was most afraid of a Slav expansion. The
Hungarians are very much like the Prussians, national-
istic and chauvinistic, having ruled the Slav popula-
tion of the Dual Monarchy most ruthlessly.

Bismarck started by backing Austria whole-heartedly
at the Berlin Congress, meeting all her demands and
finally giving her the provinces of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. As Temperley says in his "History of Serbia,"
"where Russia had spent thousands of lives and millions
of pounds, Austria spent only ink and paper" and still
she got the greatest advantages out of the Berlin
Congress.

At that time the Austro-Hungarian Empire was gov-
erned by a Hungarian, Count Andrassy,Sr., who eagerly
met Bismarck more than half way. In August 1879
Bismarck arranged for an interview with Andrassy at
Gastein in order to discuss the mutual policies. From
the very start he proposed an alliance between the two
empires of a most "general" character, covering the
west as well as the east. Andrassy demurred, realiz-
ing the dangers that were created in the west by the
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and the undying, though

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 9§

for the moment hidden ill feeling of France. He pro-
posed instead an agreement that would be directed
against the east exclusively (against Russia). Bis-
marck did not quite like it, as he knew that the Ger-
man Emperor would be very unwilling to antagonize
Russia and the Russian Tsar, with whom he was bound
by personal friendship and family ties. The Chancel-
lor overcame, however, these objections, as he so often
did during his lifelong service, and agreed to the con-
clusion of the alliance with Austria, which was signed
October 10, 1879 and ratified October 15, 1879. The
fate of the Austrian empire became henceforth abso-
lutely dependent on the policies of the Berlin govern-
ment; the two monarchies were bound to stand and
fall together.

In dealing with Austria Bismarck had only military-
advantages in view, considering the possibility of a
future war on either side of the German empire, west
or east. He did not care for taking part in the Balkan
trouble and left it entirely to Austria; Germany had
still much room for her national expansion and Bis-
marck persistently declined to start any colonial or
Near East policy; Austria might deal with Russia or
the Balkan Slavs as best she could.

The treaty of 1879 was kept secret but its contents
soon were known to the world and aroused, especially
in Russia, a very natural feeling of anxiety. The ob-
jects of this dual alliance were, first, the defence of
the status quo created by the Berlin Congress, sec-
ondly, a mutual insurance against Russia. The first
article of the treaty promised reciprocal aid in case of
an attack by Russia; if another power attacked, Aus-

96 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

tria-Hungary was to remain neutral, but if Russia
joined the attacking power, article I. was to be in force;
finally Austria was to warn Tsar Alexander that if he
attacked one of the allies, the other one would be com-
pelled to join the power attacked. The treaty was
concluded for five years, but was constantly renewed.
The full text of this agreement is published by Pribram
and Coolidge, "Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary,"
1920. Thus there was formed a strong nucleus in east
Europe.

Having achieved this great consolidation, Bismarck
cleverly proceeded to pacify Russia; he could not af-
ford to have Russia as an enemy-neighbor. He was
actuated, however, in the case of Russia not only by
military considerations; there existed strong political
reasons for a Russo-German understanding: first, the
personal friendship that existed between the two em-
perors, and second, the need of upholding the mon-
archical principle, on which both empires were built.
In consequence, he tried to find means of approaching
Russia and allaying her fears.

The situation in Austria-Hungary was much more
difficult. Her alliance with Germany was bound to in-
crease her quarrels with the Balkan Slavs, her own
numerous Slav population included; many of them
were dreaming of entire independence; the Pan-Slav
ideal too, which Austria and especially Hungary hated
and feared so much, seemed to increase steadily in
strength. One must keep in mind in this respect a
most characteristic trait of the Russian Pan-Slav move-
ment; it was prompted much more by hatred of Ger-
mans than by love of Slavs; Vienna paid too little at-

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 97

tention to this factor. It soon proved to be the main
source of trouble between Austria and Russia; for a
very long time it disturbed the peace of Europe and
unfortunately the question is still with us: Is it solved?

Bismarck, meanwhile, spent his time and efforts in
endeavoring to build up an understanding with Russia.
He made use in this respect of the former alliance, the
so-called "Entente of the Three Emperors," existing
since 1872 ; he wanted it resurrected in spite of his new
alliance with Austria and finally persuaded the two
other governments to renew it; it was signed in Berlin
June 18, 1881 by himself and the two ambassadors,
Sabourof for Russia and Szecheny for Austria-Hun-
gary. According to that understanding, if one of the
three countries should be at war, the other two were to
remain benevolently neutral; if war broke out with
Turkey, the three powers had to reach a special agree-
ment concerning the outcome of such a war. This un-
derstanding was concluded for three years, and the first
difficulty arose in 1883, when the renewal of 1884 was
discussed by the allies. Russia wanted to be free to-
wards Turkey, but this attitude alarmed and displeased
Austria and friction seemed imminent.

Bismarck then once more displayed his great diplo-
matic skill. Harping on the monarchical ideal he con-
vinced the three emperors of the necessity of a per-
sonal meeting in order to further strengthen their
autocracies. He succeeded in bringing them together
in Skiernevice in 1884, where they met accompanied
by their ministers.

One can easily judge of the complicated situation
and the involved game Bismarck was playing by the

98 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

fact that simultaneously he succeeded in greatly
strengthening the Dual Alliance by the accession of
Italy, which was to act, at the same time, as a counter
weight to Austria. Italy agreed to join chiefly for two
reasons, because of her isolated position in Europe and
on account of some anti-French feelings that existed
among certain Italian parties; France had hampered
the Italian policy in Tunis. Germany on her side
promised Italy commercial advantages for the recon-
struction of her shattered finances. Austria expected
that Italy's accession would minimize the dangers of
her Irridenta on the Italian frontier.

Thus we can see how these diplomatic entanglements
crossed and neutralized one another, increasing the
difficulties of the Eastern Empires and creating mutual
distrust and dissatisfaction.

The Balkan trouble, just then developing between
Bulgaria and Russia, only helped to add fuel; Austria
was glad of making use of it and looked on with pleas-
ure at the Serbian war with Bulgaria that broke out
in 1885.

Russia, on the other hand, showed more distinctly
her dislike of Austria, and when in 1886 the time came
for another renewal of her treaty with Austria and
Germany, she naturally hesitated and wavered in her
policy. The treaty was finally renewed on June 18,
1887, but without the participation of Austria, to the
latter country's great alarm.

We cannot wonder at that. Austria was very much
afraid of her Slav subjects and of the growing Pan Slav
movement. The only solution for her would have been
to frankly admit the federal principle; but just this

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 99

she would not do. The reasons for this were both
poHtical and economic. She was too centralized and
reactionary, and too much dependent economically on
the Balkan peoples; most of her raw materials came
from there and her own products of industry had to be
sent south: Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Russia
closed her other frontiers. Austria had no colonies
worth mentioning and the Balkans were thus her
only market.

Parallel to these difficulties came the transactions
concerning the renewal of the Teutonic alliance. Bis-
marck rightly pointed out that since the accession of
Italy and the many changes in eastern Europe the
premises of the original agreement required thorough
revision. This was achieved during the years 1886-
1887 and the new text of the Triple alliance signed in
1887 was somewhat different from that of 1879.^ Thus,
for instance, we find three new words inserted, "with-
out direct provocation," referring to the possible at-
tack on one of the allies, which were absent in the text
of 1879 ; the latter was much simpler, whereas the text
of 1887 became very ambiguous; this can be easily ex-
plained by the increased complexity of the political
situation in Eastern Europe. A little later arose a very
interesting, but troublesome question, as to the con-
tinuation of the treaty of 1879; some statesmen and
jurists argued that the two treaties of 1879 and 1887
were two different instruments and the one of 1887
could not be looked at as the mere renewal of the pre-
vious alliance of 1879, and as there was no mention
made about the abrogation of the treaty of 1879, it

^Pribram, A. F., Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary.

100 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

still was in force, parallel to the agreement of 1887.
This point of view is defended, for example, by Fried-
jung.^ This made the involved situation still more
complicated, but unfortunately there is much justifica-
tion of the cited opinion, especially as the alliance of
1879 was now made public in Berlin, Vienna, and Buda-
pest; the treaty of 1887 remained secret up to the time
of the Teutonic defeat. Thus the web of diplomatic
intrigue was unabatingly woven by the eastern autoc-
racies, which were fated finally to perish themselves,
strangled in the vicious meshes of their own fabrica-
tion.

II.

In the '90's the relations between Russia and Austria
began gradually to improve. There were two important
causes for this: on the one hand, the Pan-Slav move-
ment lost its former impetus and there appeared many
points of disagreement among the Slavs of different
countries; on the other, Russia, their elder sister, sud-
denly changed her policy, henceforth ignoring the Bal-
kans and directing all her efforts toward an unexpected
expansion in the Far East; this latter development was
bound to tell on Russia's relations to her southwestern
neighbors.

Vienna was not slow in noticing it; in 1896 Francis
Joseph paid a visit to St. Petersburg where he was
cordially received, and proposed a new understanding
between the two countries. As a matter of fact an
agreement was signed in 1897 to the disadvantage of
* Comp. his book Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 101

poor Serbia, which was left by Russia to the mercy of
Austria. The objects of this understanding were: first,
,the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans,
especially in Macedonia, where bandits were openly
pillaging; and second, the delineation of spheres of
influence; to Russia were apportioned Bulgaria, Tur-
key, and Montenegro, while Austria got as her sphere
of influence Serbia, Macedonia, Saloniki, and Albania.

Simultaneously, we can witness the appearance in
both countries of new political groups, working for
mutual friendship, austrophiles in Russia and russo-
philes in Austria.

But even during this period of better understanding,
the horizon was never entirely without clouds. The
storm center lay in Macedonia. Serbia and Bulgaria
continuously clashed there; each one wanted its own
schools, its own influence, its own advantages. From
the south there came also Greek interference. Turkish
maladministration and occasional massacres only added
fuel.

During this whole period, 1896-1907, the efforts of
the great powers were much too timid and insincere
to be able to achieve any drastic change or improve-
ment. In 1902 the Russian foreign minister, Lams-
dorff, undertook a special trip to Vienna, Sophia, and
Nish in order to reach some mutual understanding,
but failed; even the small nations seemed to want to
keep away from Russia. Lamsdorff succeeded, how-
ever, in convincing Vienna of the necessity of discuss-
ing amicably the Balkan situation and of deciding on
some sort of mutual policy.

In consequence, a Russian-Austrian memorandum

102 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

of reforms was drawn up on February 17, 1903 and
sent to the Sultan, who accepted it without protest,
but also without paying much attention to it. Later
in the year a meeting of the two emperors, Nicholas
and Francis Joseph, took place at Miirzsteg (Septem-
ber 1903) and a new program of common action was
worked out and accepted. According to the provisions
of this new understanding, a special Inspector-General,
commanding the gendarmes in Macedonia was to be
appointed by the Porte, with two assistants, one of
whom was to be a Russian, the other an Austrian.
Further, there were to be mixed courts for political
crimes and the christians were to receive a special in-
demnity.

This plan also failed to impress the Sultan, who
calmly continued in his old policies. Moreover, though
all other powers sanctioned these reforms, Germany
demurred, in the hope of secretly sustaining the Turks;
the latter gladly took this chance and felt themselves
supported in their opposition to Russia. The reform
plans naturally were bound to fail.

Then came the unfortunate Japanese war, taking up
all Russia's time and strength and preventing any pos-
sibility on her part to interfere any more in the policies
of the Balkans.

During the war Lamsdorff, the Russian foreign
minister, signed an agreement with the Austrian am-
bassador, d'Aehrenthal, by which Austria promised to
remain neutral and keep up a joint policy with Russia
in the Balkans; at that time Austria did not take any
advantage of Russia's weakness.

The last act of this friendly period was Iswolsky's

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 103

visit to d'Aehrenthal and the Austro-Russian note of
October 1, 1907, concerning the Macedonian reforms
and the Miirzsteg program, which seemed to affect
Turkey so little. This common action was weaker than
ever and showed already the increasing insincerity in
the relations of Austria and Russia. The storm was not
long in coming.

III.

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the per-
sonal enterprise of the energetic count d'Aehrenthal,
who had no scruples, especially when Russia and Rus-
sian interests were concerned.

Before he became minister of foreign affairs for
Austria he had a long record of diplomatic service in
Russia and knew well the Russian Court and the bu-
reaucratic surroundings of the Tsar. Likewise was he
acquainted with all the details of the situation of the
Russian government at that time; after he left St.
Petersburg there were many friendly informants, who
kept him in touch with what was going on there. He
had for example a great friend in the person of one of
the ministers, Mr. Schwanebach, of German descent,
who was always willing to send him any information,
even to the extent of being paid for it. D'Aehrenthal
succeeded the old count Golouchovsky in October 1906
and from the start had two political objects for future
policy: the establishment of Austrian supremacy in
Serbia and ousting the Russian influence, having espe-
cially in view the Russian minister at Belgrade, Hart-
wig, who was looked upon in Vienna as the source of
all evils, and second, the reforms concerning Turkey,

104 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

in particular her administration in Macedonia and her
finances. D'Aehrenthal was very clever and astute and
had what not many Austrian statesmen had possessed
before him — firmness of character and clear vision of
what was going on in the other capitals of Europe,
especially in Russia. One must say that old Austria,
as the Russian jurist Baron B. Nolde once wrote, had
educated a wonderful school of diplomats and clever
bureaucrats, who administered that chequered empire
as well as it was possible. This is perhaps the only
merit of this defunct monarchy, which was really an
abstraction, not a nation. There was even no national
culture to back the government.

D'Aehrenthal was well aware of Russia's internal
troubles and of her great weakness, which undermined
her forces after the Japanese war. The reactionary
policy of the Russian government further helped to
increase her internal trouble and weakness. On the
other hand Turkey was also much too weak after her
revolution and seemed powerless to protest against
whatever Vienna undertook to do in the Balkan penin-
sula. The moment must have seemed a very propitious
one for him.

Further, after the Turkish revolution there might
have come up at the instigation of the nationalistic
young Turks the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina's
representation in the Turkish Parliament. Turkey
might have claimed that after all these provinces be-
longed to her, according to the treaty of Berlin, their
population was composed of Turkish subjects and it
would have seemed only fair to give them a chance to
participate in the newly established system of represen-

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 105

tation. The powers would then have been unable to
protest because such a measure would have been un-
dertaken in the name of constitutional principles and
civic freedom. This would have meant, necessarily, the
end of Austria's "administration" of these provinces,
which d'Aehrenthal had no intention of losing. Turk-
ish chauvinism alarmed him very much.

There were still further reasons for anxiety. The
Teuton powers had just learned the details of King
Edward's visit to the Tsar, which took place at Reval,
where the plan of an understanding between Russia
and England was seriously discussed. Austria could
not afford to have Germany threatened.

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina came not
quite as a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. D'Aehren-
thal had prepared his way very carefully ; several meas-
ures taken by him had cleared the way for this last
act. His first step was taken in January 1908 ; on the
27th he proposed in a speech before the parliamentary
delegation of Austria-Hungary the building of the
Mitrovitza railroad. This proposition was not merely
a technical plan of railroad construction, but a detailed
program of economic exploitation of the whole Balkan
peninsula; it was a plan destined to alarm all the
powers, but especially Russia. Turkey became evi-
dently anxious too for she protested to Vienna; Rus-
sia then made public her own similar plan for another
railroad going east-west to the Adriatic.

From the very beginning of his administration of
foreign affairs, d'Aehrenthal was ably assisted by the
Austrian Heir Apparent the Archduke Francis Ferdi-
nand. The latter stood, as is well known, for the so-

106 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

called "Trialism/' viz., the addition on equal terms to
the Austro-Hungarian union of a third part, com-
posed of the Slav elements of the empire, Croatia-,
Slavonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bohemia and all others.^
This combination had great advantages to speak for it.
It might have solved the problem of Austria's future,
since it certainly would have eliminated the greatest
danger — the Slav resistance. It would have satisfied
them and guaranteed them full national equality. Yet,
it had many staunch enemies; against it was the whole
Magyar nation, which did not want to give up its privi-
leges of exploitation of those parts of the empire,
which were predominantly Slav. Against it also were
the Austrian bureaucratic interests and the Austrian
government ideology. The Vienna officials were too
much bound by their old methods of administration.
Finally there existed the real danger for Austria in the
growing Slav hope for a "Greater Serbia," which
would have been given an impetus by the system of
Trialism.

The German influence at Vienna was also against
the plan. Berlin could not look with indifference upon
the growth of the Slav element in Austria-Hungary;
we know that the Kaiser repeatedly tried to persuade
Francis Ferdinand to give up the plan. The Austrian
Heir-Apparent, however, was insistently pressing it
on d'Aehrenthal. The latter's attitude towards the
plan is not quite clear but sufficient evidence exists to
show that he did not altogether sympathize with it;
he was temporizing when he was dealing with Francis

^Some east-European statesmen were even dreaming of a great
trialistic empire, with Constantinople as its capital!

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 107

Ferdinand, whereas the latter was always sincere in
his attitude towards the minister.

The second step of d'Aehrenthal was consequently
taken in the same direction of spreading the adminis-
trative system of Austria over the Balkans. In July
1908 he came forth with the plan of annexing the Sand-
jak of Novi-Bazar; it entailed a program more vast
than the railroad plan of the preceding winter. It had
more strategic advantages for Austria-Hungary and its
economic advantages were no less. But for those
reasons it called forth much more energetic protests
from the other powers, some of which like Russia were
really quite indignant about it. D'Aehrenthal realized
that the moment for action had not quite come and
withdrew his plan; it had important consequences,
nevertheless. First of all because he succeeded in se-
curing simultaneously the friendship of Bulgaria, prom-
ising her support in case she would like to proclaim
her full independence from Turkey; second, it bared
the weakness of Constantinople and the Turks; third,
it was a start for the idea of federation of the Balkan
peoples, under the hegemony of Austria, which greatly
increased the prestige of the latter country. Finally it
helped the negotiations between Austria on the one
hand and Rumania and Greece on the other.

In order to meet the fears of Russia d'Aehrenthal
played a rather contemptible trick on Iswolsky, then
Russian foreign minister. He invited Iswolsky in
September 1908 to count Berchtold's country place at
Buchlau and had long talks with him of a most intimate
character, succeeding thus in allaying all his fears and
promising him not to act independently. Iswolsky was

108 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

quite satisfied and content with the Buchlau meeting
and was certain that he had the friendship and con-
fidence of his unscrupulous opponent.

Then came the sudden coup. On October 5, 1908
d'Aehrenthal unexpectedly announced that Austria-
Hungary was annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was
a deliberate infringement of the provisions of the Ber-
lin treaty of 1878 and likewise a breach of faith with
Russia, and personally with Iswolsky. Those events in
October 1908 created a sensation all over Europe and
were a terrible blow to the Slavs. Only among some
Slavs of the Austrian empire did the act of annexation
meet with sympathetic favor, for special reasons. The
Bohemians, especially Kramarz, were not averse to the
annexation, because they argued, it strongly increased
the Slav element of Austria. This element was bound
to triumph some day. It was not, however, what
d'Aehrenthal wanted. The Serbians were very much
alarmed and considered d'Aehrenthal's policy a direct
threat to their kingdom.

The Turks were anxious, also, and declared a boy-
cott on Austrian goods in the Levant, which proved
very successful and materially hurt Austrian products.
Finally, Italy looked askance on the increase of Aus-
tria's strength and was in no way ready to support the
latter's claim. We see here probably the first fissure
in the triple alliance between Germany, Austria and
Italy; Italy was unwilling to follow the leadership
of the other two. There is little wonder that
contemporaries at that time considered the equilib-
rium in the Balkans seriously, if not permanently,
shaken.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 109

Russia at once took steps to counteract Austria's
policy. Iswolsky sent out a note and then went per-
sonally to see Sir Edward Grey in order to protest and
to propose a European conference instead, which would
settle the whole Balkan matter. He worked out a de-
tailed program concerning all the disputed questions,
but his labor was in vain.

The idea of a European conference was untenable
both to Vienna and to Berlin and for a simple reason.
In both those capitals the statesmen realized very well
that their claims and policies had not the least chance
of being accepted by the other powers. They were
far too selfish and aggressive. Austria especially pre-
ferred direct dealings with Russia, hoping to bluff her,
which would never have been allowed by the other
powers. Perhaps it was a mistake on Iswolsky's part
to have included in his program the question of Con-
stantinople and the Straits. This inclusion might have
frightened England and not have secured for Russia
her whole-hearted support.

Germany on her side was strongly opposed to any
conference and her action proved decisive for Russia.
The displeasure of Berlin came forth first in a speech
of the Chancellor, delivered October 7, 1908, in the
Reichstag, in which von Bulow unrestrictedly accepted
Austria's act of annexation. Vienna was simultane-
ously notified by the German ambassador of the whole-
hearted support of Berlin.

Later came a token of personal friendship in the
form of a trip of the Kaiser to Vienna (April 1909),
meant to accentuate the mutual understanding, and
a blunt notification of St. Petersburg, that Germany

110 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

will "stand in shining armor" by the side of her ally,
which was practically an ultimatum to Russia, and was
thus understood by her government and her people,
by the press and public opinion. All were terribly in-
dignant, but none could help, for Russia was much
too weak after her war with Japan and unsuccessful
attempt at revolution. Russia could not resist the
German threat. The insult, however, was never for-
gotten.

In only one way did Russia score a success. She
helped to estrange Italy from Austria. In December,
1908, Iswolsky spoke in the Duma and Tittoni spoke
in the Italian parliament about the Italo-Russian
friendship, both hinting that all was not quite right
with Austria. Then came the visit of the Tsar to
Racconigi, where he met the King of Italy. It is inter-
esting to note in this respect that the Tsar's trip, under-
taken from Odessa, was routed in a wide circle in order
to avoid any Austrian territory ; this was an intentional
demonstration against Vienna.

But if Russia was not ready for a conflict, neither
was Germany. So, after brandishing the sword and
appearing in "shining armor" Wilhelm sheathed his
sword and put away his armor, attempting again to
make friends with Russia as best he could. The fol-
lowing summer he took a cruise in the Baltic, coming
to see the Tsar (June 17, 1909) at Bjorko. This visit
does not speak well for the sincerity of the Kaiser, nor
for the cleverness of the Tsar. Seemingly each tried
to fool the other, but it is a splendid example of the
great dangers to a nation of such autocratic rule, where
a monarch by his personal acts can endanger the peace

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 111

of the world and the happiness of his own people.
The two emperors patched up their differences a year
later, when in November, 1910, the Tsar paid a return
visit to the Kaiser at Potsdam.

Finally we must note the important role the Aus-
trian press played in the hands of d'Aehrenthal. He
knew how to manage it wonderfully well and manipu-
lated it without any scruples; he realized the influence
of the press on public opinion in modem times. All
through this crisis of 1908-1909, d'Aehrenthal con-
stantly held a firm grip over the Vienna papers, filling
their columns almost daily with his propaganda and
coloring all the news that came through them to the
Austrian people. His assistants were men of no mean
ability; we need mention but one, the famous his-
torian Friedjung. It was not the first time this man
had worked for the Ballplatz government. Later on
Berchtold followed the example of his predecessor in
handling effectively the Austrian press.

IV.

The Balkan wars of 1912-1913 once more changed
the whole aspect of the Near East policies of the Rus-
sian government and her relations with Austria.

The first war and especially the alliance of the
Balkan people greatly alarmed Vienna for they were
exactly contrary to her interests. However, she, as
well as Germany, soon saw that the alliance would not
last and that Russia had not the influence in it that
they had at first imagined. The quarrels between the
Balkan alhes, which soon followed, filled Vienna with

112 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

joy. As a noted French writer said : the hatred of the
Balkan peoples helped "Austria to definitely break up
the Balkan block."

This meant the estrangement of Russia from Bul-
garia and her growing feeling of friendship for Serbia;
the farther Russia got away from Bulgaria, the easier
did it become for Vienna and Berlin to spread their
own propaganda among the Bulgarian people. The
consequences of this began to tell at once after the
Great War broke out and led to Bulgaria taking sides
with the Teuton powers.

The liquidation of the wars of 1912-1913 was.assisted
by the united action of Russia and Austria; this gave
the latter an important trump and helped to strengthen
her influence in the Balkans.

Russia could not afford the victory of the latter and
yet Germany's "Drang nach Osten" seemed at times
impossible to stop. It was unfolding so rapidly and
so cleverly, receiving from Berlin such a tremendous
impetus.

Great Britain was also alarmed, and so much so,
that she forgot her century old feud with Russia con-
cerning Constantinople and was willing to back Rus-
sia's claims even to the extent of establishing an
entente with Russia.

Italy gained from these conflicts* and simultaneously
weakened her ties with the Teutonic powers.

Russia was hailing with joy the alliance of the
Balkan people, but her wavering and inconsequential
policy could not make use of events and was never
really successful. Austria was against such an alliance
unless it was put under her full control and hegemony,

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 113

which the Slavs neither liked nor wanted. These two
powers were constantly at odds in the Balkans and
Germany made use of this for her own purposes in
order to strengthen her eastward rush.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Larmeroux, J., La Politique exterieure de TAutriche-Hongrie, 1875-

1914, 1-2, Paris, 1918.
Schwertfeger, Zur Europaischen Politik, 1897-1914, 1-5, Berlin, 1918.
Debidour, A., Histoire diplomatique de I'Europe, 1 — 1878-1904, 2 —

1904-1914, Paris, 1916.
Pribram, A. F., Secret treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914. Eng.

edit, by Coolidge, A. C, Harvard, 19?9.
Friedjung, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus, Berlin, 1919.
Molden, Graf d'Aehrenthal, Stuttgart, 1917.
Steed, H. W., The Hapsburg Monarchy, London, 1914.
Stuart, Graham H., French Foreign Policies, N. Y., 1921.
Tittoni, Tommaso, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy, London, 1914.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BALKANS.

I.

We may approach the Bulgarian problem from two
angles. In the first place Bulgaria was looked upon by
the world as a child of Russia, though their relations
had in them the tinge of those of a foster child.
There was much sentimentalism in the idea of Pan-
Slavism : the religious element of St. Sophia was often
a factor subsequent to the conquest of 1453. It failed
because the Slavs did not want to be liberated by the
autocracy of Tsardom.

The Black Sea and the Straits, which Bismarck so
well named "the keys to Russia's back door," we will
examine as the second part of the question. Russia
often changed her policy, sometimes for and sometimes
against the Turkish possession of the Straits, but her
purpose was ever constant and clear — to acquire her-
self the control over the Straits. As early as Septem-
ber, 1877, Nelidoff, future ambassador to Turkey,
stated the two purposes of this policy: free communi-
cation for Russia with the Mediterranean Sea, and
closing access to enemy ships to enter the Black Sea
to attack the southern Russian coast. Never for a
moment did Russia lose sight of this, even at the time

114

THE BALKANS 115

of her worst reverses; one can find it in the reigns of
Catherine II, Alexander I, and Nicholas I, during the
Crimean War, or the Turkish War; Beaconsfield pre-
ferred to help the Turks rather than assist Russia,
effectively thwarting the Russian claims and policy,
but Russia doggedly held on to her diplomatic game.

It was a great national aim, coupled with sentimen-
tal mysticism and religious superstitions, but it was
invariably handicapped by the very deficient political
organization of Tsardom as well as by English jealous-
ies and supported by misrepresentations of narrow-
minded nationalists on both sides.

Pan-Slavism as a national movement is very little
known abroad and one might add that not so long ago
Russians themselves did not quite realize the purport
of the movement.

Pan-Slavism can be studied under three different
aspects. It has first a strong sentimental side to it.
This, however, can easily be disposed of. In the past
it was constantly much exaggerated and at times even
distorted by nationalistic jingoism.

In the psychological element of Pan-Slavism an im-
portant role was played, for instance, by historic
memories of Russian conquests, when prince Oleg
nailed his shield on the gates of Byzantium, or the
Russian armies stood victorious at the walls of Con-
stantinople; further, the christian feelings were easily
aroused by the Turkish Crescent dominating over the
Holy Cross on St. Sophia, as an emblem of vanquished
Christianity and a symbol of the victorious Ottoman.
The reUgious element was prominent only at times and
always for a short while, as, for example, in 1876-1877,

116 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

when a holy war was preached among Russians and
Slavs, which resulted finally in the liberation of the
Balkan peoples. Among the latter, the desire for pro-
tection against the Turks was naturally very strong
and forced them to look to Russia for their salvation.

And yet we can see at present how much this feeling
was exaggerated. The racial element among the Slavs,
all belonging to the same historic group of people,
played a much more important role. Leaving aside
the doubtful question of the early origin of the Bulgars,
we can definitely state that to all practical purposes
they belonged to the Slav family for many centuries.
And it is this racial element that creates the strong
feelings of unity and of mutual bonds, that are bound
to play a most important role in the near future. Here
we find the really sound foundation for Pan-Slavism.

But in order to establish friendship and unity, alli-
ance or federation, something more is necessary. And
it was this third element or aspect of Pan-Slavism that
constantly was either entirely lacking or badly warp-
ing the mutual relations of the Balkan States and
Russia, namely, the confidence of the former in the
policy and government of the latter.

There always existed a tremendous difference be-
tween Russia and the Balkan peoples in size and in
potential social force; Russia was many times stronger
and larger than all the other Slav nations. The small
size of the latter made them naturally very cautious
and suspicious, and historical developments prove
sufficiently that such feelings were well grounded.
The political system of the larger sister-state was
quite unsatisfactory and could not arouse confidence

THE BALKANS 117

among the Balkan nations; they were afraid of Rus-
sia's hegemony. Their dearly won independence was
constantly threatened by Russian autocracy, which
viewed with an evil eye the constitutional develop-
ments in the Balkans, and consequently imperilled
local autonomy and self-government. The history of
the Russo-Bulgarian relations is the best possible illus-
tration in this case, as the Tsar's government for many
years impeded and thwarted all the liberal efforts of
the Bulgarian people.

Under such circumstances there is small wonder that
the main ideas of Pan-Slavism could not find any real
response in the Balkans, and that the other Slav na-
tions shunned the friendship of Russia. Russian
friendship or assistance meant to them much more
domination than federation.

Among the Balkan peoples the Bulgarians suffered
most and longest from Turkish oppression, and stood
closest to the Russians, territorially and spiritually;
there existed a constant interdependence of culture
between Bulgaria and Russia; this was very evident,
for example, in the '70's.

There broke out at that time in the Balkans a suc-
cession of uprisings and Russia came to the rescue.
The war of 1877-1878 was a war of liberation of the
Slavs and an epoch when Pan-Slavism was at its best,
being a sincere outburst of friendly feelings. Even at
the present day this fact is not forgotten by the Balkan
peoples, who are sincerely grateful to Russia for their
freedom.

Unfortunately, these feelings of friendship never had
free play; they constantly encountered political oppo-

118 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

sition within Russia and hostile injBiuences without,
from other nations, especially England. Thus, one of
the main objects of the Berlin Congress of 1878 was to
weaken Russia and frustrate her influence in the
Balkans.

In Bulgaria use was made of the new prince, Alex-
ander of Battenberg, a nephew of Tsar Alexander II,
elected on April 29, 1879. It was the more easy because
of the short-comings of the Russian government
regime. Instead of an enlightened guidance, Russia
sent to Bulgaria some of her most tactless generals,
who soon succeeded in alienating most of the Bulgarian
statesmen and politicians.

According to the Berlin arrangements, Turkey kept
her suzerainty over Bulgaria, but the administration
was in the hands of the Russian generals, first
Dondoukoff, later Ehmroot, Soboleff, and Kaulbars.
The Bulgarian army had Russian officer-instructors.

Then came the awakening of the Bulgarian nation
and a remarkable growth of their liberal aspirations,
which displeased the reactionary Tsar. It soon became
evident that the rule of the Russians not only was
powerless to stop the movement, but on the contrary
helped to spread dissatisfaction among the Bulgarian
people, who were aspiring to full independence. They
could not understand what purpose could exist for up-
holding any longer their Turkish oppressors. From a
humanitarian point of view it was inexplicable. The
worst fact to them was that Russia was now against
them.

Prince Alexander unhesitatingly took the side of his
people and thus aroused the ire of the Tsar, Alexander

THE BALKANS 119

III. Friction with Russia appeared very early; the
first trouble came on account of the railroad construc-
tion plans; the Bulgarian ministry proposed a different
project from the one worked out by Russians, but it
connected the Bulgarian railroads with the Austrian
net, whereas the Russians insisted on building a line
much more expensive and connected with the Russian
net. The Bulgarians were forced to agree. In 1883
the differences with Russia became very acute when
prince Alexander appointed a liberal ministry, with
Zankoff at its head. But the act of prince Alexander
that aroused the Tsar's strongest anger was the restora-
tion, in 1883, of the Bulgarian constitution, which had
been in abeyance since 1881. That really maddened
the Tsar, who also looked askance at the annexation
of eastern Rumelia (October 21, 1885). Russia was
not averse to the annexation, but it was her desire to
do it herself instead of Bulgaria. On November 3,
1885, the Tsar struck the name of prince Alexander
from the lists of the Russian army. This definite rup-
ture between Bulgaria and Russia found favor both
with England and Austria. Austria now set herself
to the task of sowing seeds of discord among the
Balkan peoples in order to weaken them for future
exploitation.

Serbia then stepped into the breach. She was as
the grain between millstones for Austria hemmed her
in on the north, while Turkey and Greece were on the
south. Her natural outlet was eastward and she was
therefore strongly opposed to the strengthening of
Bulgaria; thus the annexation of Rumelia could in no
way lessen that opposition. Austria was assiduously

120 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

fomenting this discontent and made use of the Serbian
King Milan, of the Obrenovich line, to further her pur-
poses. He was a mere tool of Vienna and was easily
persuaded to attack Bulgaria that he might thereby
acquire more territory for Serbia; but superiority of
numbers proved no help to him; he was badly defeated
by the Bulgarians at Slivnitsa. Serbia was the more
ready to engage with Bulgaria because she thought
that the Bulgarian army had been demoralized by the
withdrawal of the Russian instructors. Austria
helped because of her treaty with Serbia, June 28,
1881; the treaty was renewed, February 9, 1889, and
continued in force up to 1895.

Peace between Serbia and Bulgaria was concluded
March 8, 1886. Bulgaria, though victorious, gained no
advantages; the occupation of Pirot meant nothing
for her, though it worried Serbia. It was on the thresh-
old of Serbia. After that prince Alexander gradually
began to lose his popularity. As the Tsar still con-
tinued to be opposed to his rule, Alexander could not
hold out and Stambouloff had no great difficulty in
deposing him on August 21, 1886. The prince at-
tempted to come back to Sophia in September, but
the Tsar would not allow it. The new regime lasted
about a year — until the Sobranje succeeded in electing
a new prince, July 7, 1887. He was Ferdinand of Saxe-
Coburg-Gotha, whom Russia did not want either.

The stubborn Alexander III did not change his rela-
tions with Bulgaria up to the last; he disliked the
liberal tendencies of the Bulgarians and hated their
constitution. Only after his death in 1894 did the rela-
tions of Russia and Bulgaria begin to improve.

THE BALKANS 121

Thus ended the first period of Russian-Bulgarian
relations, 1878-1894, a time of constant strife and
mutual discontent, after the brilliant but short period
(1876-1878) of liberation and friendship. The history
of those years shows already what a storm center the
Balkans were for Europe, how complicated and unsat-
isfactory was the solution of the Berlin Congress of
1878 and how selfish were the great powers in foment-
ing and upholding this dissatisfaction.

This epoch left a disagreeable aftermath both for
Russia and Bulgaria; true their mutual relations after
1894 kept rapidly improving up to the time of the
conclusion of the Russo-Bulgarian convention of 1902,
but under that outward friendship, under cover of
handsome Pan-Slavic decorations, there constantly ex-
isted a vicious undercurrent of distrust, fed by the in-
consistency of Russia's policy, undermining the Rus-
sian prestige.

In order to appreciate the great difficulties of the
situation in the Balkans, one must never forget the
constant interference of the other powers, of England
especially, who endeavored to keep Russia out of Con-
stantinople, and of Austria, who made great efforts to
get control over the Balkan peoples. Only later did
the third competitor, Germany, appear on the scenes.
It was this coming forth of Germany that caused such
a drastic change in the English policy, for it put her
suddenly and unexpectedly on the side of Russia.

The years 1896-1910 were the happiest in the his-
tory of Russo-Bulgarian relations. This was also the
period of redoubled activities of Bulgaria in Macedonia,
which proved so very dangerous to her later on.

'0

122 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

The seeming stability of the situation was, however,
achieved at a high cost to Russia, namely, her under-
standing with Austria. The cost was high since their
interests were so contradictory in the Balkans and
Russia did not succeed in upholding her prestige.

This policy of balancing Russia against Austria was
the favorite idea of prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria; he
always insisted that Bulgaria must lean on both powers
simultaneously, that just as soon as she gave prefer-
ence to one of them she was lost. The idea is not
without truth.

In 1902 a Russo-Bulgarian convention was con-
cluded against Rumania; its most important clause
was a promise on the part of Russia to guarantee Bul-
^ garia her territorial possessions. In 1910-1911 this
convention was renewed. On March 8, 1905, came the
treaty of commerce and navigation. Further, Russia
promised Bulgaria in September, 1907, an outlet to
the ^gean Sea. Prince Ferdinand visited St. Peters-
burg on February 23, 1910, and had a cordial reception;
unfortunately even then we cannot find any definite
policy on the part of Russia.

Beginning with the year 1911 there started a rapid
decline of Russian influence in Bulgaria; especially
did the wars of 1912 and 1913 prove how weak was
Russia's hold on the Balkan peoples. At that time
there was an understanding between Bulgaria and
Austria. With the acquiescence of the latter, Bulgarian
independence was proclaimed October 5, 1908. At the
initiative of Iswolsky, the Turkish debt to Russia,
existing from the war 1878, was transferred upon
Bulgaria, on condition that the Bulgarians should re-

THE BALKANS 123

ceive the management of the Oriental raih-oad. Bul-
garia was to pay Russia in long installments, having
the privilege of exploiting this railroad. Turkey
recognized Bulgarian independence April 20, 1909,
and her example was soon followed by the other
Powers.

The war of 1912, as is well known, was the outcome
of the alliance of the three Balkan peoples: Bulgarians,
Serbians and Greeks. The treaty of alliance, 1912, had,
added to it, special military conventions. It was
planned and carried out without the participation of
the great powers, and in most details, even without
their knowledge. Russia was informed about the alli-
ance by a special ambassador, Danef, in March, 1912,
and in answer the St. Petersburg government hastened
to express a wish for moderation on the Bulgarian
side.

Russia was very much afraid of this armed conflict.
Repeatedly did her minister of foreign affairs, Sazo-
noff, warn the Bulgarians to be cautious and avoid
any aggression. It was not the first time that Russia
counselled moderation and warned Bulgaria of evil con-
sequences of aggression. Russia told the Sophia gov-
ernment, through Dr. Danef, that she would not brook
the Bulgarian claims in Macedonia. Bulgaria's posi-
tion was always embarrassing; she could not afford to
discard Russian advice, but it was at the same time
very hard for her not to protect her brothers and sons,
the Bulgarians in Macedonia, suffering from Turkish
cruelty and maladministration.

Sazonoff travelled to Paris and London to find some
peaceful solution of this trouble. He had conceived a

124 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

little earlier a plan to marry one of the Tsar's daugh-
ters to the Bulgarian crown prince Boris, but under
the conditions existing in 1912 this plan was bound to
fail. It was, however, too late, mainly for psychologi-
cal reasons. Russia's arguments were lost on the Bul-
"garian people because the latter refused longer to
trust Russia's judgment, having set their hearts on
finally getting rid of the Turkish oppressors. Russian
sympathies were with the Balkan people from begin-
ning to end; she helped them diplomatically, kept
Rumania out of the war, supplied them with munitions
of war. In doing so, her objects and possible advan-
tages during the conflict of 1912 were: first, the con-
solidation of Balkan peoples; second, she was afraid
that Turkey would defeat the Slavs; third, Russia
hoped to maintain the status quo of Turkey and had
herself designs on Constantinople; and finally, Russia
was not prepared for a European conflict, which was
evidently threatening.

Much more astonished and surprised by the Balkan
alliance were Austria and Germany. Austria was
naturally very much alarmed by the Balkan alliance
and tried to help Turkey by sending her, through
Rumania, heavy artillery for her fortresses. Still,
outwardly Austria kept with Russia and even sent a
joint note, October 8, 1912, warning the allies not to
go to war. This was Sazonoff's last achievement be-
fore war broke out.^ The results of the war of 1912

*See, Hanotaux, G., La guerre des Balkans et I'Europe, 1912-13;
also Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, Report of the Interna-
tional Commission to inquire into the causes and. conduct of the
Balkan wars, 1914.

THE BALKANS 125

were that the Turks were beaten to the surprise of all,
but especially of Germany. Germany's whole plan
seemed torn to pieces.

But unfortunately these very excellent achievements
were soon thwarted by the fratricidal war that fol-
lowed between the Balkan allies themselves in 1913.
Russia again tried to mediate; this time quite unsuc-
cessfully, as her policy after the victories of 1912 was
opposed to Bulgaria's claims. Russia was at that time
most unpopular in Bulgaria. In this atmosphere the
proposition that Nicholas II should mediate was quite
unacceptable. It was bound to fail. According to
article 1 of the treaty of alliance between Bulgaria
and Serbia, these governments promised to ask the
Tsar to arbitrate in case of differences. On June 8,
1913, the Tsar telegraphed to both Bulgaria and Serbia,
counselling them to avoid a quarrel; the telegram was
couched in strict terms and contained a special warn-
ing to Bulgaria, mentioning the pending danger and
the impossibility for Russia of helping her in case of
disaster. It was, however, again too late. The feeling
in Bulgaria was too strong against Russia and war
broke out to the great joy of Germany and Austria
and to the undoing of Bulgaria.

On June 16, Ferdinand gave his army orders to
attack the Serbs even without the knowledge of his
own government and on June 26 Bulgaria, defeated
and humiliated, was forced to sign the disgraceful peace
of Bucharest.

Russia, however, could not allow Bulgaria to be ut-
terly crushed by Rumania; this would have meant

126 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

upsetting the whole balance of the Balkans; a too
strong Rumania, with her Teuton leanings, seemed
quite undesirable at St. Petersburg. So the Russian
representatives had to keep a watchful eye on the
transactions at Bucharest and put a damper on the
designs of the victors.

In Bulgaria there was no feeling of gratitude towards
Russia; on the contrary, I should say that the anti-
Russian tendencies strongly dominated. Bulgaria felt
deeply her humiliation, not realizing her own faults
and the criminal activity of Ferdinand, who started the
whole trouble.

It was with such feelings that Bulgaria met the news
of the Great War. The Bulgarian government was
strongly anti-Russian. At the same time there existed
among the Bulgarians intense hatred of the Serbs and
an unshakable belief in the strength of unconquerable
Germany.

No wonder the Bulgarian statesmen of those days
leaned towards Germany and not towards the Allies,
though the majority of the Bulgarian people never
evinced Teutonic sympathies. In addition one must
say that the Entente seemed unable to elaborate any
program, sufficiently alluring to the Bulgarians. Their
proposals were neither coherent, nor consequential.
Russia, knowing the strong anti-Russian tendencies
in the government and among some political circles,
was wary and over-cautious in her proposals at
Sophia. After many waverings the Allies finally pro-
posed to Bulgaria, May 16, 1915, the following pro-
gram: first, a frontier line, Media-Enos; second, a
Serbian Macedonia up to the line Egra-Palanka-Sopo^

THE BALKANS ./ 127

Ochrida; third, the exchange of Itavala, which was
to go to Bulgaria for new .acquisitions for Greece in
Asia Minor; further, the Bulgarians were promised
allied support in case of transactions with Rumania,
in order to give Bulgaria the Dobrudja, and financial
help as well.

Unfortunately, all that was much too late. German
offers proved more enticing, and what was more im-
portant, more certain. The die was cast. Bulgaria
made her choice in favor of the Teuton Alliance.

In conclusion, I must mention that at the present
day Russia in her plight gets much sincere help from
the Bulgarian people; there is a numerous Russian
colony in Bulgaria that receives a wonderful hospi-
tality; many Russian professors lecture at the Sophia
University, and there seem to grow up strong cultural
ties.

II.

I have much less to say about Serbia, except that
she too got her freedom at the hands of Russia, as a
consequence of a war with Turkey (Treaty of Adria-
nople 1829). During the first decades after the Berlin
Congress, 1878, there was not much in common be-
tween Russia and Serbia. It was Bulgaria, not Serbia,
that drew most of Russia's attention; the latter was
considered only when the main question of a general
Pan-Slav movement, concerning all the Slav people,
was raised. This was not often the case, because the
Pan-Slay movement had after all no great hold on the
Russian people; its fame was much exaggerated
abroad ; then too, that movement was made use of by

128 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Russian reactionary influences, which estranged the
liberal and educated men.

This gave Austria the chance to concentrate her
attention on Serbia and for some years Russia seemed
to consider Serbia the legitimate sphere of Austrian
influence. For example, when a Russo-Austrian
agreement was reached concerning the Balkans, Aus-
tria invariably was given control of Serbian interests.
There existed many points of contact between Austria
and Serbia, many economic interests, .strategic matters,
a long frontier, and last, but most important, the Slav
element in the Austrian Empire, which was constantly
affected by the proximity of Serbia. Many of the
Austrian Slavs were eager to follow the example of
Serbia and get their independence; they were fretting
under the Austrian rule. The Serbians^ on their part,
were not averse to making use of this feeling of their
Slav brothers, against the Austrians.

The Obrenovitch dynasty was absolutely under the
control of Vienna, but after the abdication of Milan
and the murder of Alexander and his wife Draga, with
the new dynasty of the Karageorges, the influence of
Russia began to be felt in opposition to Austria. The
new king evinced no friendship or gratitude towards
Vienna and felt free to act as was best for his people.

The change of dynasty, occurring in 1903, was
mainly an outburst of ill-feeling of the people, due to
the long misrule of the Obrenovitchi, though the bloody
form it took was a great misfortune for Serbia's future.
King Peter I was handicapped in his pohcy from the
very beginning for just that reason. His relations to
the great powers were necessarily not quite sincere,

THE BALKANS 129

due to the manner in which he had gained the throne.
He made no effort at all to punish the assassins of
Alexander and Draga.

Most of the diplomatic representatives were with-
drawn from Belgrade (except those of Russia and
Austria-Hungary) and allowed by their governments
to return only in 1904. However, by very tactful pro-
ceedings king Peter and his government succeeded in
reestablishing the confidence of the powers, but with
the difference, that he showed much more independ-
ence than the Obrenovitchi ever had. Serbia began to
drift away from Austria and the latter's influence was
gradually replaced by that of Russia. The internal
conditions improved rapidly and this Jielped the hopes
of the Serbian patriots for further achievements.

The test came at the time of count d'Aehrenthal's
coup of 1908. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
very naturally affected the Serbians greatly. Serbia
was much alarmed by the increase of Austria's strength
and by the fate of the Slavs, living in the annexed terri-
tories. It was entirely against her interest and policy.
We know that Russia also felt very badly about
the annexation, which thwarted her Balkan plans.
In consequence they became brothers-in-misfortune;
Serbia was glad to find a sincere friend in Russia, ready
to back her in her indignant protest to Austria. How-
ever, German interference forced Russi-a to withdraw
her support.

As Russia herself was not ready for any quarrel and
had not yet overcome the consequences of her Japanese
defeat, she was even obliged to tell Serbia frankly, that
she could not help her and counselled moderation.

130 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Serbia naturally had to withdraw her protests and
hide her indignation for a while. She sought the
friendship and moral support of another member of
the great .Slav family, her small but brave neighbor,
the princedom of Montenegro.

Soon, however, there came a new provocation from
Austria. The Vienna government turned its attention
to hunting down those Serbian patriots, who were help-
ing the Slav movement among the Austrian subjects,
trying to accuse Serbia of instigating a revolutionary
spirit. Thus, several Serbs were arrested in Croatia
and Bosnia and court-martialled in Zagreb. On Octo-
ber 5, 1909, thirty of them were sentenced to heavy
punishment, notwithstanding the protests of many
prominent men. It was then that Professor Masaryk,
now President of Czechoslovakia, started a campaign
to prove that these men were indicted on false docu-
ments, forged by .some Austrian ofl&cials, a fact which
was well known by the Vienna government. Two men
played an important role in these forgeries; professor
Friedjung, a talented historian, but an extreme nation-
alist, without any moral scruples whatever, and the
Austrian minister in Serbia, count Forgatch. The
disclosures of Masaryk saved the lives of the poor
Serbs, accused by Austria, but certainly could not stop
either the further persecutions of Vienna or the na-
tionalistic propaganda of Belgrade. Too many hatreds
were now loose and matters were bound to get worse.

In March, 1910, King Peter visited St. Petersburg,
received a most cordial reception and established per-
manent friendly relations with the Russian govern-
ment. Russia henceforth became the avowed protector

THE BALKANS 131

of Serbia. Tragic results ensued four years later, for
Russia was now in honor bound to support Serbia in all
circumstances.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Denis, E., La grande Serbie, Paris, 1915.

Temperley, H. W. V., History of Serbia, London, 1917. ^

Nekludojf, A., Diplomatic Reminiscences, etc.. New York, 1920.
Serkis, C, La Roumelie Orientale et la Bulgarie actuelle, Paris, 1898.

III.

The relations between Montenegro and Russia have
never had a complicated historical development.
From olden days they were based on very close friend-
ship and intimate Court bonds. There was a time,
for example, when Alexander III often used to say
that prince Nicholas was his only true friend in the
whole of Europe. At most of the international con-
ferences, Montenegro was represented by Russians;
thus the well known jurist, Th. Martens, used to have
the Montenegrin vote at many an international meet-
ing.

On January 1, 1910, Montenegro was proclaimed a
kingdom and recognized as such by Russia and the
other powers. It was not agreeable to Austria, but
she could not help it. Russia on the contrary was
very much pleased in getting one more element of
support in the Balkans against Austria. Montenegro
played an important role in two cases: in the Albanian
question and during the first Balkan war of 1912. In
both cases Russia had in this little kingdom a warm
friend. Its strength was certainly small and negligible,

132 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

but its moral weight was not unimportant, and gave
Russia a chance for interference in support of her own
interests in the Balkans. Nicholas of Montenegro
knew very well how to make use of this for his own
purposes. Two of his daughters were married to two
Russian Grand Dukes and at times exerted great influ-
ence at the Russian Court. The worst of this was, that
one of them helped the so-called "occult" influences,
Rasputin among others, to get hold of the Tsar and
his wife.

IV.

With Rumania, on the contrary, Russia never had
cordial relations. One reason was that subsequent to
1883 (October 30) Rumania had a treaty of alliance
with Austria, renewed in 1892 (July 25), the purport
of which was directed against Russia. In 1883 a treaty
was concluded also with Germany and later in 1888
with Italy. On November 23, 1892, they were
changed into one agreement, which was renewed in
1896, 1902, and in 1913. This was mostly the work
of Bratianu; his argument was that Rumania had no
choice. England and France were cool towards her,
while Russia acted quite inimically when she annexed
the Rumanian province of Bessarabia.

Great assistance was given at that time to Bratianu
by the Rumanian king, Carol, himself a HohenzoUern
and a profound admirer of Germany. The people were
more or less indifferent, mostly due to their very rudi-
mental social development. The alliance of Rumania
with the Teuton powers was a direct menace to Russia

THE BALKANS 133

and helped immensely to strengthen Russian fears of
the evil influences in the Balkans. A consequence
was the conclusion of an alliance between Russia and
Bulgaria, in 1902, directed against Rumania and prom-
ising Russian support to Bulgaria against Rumania.
The latter was economically entirely dependent on
Austria, which took all possible advantage from this
situation.

Rumania never dared to show any signs of unfriend-
liness against Russia, but she always could try to
attack Bulgaria, which had thus to seek the support
of Russia. At times there was open enmity between
these two countries, Bulgaria and Rumania., Rumania
avenged herself in 1913, when she helped to defeat and
humiliate Bulgaria; unfortunately it was the latter
country's fault entirely.

V.

The quarrel between Russia and Turkey is a very
old one. It dates back centuries, sometimes abating,
sometimes wildly flaring up again. Many a war has
Russia fought against Turkey and with few exceptions
always getting the best of her, but never really suc-
ceeding in destroying her ancient enemy.

Russia's aim of conquest of Constantinople, dating
back so many centuries, is too well known to need
elucidation; it is an historic trend toward the open
sea. With great diflSculty did Russia reach the coast
of the Black Sea at the end of the eighteenth century,
and then only to find that her outlet was blocked by
Turkey, strongly entrenched on the Bosphorus and

134 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

the Dardanelles. It was mostly due to England alone
that Russia could never achieve this historic task of
hers, to oust the "despicable Turk" from Europe.
England was constantly opposed to Russia getting a
foothold on the Straits, and thereby she saved Turkey
time and again.

The last time this happened was in 1878 after Rus-
sia was at the doors of Constantinople and had already
signed the victorious armistice of San Stefano. Due
to Lord Beaconsfield's energy, the Berlin Congress
undid all that Russia accomplished by her victorious
armies and left Russia dissatisfied and discouraged.

The commercial importance of Constantinople is
also too well known to call for any special mention;
most of Russia's southern trade is bound to pass
through the Bosphorus. Her wheat and hides, her
coal and oil cannot reach the European markets any
other way; her manganese and petroleum are inac-
cessible to other nations if they cannot find an
outlet from the Caucasus by the Dardanelles. This
was clearly demonstrated during the Turko-Italian
war, when the Ottoman government suddenly closed
the Straits and bottled up the Russian commerce. The
Dardanelles were closed for only a few days to Russian
sea trade and yet about one hundred and fifty
steamers were held up and the loss to Russian business
houses amounted to eight million francs. Communica-
tions were soon reestablished, but it taught Russia a
lesson, showing her once more how important a role
the Bosphorus played in her commercial development.

Toward the end of the century, Germany began to
interfere with the Levant commerce. The German im-

THE BALKANS 135

ports rose appreciably and began to replace the Eng-
lish and French goods; gradually even Russia began to
feel the new competition and with it came political
influences. Germany started to build up her friend-
ship with the Turks with great care and perspicacity;
she helped to reform the Turkish army, gave the Turks
instructors, furnished artillery and ammunition and
reorganized her system of defence. At the same time
German influence began to be felt at the Porte, in
the very heart of the Ottoman government. , Turkey
seemed to grow much stronger and consequently re-
sented the Russian, English or French ways of inter-
fering in Balkan matters and her own affairs, invari-
ably finding support in German counsels. This natu-
rally caused great anxiety among the statesmen of the
European capitals and thwarted all their efforts to
force Turkey to reform and accept their plans con-
cerning Macedonia, Asia Minor or Armenia.

Then suddenly came the unexpected break. For
some time between 1902 and 1904 the attentive ob-
server could have noticed, that there was developing
in Turkey a strong revolutionary discontent. About
1903 a small but very energetic party came to the
front; they soon were known to the world as the Young
Turks, standing for reform and constitution, but led
by German influence. Most of them had German edu-
cation or training, some were directly under German
leadership. They formed the Committee of Union and
Progress in 1904 and founded the powerful and influ-
ential paper. The Ikdam. Most prominent among
them were Taalat and Enver Bey, both strongly pro-
German; their headquarters were among the officers

136 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

of the second and third army corps; their propaganda
affected mostly Macedonia and Saloniki.

The years 1907-1908 were very anxious ones for the
Sultan. He must have felt that his powers were being
undermined. Finally the Ottoman government offi-
cials lost their heads entirely and were overthrown
without much difficulty in July, 1908. This was a
great triumph for Germany. She scored a political
success of high significance and importance and at the
same time disarmed the protests of the other powers,
as the coup was made in the name of liberalism and
freedom. Neither Russia nor England could very well
protest against the deposition of the Red Sultan, whom
they hated so much themselves. And everything was
accomplished exclusively through German help and
German inspiration.

The causes of the revolution of July, 1908, are rather
complex. It was mostly the constant interference of
the European powers in the Macedonian question that
hurt the pride of the Turks. They attributed this to
the undue weakness of the Sultan. The Young Turk
propaganda pointed this out repeatedly, arousing the
nationalistic feelings of the Mussulmen. Maybe we
have in this respect a part explanation of the strong
nationalistic feelings that characterized the Young
Turks from the very beginning and proved so very
harmful to them later on.

There was, however, an immediate cause, explaining
why the revolution broke out just at that moment; I
mean the German influence. Germany was much
alarmed by the visit king Edward paid to the Tsar at
Reval in June of that year; she consequently hastened

THE BALKANS 137

to establish her firm rule at Constantinople, as an out-
let before it should be too late. For that purpose she
deliberately let loose the Turkish revolutionary forces
and carried out her eastern plans with great pre-
cision.

Germany's position was, however, a delicate one,
on account of her relations to Austria, her weak
sister. Vienna could not have been much pleased by
the revolution, as she did not like to see Constantinople
strengthened and Germany had to display great tact
in order to lull the Austrian suspicions. The feeling
of growing independence of the Young Turks could
not be agreeable to Austria in any way; it was just at
that time that d'Aehrenthal was carrying out his pro-
gram of annexation of the Turkish provinces of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, a policy which was as much
against Turkey, as it was against the Slavs, Serbia and
Russia.

Without serious difficulty Berlin convinced both
Vienna and Constantinople that moderation was the
only possible and profitable^ policy ; this seemed to sat-
isfy both sides. Russia was entirely excluded for the
moment by her difficulties with Austria, by the German
support of the latter, and her own internal revolu-
tionary troubles. Thus did Germany, by persistent
effort, succeed in firmly establishing herself at the
Porte.

Russia and England, now for the first time close
allies in the Turkish question, recognized the new
Ottoman government without hesitation. They were
hoping that this new regime would finally bring to
Turkey the long expected reforms. They were disillu-

138 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

sioned, however, by the characteristic traits of the
Young Turks, which soon became evident. These
Turks proved to be intensely chauvinistic, hating all
foreigners, without ever trying to conceal their hatred.
With alarm did those two powers witness the increas-
ing strength and influence of Germany at Constanti-
nople; it ruined their own policy and threatened their
fondest hopes.

Then came the unexpected surprise with the first
war in the Balkans; the sudden and overwhelming
defeat of the Turks was a thunderbolt.

There is reason to believe that Germany was so
thoroughly convinced of Turkey's strength under the
military leadership of German instructors and gen-
erals, that she even viewed with pleasure the brewing
storm in the Balkans and in no way impeded the alli-
ance of the Balkan nations. Thus to Germany the
Turkish defeat meant much more than to any other
power; it really spelled the ruin of the whole of her
Near East plans. It meant, first, the destruction of
her own military prestige; everyone could easily see
that it was the German military methods that were
defeated by the Balkan allies; her military leadership
was now questioned, her instructors seemed at fault
and her generals — incapable; second, the victory of
the Balkan allies threatened the existence of Turkey;
it shook the foundation of the Balkan equilibrium,
so painstakingly built up, tearing to pieces the Ger-
man plans of advance through Turkey into Asia Minor.
Even the Bagdad railroad lost its meaning with the
defeat of the Porte. No wonder Berlin was furious
and felt upset. The whole German policy of aggres-

THE BALKANS 139

siveness, of getting "a place in the sun" had to be re-
constructed from the very beginning.

For several months Germany was extremely nervous,
but to her great joy the Balkan allies did not know how
to share the spoils in peace. Presently it became evi-
dent that they would quarrel and destroy with their
own hands the military achievements of the first war.

The second war, of 1913, was a pleasant sight to
Germany, whereas the other powers, and especially
Russia, did all they could to prevent it. The St.
Petersburg government realized very well both sides
of the question, the German political defeat, which
came with the Turkish military disaster, and the rising
hopes of Germany when the Balkan allies began to
bicker and quarrel. The Russian warnings were of
no avail, however; after the treaty of Bucharest was
signed, Germany had regained her former influence in
Constantinople and was once more set on establishing
her supremacy in the Levant. During the long and
wearying peace negotiations in London, 1912-1913,
Russia was effectively backing the Slav nations and
earnestly trying to find a way of mutually satisfying
the contradictory interests of the Balkan peoples. She
was careful and considerate, but perhaps just for that
reason her advice had no great influence in the Balkans.

It thus happened that when the Great War broke
out, Turkey was once more under the spell of Germany
and it took no great effort on the part of the latter to
persuade Turkey to join her against the western
Allies.

There is no doubt but that the events of 1914, which
led to the Great War were in no mean degree hastened

140 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

by that nervous desire of Germany to assert her final
power in Constantinople while the Young Turks had
still a predominant influence there. Germany could
not have stood the chance of a second defeat and over-
throw of the Young Turks.

Germany was not alone in a nervous state during
those two eventful years, 1913-1914. Russia was also
getting restless. With great anxiety did she watch the
renewals of German intrigues at Constantinople, after
the peace of Bucharest; she looked at these develop-
ments as a direct threat to herself. Indeed, Germany
firmly entrenched on the Bosphorus, meant a national
danger to her. Germany would thus be able to control
the entire southern export trade of Russia, as well as
her relations with all southern powers. Sazonoff con-
sequently tried to persuade the Russian government
to take urgent steps to counteract that policy of Ger-
many. The Bolsheviki made known to the world
the Russian plan of action, in their publication of secret
treaties (Paris, 1919). On March 23, 1914, four
months before the Great War broke out, Sazonoff made
a special report to the Tsar, after having debated the
questions with military and diplomatic representatives.
He contemplated the occupation by Russia of the
Straits and of using military force if necessary, to
coerce the Porte. Nothing came of it, fortunately for
Russia, because otherwise she would surely have been
accused of having started the general European confla-
gration, as Germany would never have acquiesced in
such action without calling forth an open conflict. But
it clearly shows how full of electricity the air was and

THE BALKANS 141

how near the storm really was; Russia and Germany
both were very intense in their purposes.

When the war did come Turkey almost at once took
sides with Germany, perfectly convinced of the invin-
cible strength of the latter. The Russian interests
were thus in abeyance and Russia had to wait, pa-
tiently conducting negotiations with her Allies to have
her desires satisfied in the Near East after the final
victory.

The Allies on their part were very reluctant to make
any promises or definite arrangements concerning the
fate of Turkey. Toward the end of 1915 they agreed,
however, to promise Russia Constantinople (some
porto-franco arrangement seemed best to them) and
the control of the Straits. This promise was finally
embodied in a special secret treaty, also made public
in 1919 by the Bolsheviki.

In 1917 the Russian provisional government met
with great difficulties just on this account, and Miliu-
kov, the first foreign minister after the abdication of
the Tsar, had to resign, because he defended these same
claims of Russia regarding Constantinople.

During the following months Russian interests in
Turkey seemed to be entirely forgotten and at the
time of the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, Russia was
conspicuously absent. By a strange irony of fate,
however, that treaty itself seems to have gone to pieces
and the whole question of Constantinople and the
Straits remains still unsettled.

We might add in conclusion a few words as to the
future of the Turkish question. From the Russian

142 RUSSIA'S FOEEIGN RELATIONS WITH

point of view the matter can be discussed from three
angles:

First, concerning the Turkish rule in Europe. It
will stand to the everlasting shame of the Allies that
Turkey has been allowed to remain in Europe. The
allied nations were promised by their governments,
that in case of victory Turkey will be driven into Asia,
where she really belongs; and that very definite prom-
ise was broken by the treaty of Sevres. To Russia
this is politically a matter of indifference. We can
and shall condemn this allied policy morally, but we
will always remain passive onlookers at the further
developments.

The second angle relates to the question of Constan-
tinople, with its very large and cosmopolitan popula-
tion, where the Turkish element does not play the pre-
ponderant role. What is to be done with that city?
Even if the Turkish rule will disappear from Europe,
there will constantly remain the question of how to
deal with the Turks of Constantinople. We can sup-
pose at present that in this last respect the vast
majority of Russians will also be more or less indiffer-
ent; in former days many Russians would have pre-
ferred for sentimental reasons to have the city as their
O own ; so many times did the Russian armies come close

V to the walls of Constantinople-Byzantium, that Rus-

sians could not help expressing the wish to occupy the
city. Now, however, this is quite impracticable. In
the near future every educated Russian will be needed
at home; Russia has her own vast and lasting troubles
on hand; she cannot spare a single citizen to govern
an outside town. Thus, the only possible solution

THE BALKANS 143

would be to establish an international administration
of Constantinople, under the League of Nations or oth-
erwise ;i Russia might be given a chance to participate,
in case she wants, on equal terms with the other
nations. No single power will be able to do this alone,
least of all Greece; some people have suggested Bul-
garia, as least objectionable; the trouble is, however,
that these small powers will never succeed in enforcing
their rule and remain themselves impartial; on the
contrary, they will inevitably arouse jealousies and
quarrels.

The third and most important phase of the question
concerns the Straits. No matter what happens to
Constantinople, Russia must be assured of the freedom
of the Straits. This is one of the most weighty of her
historical claims, for which she was fighting and striv-
ing for so many centuries. The question of the Straits,
again, has a double meaning, first, the freedom of com-
merce, viz., that there should not be any possibility on
the part of any power to close the Straits against the
outflow of raw materials from Russia; and second,
that the Straits should not be used in time of war for
strategic purposes, in other words, that there should
not be possible any military attack on Russia through
the Straits, or based upon them; no fortifications can
be allowed around the Straits; the latter must not be
used by any navy for strategic purposes.

We might hope that the progress of international
relations will achieve these two objects: that the Turks

^ For example, an international Commission with a Governor-Gen-
eral at the head and a porto-franco or free port for international
commerce.

144 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

and especially their rulers will sooner or later leave
Europe, and that such international guarantees will
be established, that would make Russian commerce
safe through the Straits and would prevent the use
of them as a point of aggression against Russia.

CHAPTER VII.

GERMANY.

I.

Our narrative concerning the relations of Russia
and Germany starts also, immediately after the Berlin
Congress of 1878, with the description of a rather hos-
tile attitude on the part of Russia. She had been
counting very much on Germany's support. Their
old friendship, the perfect neutrality of Prussia during
the Turkish war, the monarchical ideals of the two
Courts and not least of all the personal relations of the
two Emperors created the Russian hope, that when
English hostility became so evident and the British
fleet was ready to bombard the Russian troops at their
entry into Constantinople, Germany would openly side
with Russia and prevent such disastrous occurrences.
Bismarck, previously, was often talking of his friend-
ship with Russia; often too, did he say that Germany
must keep close friendship with her eastern neighbor
to preserve her monarchical ideals. As is well known,
he called his role at the Congress of 1878, that of an
honest broker, and as a matter of fact he did have
a splendid chance of holding the balance between
Russia and England. The Russian government was
cognizant of this fact. And yet the results of the Con-
gress were exceedingly disappointing to Russia and

ii45

146 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

much of the blame for this diplomatic defeat was put
by the Russians upon Germany and her leading states-
man, the Iron Chancellor.

Several times the Russian government expected
assistance or at least sympathy from Germany, but
invariably she found Berlin's attitude very cool.
Things went so far that in 1879, Alexander wrote a
long letter to the Kaiser complaining of this attitude
of the German government and expressing his aston-
ishment at the "systematic refusal of cooperation."

On the whole, Bismarck was not much impressed
by Russia's strength; much better than many other
European statesmen he realized Russia's weakness,
caused, primarily as he thought, by internal dissatis-
faction and by the revolutionary movement that her
government did not know how to cope with. Conse-
quently he directed all his efforts elsewhere, building
up an alliance with Austria. His main object was to
make that alliance as strong as he could; the under-
standing with Russia was supplementary.^ At that
time he looked at Russia as a mere insurance of his
eastern front, guarding Germany against any possible
understanding between Russia and France, his real
enemy. Bismarck never for a moment forgot that
France would some day try to avenge her defeat of
1870. But he began to cool considerably as to the
possibility of Russia being actively useful to him in his
political designs, his plan being that she should play
merely a passive role.

Alexander III, who came to the throne in 1881 after

*This was the object Bismarck had in view at the time of his
meeting with count Andrassy at Gastein in September, 1879.

GERMANY 147

the assassination of his father, was very well disposed
towards Berlin; his first visit he paid in consequence
to the Kaiser. The alliance of the "Three Emperors"
was renewed in 1881 and 1884. The second time, in
1884, Bismarck arranged for a personal meeting of
the three Emperors, which took place in September,
1884, at Skiernevice; it was a great demonstration of
monarchical friendship. But in 1887, when Russia
inquired about the next renewal, she was met in Ber-
lin, to her great surprise, rather coldly; the follow-
ing negotiations lasted longer than usual. In Novem-
ber of that year an important incident took place,
which was bound to strain the relations between the
two countries, the personal quarrel between Alexan-
der and Bismarck concerning the forged Bulgarian let-
ters. Bismarck never forgot Alexander's words. His
demeanor regarding the renewal offended the Tsar very
much and only added to his growing feeling of distrust
of the Chancellor's policy in general.

The treaty of "reinsurance," as Bismarck called it,
between Russia and Germany was finally signed in
1887 in Berlin, but there was no success in reestablish-
ing friendly relation between the two countries. There
remained a certain feeling of distrust and suspicion on
both sides.

The treaty of 1887 provided : first, for the status quo
in the Balkans and for the recognition of the Russian
interests there; second, for the status quo of the
Straits; and third, for the secrecy of this agreement.
There was an additional protocol attached to the
treaty, promising the assistance of Germany in re-
establishing order in Bulgaria; Germany also agreed

148 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

to remain "benevolently neutral" in case Russia would
have to defend by force of arms her claims concerning
the Straits. It was concluded once more for three
years.

When the time for its renewal came in 1890 much
had changed in the situation in Eastern Europe; the
Iron Chancellor was no more in his towering position
decreeing the fate of the German Empire. The nego-
tiations with Russia were, however, started in Berlin,
but did not progress rapidly, and after several months
of half-hearted efforts were first transferred to St.
Petersburg and then finally dropped. The treaty of
reinsurance thus lapsed. There exists an opinion that
the main opposition to the renewal came from the new
Chancellor; Caprivi maintained that it was too offen-
sive for Germany's trusted ally and that good relations
with Austria created a moral obligation for Germany
not to have any secret understanding with Russia.
We can seriously doubt the sincerity of that story;
Germany never evinced any moral scruples concerning
her allies. Both, Russians and Germans, asserted
later on that it was due to their initiative that the
transactions were broken off, and I think that more
or less both were right, as these countries quite evi-
dently rapidly drifted apart, though the reluctance of
Russia to the renewal of the agreement of 1887 is well
known and can be historically proved. The Russian
point of view is very lucidly exposed by S. Goriainov
in an article, "The End of the Alliance of the Em-
perors." (Amer. Hist. Rev., 1918, vol. 23). The
author proves that the Russian statesmen were almost

GERMANY 149

unanimously of the opinion that the alliance was not
to be renewed, due to the existing strained relations
between Russia and Austria.

It was then that the real rapprochement of Russia
and France began, at first unconscious, and so thor-
ough later on; in other words, the policy that Bis-
marck was always most afraid of.

We must mention in this respect a powerful personal
anti-German influence in Russia, namely, the feelings
of the Tsar's wife, the empress Marie. She was a
patriotic Dane, the daughter of king Christian, whom
Bismarck had treated so badly; she never could forget
this and was constantly urging Alexander not to be
too friendly with the Germans; her personal influence
on the Tsar was very strong.

As we have mentioned, Alexander strove to with-
draw from west-European politics and concentrated
all his attention exclusively on the Balkans. Bismarck
in the '80's was taking himself a rather passive attitude
towards the Balkan peoples; it was at that time that
he made his pointed remark that "The Balkans are not
worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier";
he much preferred not to interfere and let Austria
fight out the quarrel with Russia, playing for him in
the Near East the role of the monkey taking the chest-
nuts out of the fire. As to Constantinople, Bismarck
did not care in the least what was happening there or
whose influence dominated; and he really meant to
prove to Russia that he did not care. Thus, for in-
stance, in 1888 he started in the Hamburger Nachrich-
ten 8L whole campaign, publishing a series of articles

150 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

expounding the government's program. Gradually,
however, he became more truculent towards Russia^
egged on by the seeming indifference of the Tsar, and
j&nally burst out with rage, when he delivered his
famous aggressive speech in the Reichstag, saying that
"Germany feared no one, but God." This was a direct
threat against Russia and was thus understood by the
latter.

Bismarck was not alone in his unfriendly attitude
toward Russia; one might even say that he was more
considerate than some other Germans. There existed
a very strong group among the German generals,
with the Chief of Staff and his Assistant, the Gen-
erals Moltke and Waldersee at their head. These
men were absolutely convinced that a war with Russia
would break out sooner or later and considered, just
as in the case concerning France, that a "preventive"
war, that would annihilate and break Russia up, was
far preferable. Some people, Fried jung for example,
still think that it would have been much better for
Germany to have struck then at Russia and defeated
her once and for ever.

Bismarck's own plans were more political than stra-
tegic, possibly because he constantly underrated
Russia's military strength. His own idea was to break
Russia up, severing all the non-Slav peoples and
forming out of them an anti-Russian alliance or else
a federation under the guidance of Germany or of her
allies. The wonderful part of this is that Bismarck's
plan was made use of much later not only by the
German government (for instance, at the time of the

GERMANY 151

conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace), but even by
some of Russia's western allies.

Bismarck's aggressiveness reached its height toward
1888, and just then suddenly the old Kaiser died and
a period of political confusion followed in Germany.
It was evident that the emperor Frederick, who suc-
ceeded Wilhelm I, could not live long. Then came the
accession of Wilhelm II, who brought with him very
kind feelings towards Russia. The Tsar also at the
beginning was quite sympathetic towards the young
Kaiser. The latter, as is well known, soon began to
fret under the bullying Chancellor and eventually got
rid of him.

There is a story, dating from those days, the gist of
which is, that Bismarck, just prior to his resignation,
realized that he had gone too far with Russia and that
he was ready to make up with her, but that his dis-
missal prevented it. This is quite possible. The
rapprochement of Russia with France, of which he
knew much, was certainly not to his taste. It may be
that he began to realize that it was his own policy
that had helped to estrange Russia from Germany. It
was, however, too late for him to act.

There exists also another legend concerning Bis-
marck's views of Russia, namely, that all his life he
advocated close friendship between Russia and Ger-
many and that it was really Wilhelm II who brought
with him the final break between the two countries.^
This one often hears from contemporary Germans of

^ The main support for that point of view is found in Bismarck's
own memoirs and the pubhcations of his friend Busch.

152 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

the old school, who admire Bismarck and his days of
German greatness. It is only relatively true, however ;
Bismarck well realized the possible dangers to Ger-
many of an understanding between Russia and France.
His plan was always to keep peace with the eastern
neighbor and not let Russia make an agreement with
France ; but that is all. Bismarck did not realize that
he was bullying Russia and irritating her by his over-
bearing ways. He did not see that his friendship with
Austria was exceedingly unpleasant to the Tsar. It
was this policy that was chiefly the cause of the gradual
estrangement of Russia; Russia resented deeply his
desire to keep her weak.

The results of Bismarck's policy were quite evident
in 1890. Russia was no longer under the influence of
Berlin although the Tsar was still supporting strongly
the monarchical principle, and disliked the French
people.

II.

At his accession to the throne Wilhelm II was very
anti-British. He knew too that the Tsar was no friend
of England, that Russia had great troubles on hand
on account of her disputes with England. Though he
showed signs of desiring close friendship with Russia,
which met with the hearty sympathy of the Tsar, the
Kaiser was, nevertheless, not averse to a quarrel
breaking out between England and Russia. Wilhelm
^shrewdly counted upon such a possibility; it would
have been profitable to Germany, as both antagonists
could only be weakened by such a war. Russia cer-

GERMANY 153

tainly was bound to lose much by it and England had
but little to gain in any case ; the gain would have been
to Germany's profit. It was exactly the same idea that
prompted the Kaiser to interfere, later on, with the
Boer uprising and still later in the Japanese war with
Russia, while he was surreptitiously urging the Tsar to
oppose the Japanese claims.

At the same time, Wilhelm was doing all he could to
make himself agreeable to the Tsar. Alexander III
liked him at first and was seemingly inclined to renew
his friendship with Berlin, so disappointingly inter-
rupted by the harshness and aggressiveness of Bis-
marck. However, the previous policy of the German
government had by this time become too deeply rooted
and Russia was too much involved with France to turn
back. The French advances and especially the loans,
in which Germany had declined to participate, had
firmly bound the Russian government to France.

The first diplomatic steps of the young Kaiser were
directed by Bismarck, who during the early months
of the new reign was still at the helm of the German
ship of State; it is possible that this fact prejudiced
Wilhelm a trifle in his relations with Russia. The
heritage of the previous reigns also told heavily upon
him. Wilhelm did not have his hands free in dealing
with the Tsar. Thus for example, he paid Alexander
a formal visit immediately following his accession to
the throne and then wished to see him once more infor-
mally. Bismarck interfered and tried to prevent this
second visit, thinking that it would mean too much of
a friendship between the two Emperors. The Kaiser
was very much displeased with Bismarck's action,

154 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

deferred his visit, but finally did go to Russia a second
time. The impression of this friendly act was spoiled,
however, because meanwhile the Tsar had heard of
the interference of the Chancellor.

The real break in the friendly relations between
Berlin and St. Petersburg, however, came a few months
later. It was caused by the greed of East Prussia.
The representatives of this province, the so-called
Junkers, soon began to dominate more and more over
the German government and forced the latter to start
a new tariff policy against Russia.

At that time a very strong man was appointed by
Alexander as minister of finance, S. J. Witte, and it
was due to him that the Russian government at once
firmly resisted the German demands for a very unprofit-
able commercial treaty. The Prussian jingoes wanted
to impose prohibitive duties on imports from Russia
and in retaliation Witte at once raised the tariff on
German goods. Germany was amazed at the action,
but was helpless. A tariff war ensued which lasted
about three years, 1892-1894, and at first neither side
wanted to give in.

This, however, was spoiling all the plans of the
German government. Russia seemed to slip away
from its grasp. The Franco-Russian rapprochement,
on the other hand, bcame much stronger and soon crys-
tallized into a military agreement. It at once became
evident that Wilhelm had failed to establish a strong
and firm German influence in St. Petersburg. Witte
had thwarted his plans and to save the situation Ger-
many had to give in and sign the commercial treaty
of 1894, thereby abandoning her hopes of exploiting

GERMANY 155

the Russian market by getting cheap and abundant
raw materials.

It was a great victory for Russia; unfortunately, the
treaty, being signed for the term of ten years, expired
in 1904, just when Russia was in the depths of defeat,
overwhelmed by Japan, and absolutely helpless.
Germany naturally made use of this opportunity to
enforce her will, abrogate the treaty of 1894, and re-
place it by a new one, in which she had all the
advantages.^

The action of Germany in taking this advantage
could not be forgotten at St. Petersburg for a long
time and the consequences of it were still felt in 1913-
1914, during the months preceding the Great War. It
also helped to create the belief that no real friendship
existed between Germany and Russia, notwithstanding
the outward assurances and promises of the Kaiser to
stand by the monarchical principle and defend autoc-
racy in all its glory. Under cover of friendship there
thus existed a strong undercurrent of mutual suspi-
cions, that saved Russia from any possible close under-
standing with Germany, which would have meant for
Russia economic exploitation and political subjugation
for a long period of time.

After the failure to establish direct influence in St.
Petersburg Wilhelm did not give up the idea of keep-
ing a close watch on Russia's foreign relations and of
trying constantly to exert a personal pressure upon the
Tsar. During the reign of Alexander III this was
certainly impossible. Alexander was too strong and
independent to be swayed by Wilhelm. Again, he

*The new treaty was signed on July 28, 1904.

156 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

was much older and was looked upon by the Kaiser as
a personal friend and relative of his grandfather. He
could play towards him only the role of an obedient
grand-nephew. But this changed at the sudden death
of Alexander. With Nicholas the situation was ex-
actly reversed; Wilhelm was the stronger and the older,
more clever and more experienced in diplomatic
intrigue. His government too was nearly always
stronger and abler, having little difficulty in
overreaching the Russian ministers, with the exception
of Witte and one or two others.

Realizing his intellectual and technical superiority,
Wilhelm constantly played the role of counsellor
towards Nicholas, exerting upon him a most pernicious
influence. The Tsar knew and felt this influence, but
was too weak to overcome it.^ One important conse-
quence was a strong feeling of dislike for the Kaiser on
the part of the Tsar. He never dared show it but it
broke out into a violent flame of hatred, when the war
began in 1914.

There exist many proofs of how Wilhelm tried to
sway Nicholas. For instance in 1895, when the Euro-
pean powers started their policy of grab in China and
exerted strong pressure upon Japan to relinquish her
gains, Port Arthur included, it was the Kaiser who
was backing Russia. It was then that he sent his
famous telegram, "greetings from the Admiral of the
Atlantic to the Admiral of the Pacific." It was Ger-

* There is no wonder whatever, knowing the personal relations of
Nicholas and Wilhelm, that the former is said to have been con-
stantly very nervous when he met the Kaiser and personally afraid
of him. This was witnessed for example by Iswolsky, Russian foreign
minister, who had the opportunity of seeing the Emperors together
several times.

GERMANY 157

many who urged Russia to develop her expansion
towards the Pacific, where she would have to meet,
without any doubt, the Japanese claims and resistance.
Further, at the time of the Japanese war, Wilhelm
energetically supported Russia, not by arms, but by
counsel (which was less expensive and less dangerous),
especially in her anti-English attitude. When the
Dogger Bank incident happened Wilhelm expressed
his sympathies with Russia and informed St. Peters-
burg that the English were marching into Afghanistan
with the purpose of annexing that country. The whole
story was simply an invention, made up in order to
create trouble between Russia and England. Most
characteristic was the demeanor of Germany towards
the Hague peace conferences, the initiative of which
belongs, as is well known, to the Tsar.

The first peace conference was due to the constantly
augmenting armaments; the great powei-s could no
longer bear the increasing expense; some even were
desperately looking for relief. Russia's situation was
one of the worst, due to her financial difficulties and the
strain put upon her by her shortsighted expansion in
the Far East. Just when her financial troubles seemed
at their worst, the St. Petersburg government heard
that Austria had begun to rearm her artillery. The
Russian war ofiice at once laid plans for a similar
reform of the Russian artillery and this called for an
expenditure that she was not able to meet. The clever
finance minister, Witte, at once protested. He was
afraid of such an appropriation, as it would be a tre-
mendous strain on the newly established gold currency,'
which might have broken entirely. Then too, it would

158 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

necessarily curtail Witte's plans for peaceful penetra-
tion of Manchuria and react on Russia's policy in
Persia. His violent protests made the other ministers
hesitate and look for some other way to meet Austria's
move. The initiative of the new proposal belongs to
the minister of foreign affairs, count Muraviev. It is
not known which one of his subordinates originated it;
it was certainly not the count himself, as he was much
too ignorant and superficial. However, he presented
a report to the Tsar, recommending a call for a peace
conference, which would start the idea of a general
disarmament program or at least stop the increase of
armaments. The other ministers supported the plan
with ardor and easily persuaded the Tsar to send out a
circular to all the Powers, calling such a conference
(August 24, 1898). This action gave the Tsar the
reputation of a "Peace-Maker." The plan of«such a
conference appealed so much to the public opinion of
all the nations, that no government dared to oppose
it, though we know now that not many sympathized
with it. The nations were too tired and exhausted by
the constant increase in armaments and were longing
for some guarantee against future wars. The Russian
proposal was met everywhere with tremendous enthu-
siasm and the governments had to comply, with the
hope, however, of thwarting the plan by sabotage.
In this latter respect the palm of success belongs to
Germany. She knew how to create friction and practi-
cally annulled the intent of the work of the conference.
Still worse was her policy at the second conference,
called in 1907; h®re too Russia had the initiative.
The Americans were most eager to have the second

GERMANY 159

conference called, but President Roosevelt gave way
to the desire of the Russian government that the
initiative should again come from St. Petersburg.
Germany very successfully opposed all the more im-
portant resolutions of this conference and really
annulled all its work. The Russian government real-
ized this and the Tsar took it as a personal offense,
though once more, he had not the courage to tell
Berlin what he thought.

III.

It is important to notice that just when Russia
was in the midst of her worst troubles during the
Russo-Japanese war, Wilhelm chose to enforce upon
Nicholas the famous agreement of Bjorko (August 24,
1905). This only shows what little regard Germany
had for Russian interests. The Kaiser simply wanted
to make use of her weakness in order to force her
either to break with France or to counteract her alli-
ance with that country. He also made use of the per-
sonal weakness of the Tsar in forcing him to sign that
treaty and keep it secret even from his own ministers.
He was harping at the same time on the anti-English
feelings of the Russians and reminding them of Great
Britain's attitude during the whole Japanese war.
The history of this agreement signed at Bjorko is too
well known at present to need any further elucidation.

Witte had his first hint about it when returning
from Portsmouth. He stopped at Berlin and was
invited by the Kaiser to spend a night with him at his
hunting lodge at Rominten, East Prussia. But the

160 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

whole story he heard only from the minister of for-
eign affairs, Lamsdorff, on his return to St. Petersburg.
He was horrified at what he rightly deemed to be a
death blow to the Franco-Russian alliance and at once
set to work to nullify its political meaning. Little
could be done, however, since the Tsar had signed the
agreement and Germany was in no way ready to release
him from this obligation. The explanatory notes sent
from St. Petersburg could not help him much. The
Tsar, as a consequence, found himself in a very false
position, for at any moment France might have accused
him of duplicity and even betrayal. It increased his
secret illfeeling towards Wilhelm, but could not affect
the disastrous consequences, which at once made them-
selves felt. It was in the Balkans that Germany first
made use of her new situation, hampering the Russian
policy where it concerned Constantinople.

One must say, however, that though Witte, clever
as he was, at once perceived the meaning of the ill-
fated Bjorko treaty, he himself was in no way averse
to a three-cornered understanding between Russia,
France and Germany. Often had he endeavored to
bring about such an agreement of the continental
powers, which would have meant the isolation of
England and the inclusion of Austria-Hungary as an
adjunct only, and which would have brought with it
finally the triumph of Germany, because of Russia's
inherent weakness. Witte himself was thus only
against the form, in which the Russian-German agree-
ment was brought about, a form that was bound to
create alarm and disappointment in France. He was
not averse to the essence of the treaty. His own idea

GERMANY 161

was to play off Germany against France and then reap
advantages out of their competition. His fundamental
mistake was, however, that Russia after the Japanese
war was no longer the rich bride with the many suitors,
but on the contrary she was hopelessly weak and the
outside world knew it only too well. The Kaiser was
more shrewd in that case than was the Russian states-
man and realized very well how much he succeeded in
making Russia's position an extremely false one. On
the day he declared war against Russia, speaking from
the balcony of the Potsdam Palace, he waved the text
of the Bjorko treaty in his hand, shouting "Er hat mich
betrogen, er hat mir gelogen" (meaning that the Tsar
promised to be Germany's ally and betrayed her in
taking sides with France). The Bjorko treaty was
such, as a matter of fact, that the Tsar was bound to
betray one or the other of his two allies, France or
Germany. The Kaiser knew quite well that Russia's
choice would necessarily be France, but this only gave
him a good chance for calling Nicholas a traitor.

The first consequences of Germany's free hand
towards Russia told very soon in Constantinople,
where German influence became predominant. The
Germans developed a feverish activity in Turkey;
their salesmen invaded every Turkish town; their
merchant navy began to do flourishing business in the
Bosphorus; their political and semi-political societies,
like the All-Deutscher Verband, began their work
among the Mussulmen. Every day saw the increase
of Germany's prestige and influence.

Russia naturally was very much alarmed at this.
The worst, however, was stiU to come, when after the

162 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ger-
many made her famous threat, standing in "shining
armor" beside her ally. This showed how much con-
tempt was felt in Berlin towards Russia and how
convinced the German government was of Russia's
absolute helplessness and weakness. Yet Wilhelm
could not afford to quarrel with Russia. On the con-
trary, he tried to allay her displeasure and indignation
for he was not yet ready for a definite break. He did
not feel that he was sufi&ciently firm in the saddle and
had to be careful with his eastern neighbor.

Strange to say, that after all that happened in 1908-
1909 the Kaiser tried to make himself once more
agreeable to Nicholas.^ With no great effort he finally
succeeded in making the Tsar pay him a visit at
Potsdam. It took place on November 4, 1910, and
resulted in a new agreement between Russia and
Germany, which was signed August 19, 1911. The
Russian government agreed to connect its Persian
railroad with the Bagdad line (Russia was supposed
to build a spur from Teheran), and practically give
Germany a free hand in North Persia in regard to
German imports there.^ From the very first day the
European governments heard of the Tsar's visit to
Germany, accompanied by his minister of foreign
affairs, Sazonoff, they were extremely alarmed.
Sazonoff had to issue a quieting communique to assure
them that no questions of a general nature were dis-

*See, the Willy-Nicky correspondence, by telegraph and by let-
ter, ed. by H. Bernstein, N. Y., 1918, and /, Don Levine, Chicago,
1920.

^ North Persia was Russia's sphere of influence according to the
Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907.

GERMANY 163

cussed and that the meeting had only Turkey and
Persia in view. Both London and Paris were dissatis-
fied with the communique; the statesmen there knew
better and thoroughly distrusted the Kaiser, fearing
at the same time the Tsar's weakness.

In other words, Germany succeeded in consolidating
her economic influences in central Asia and acquired
the possibility of a new trade route to the Persian
Gulf. Russia on her side did not get any profit out
of that understanding.

The Potsdam agreement once more proved how little
reliable was the Tsar's policy; how easily one could
get around him and how inconsistent was Russia's
stand concerning Turkey, and Persia, Germany and
England. One of Germany's objects was to separate
Russia from England and create trouble between them ;
the other, no less alarming for England, was Ger-
many's desire to enter the Persian market and get an
outlet for her trade into the Persian Gulf. It was not
Russia's fault that she was drawn into the world
conflict, but in no way could she avoid it. The reac-
tionary forces in Russia were never averse to an under-
standing with Germany and this the Kaiser knew.
The Russian reactionaries rightly saw in Germany the
only possible strong support of dying autocracy, and
in this view they were not mistaken. Fate, civilization
and progress were, however, against them and firmly
bound Russia to the western Entente, thwarting all
the Kaiser's intrigues.

There was one last warning to Germany, showing
clearly that all was not right in her plans in the Near
East. Namely the unexpected results of the first

164 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Balkan war, when to the amazement of Germany
Turkey was so badly defeated by the Balkan allies.
For the moment it seemed that Germany was quite dis-
concerted ; everything she had been hoping for seemed
to have been lost.

The tide soon changed, however, when the quarrels
of the Balkan allies saved Germany's plans. The treaty
of Bucharest proved much more advantageous for
Germany than Berlin even hoped for the previous
year. The most important fact was that Turkey was
saved and was quickly recuperating from her defeat
of 1912. Germany was ready for any sacrifice to save
the Porte from utter breakdown and that she meant to
do at any cost. This was the main object of Germany's
policy during the London conference of the powers.

But on the other hand there existed a serious draw-
back for Berlin. Serbia was becoming too strong and
was threatening the Balkan hegemony of Austria.
Germany's desire was to see a strong Austria and a
rehabilitated Turkey, working side by side, imposing
their will on the rest of the Balkan nations, neutraliz-
ing Russian influences, as far as possible.

In order to counteract the strengthening of Serbia,
Germany was bound to stand by Austria in whatever
policy the latter country might inaugurate. As Vienna
had begun the policy of force, trying to bully Serbia
into subservience, Germany was prepared to back her,
even if such a policy should involve her in another seri-
ous conflict with Russia. The German ultimatum to
Russia in 1909 was so successful that she, no doubt,
thought she might repeat the experiment with the same
immunity and success.

GERMANY 165

This brings us to the very door of the origin of the
Great War. Its causes cannot be well appreciated if
that point is not kept in mind, namely the: absolute
necessity for Germany to keep in close touch with
Austria and back her up "quand meme." The detailed
analysis of the days preceding the war, disclosing the
immediate actions of the three eastern empires, is at
present brilliantly given by the works of Kautsky and
professor Fay, but to my mind this is absolutely insuffi-
cient for the just appreciation of the entire and com-
plete situation which brought about the war. That it
is not sufficient we can judge by the fact that such a
seemingly impartial German historian as professor
Dehlbriick does not see it.^

Toward the end of the nineteenth century there was
established a seeming equilibrium in European politics,
at least the mutual aims and objects of the policies of
the different countries were clear. The Near East was
one of the centers of trouble for there Russia, Austria
and England were in conflict. The first two powers
concentrated their attention on the Balkans, while
England was looking further, through Constantinople,
into Asia. The other center was in the west, where
France was slowly but surely consolidating her posi-
tion as against Germany. In the center was Germany,
^ tremendously growing power, economically and so-
cially, needing expansion in order to have an outlet for
her increasing internal pressure. She deliberately chose
two channels for it; North Africa, perhaps a trifle less
important, and the Near Eastern route into Asia,

*See the lucid article of Headlam-Morley ia the Contemporary
Review, March, 1921.

166 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

through Constantinople. There she was bound to
come into conflict with Russia, at the nearer end of
the route, and with England — at the farther end.
Germany associated herself with Austria to strengthen
the Near Eastern route. It was a heavy weight to
carry and proved fatal to her, as professor Fay clearly
shows.

The first step towards letting loose the forces of
Armageddon was the appointment of General Liman
von Sanders to Constantinople, which at once made
evident the absolutely incompatible claims of Russia
and Germany towards Turkey. Besides, the German
action was quite unnecessary. She could have achieved
the same ends by much less aggressive means. Even
in Vienna there were a few farsighted men who realized
the danger; among these count Tisza, the Hungarian
premier, was the most prominent.

In the summer months of 1914 it was entirely too
late to prevent war from breaking out. Beginning
with the preceding summer, when the treaty of Bucha-
rest was signed, the ball was rolling down the hill and
its plunge into the abyss could not be avoided.

None of the three eastern empires — all three des-
tined to fall in consequence of the war — was able to
stop Armageddon. Austria, because her foolish states-
men had called forth spirits, which they could not in
any way control. Her Slavs, as well as the Serbians
were bound to fight for independence. Germany be-
cause of her own free will she had bound her fate so
inseparably with Austria, and finally Russia, because,
due to her inconsistent policy in the Near East and

GERMANY 167

her internal political weakness, was feeling that her
stand with the Slavs was threatened, ruining her na-
tional prestige.

At the present date a dark cloud hangs over Europe
again, and there is, I think, a great danger looming in
the background, the danger of the future relations of
Russia and Germany. There is a possibility, that
Germany will go into Russia, that she will control her
and get out of Russia the two things that Germany
needs in order to be strong — an endless supply of raw
materials and man power. And if that be the case, if
Germany could permeate the Russian body politic
and control Russia, the question is fairly put, who
won the war? There will not be any physical power
on earth to curb her then.

I am sometimes asked by Americans: After all, what
difference does it make to Russians? If that danger
to the outside world exists, as it does, what do the
Russians care about it? Isn't it the same for them
after all?

The argument follows on the lines of indisputable
facts, — first, that Russia economically is down and
out. She is ruined; her industries hardly exist; her
commerce is killed; she is prostrate. On the other
hand, she has tremendous potentialities. She has great
natural wealth, lying at the easy reach of anyone ready
to exploit her. Further, capital is always allured by
such a possibihty. The latter is very tempting; it is
enticing to go into Russia and get those natural re-
sources and pump them out.

Some people think that gold has no smell attached

168 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

to it, that capital is quite indifferent, that it cannot
make any difference if it is German or English or
American capital that goes into Russia, and that Rus-
sia is bound to be economically exploited. That theory
stands good with one exception. Economic exploita-
tion seems unavoidable; it seems further inevitable
that Russia in the near future will be exploited by for-
eign capital. She has no capital of her own ; she must
be exploited by foreign capital. But foreign capital
is not the same everywhere. The saying that "gold has
no smeU" is wrong. It does have unfortunately very
specific characteristics; with economic exploitation
there come everywhere the political ideals that are un-
consciously carried by those who come in for economic
purposes. And if in the future there will occur the
permeating of the Russian body politic by Germans,
there will enter into Russia just those ideas that we
were always most afraid of.

Such peaceful German penetration will be carried on,
first, by the technical men, engineers of different call-
ing; we might surmise that many of them are all
ready to go into Russia at short notice; second, the
military men, oflBicers of aU ranks, who do not have
any employment in Germany on account of the pres-
ent day demobilization — there always was an over
production of such men in Germany and most of them
can hardly make a living in their own country: they
will be only too glad to migrate eastward; and third,
the commercial travellers, who will come to Russia to
sell German goods; the Russians will be heartily
thankful to receive the latter, whatever their quality;
they need so much; nearly everything is lacking in

GERMANY 169

Russia on account of the prolonged civil war and the
breakdown of all industries; but with all these men will
inevitably come their political ideals, embodying their
future aspirations and hopes.

We can presume that at present Germany is sin-
cerely and honestly trying to work off her international
obligations, imposed upon her by the victorious allies.
But, when Germany will have Russia under her control
at her beck and call, wouldn't it be simply human to
suppose that the feeling for vengeance will begin to
grow among Germans, that they will begin to think
that they can get back at the allies? Here lies the
great danger. In the future fates of European nations
there is no factor on which so much depends and yet
so little heed is taken of it.

How can one fight such a danger? Only by under-
standing, by a common policy among the other na-
tions; and just that does not exist at present.

Those among Americans, who believe in a League of
Nations — and I know there are many in this country
— do not realize that the lack of success of that idea
depends not at all on the faulty construction of this
or that project of some sort of structure of a League
organization; it does not depend on the personal mis-
takes of a president or a secretary of state or a wrong
government policy. But it does depend on the absence
of good understanding among the great powers. And
as long as there is no real understanding there exists
no means of fighting the oncoming dangers.

That applies both to small and to large questions.
For just that reason the allies did not oust the Turks
from Europe; because they do not agree they cannot

170 EUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

settle the Russian question. They cannot defend the
minorities which are suffering from oppression in the
different States. They cannot control the future de-
velopments either of Germany or Russia. They can-
not finally build up a successful League of Nations.

It is thus quite evident that as long as that under-
standing does not exist, there will be no peace in
Europe, nor in the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Debidour, A., Histoire diplomatique de I'Europe, Paris, 1917.
Seymour, C, Diplomatic Background of the War, New Haven, 1916.

CHAPTER VIII.
SWEDEN.

One of the most pernicious consequences of German
propaganda was the gradual estrangement of Sweden
from Russia. The Germans did all they could to bring
about a feeling of mutual distrust between Sweden and
Russia. The object of such a policy is easily explained.
The northwest corner of the Russian Empire, where
Peter the Great built his famous "window into Eu-
rope/' was always a very vulnerable point. It is a back-
door into Russia, both strategically and economically,
and besides threatens Russia's best sea-trade-route,
across the Baltic. The Germans realized this very well,
knew the value of such a threat, and that a hostile
Sweden could be a very real menace to Russia.

This is in no way a new or modern development; it
dates back to the eighteenth century, to the epoch when
Peter reached the Baltic and established Russian rule
over the southern coast. During a whole century after
Peter, the Swedes were hostile to Russia, constantly
threatening her northern frontiers. The question was
finally solved by Alexander I in 1809, when he an-
nexed Finland after his victory over the Swedes.

For many consecutive years Alexander was secretly
but steadily preparing to fight Napoleon ; it was a sort
of obsession with him. He knew the day was sure to

172 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

come when Napoleon's greed would force him to attack
Russia. But the Tsar also realized the danger that was
threatening him in such a case from the rear. Na-
poleon could attack Russia not only from the west, by
way of Germany, but also simultaneously through
Scandinavia, going straight to the capital of Russia,
St. Petersburg, which is situated some twenty miles
from the Finnish frontier.

Thus, with statesmanlike foresight, preparing for
the coming struggle with Napoleon, Alexander en-
deavored to secure his northern frontier. Sweden,
governed at that time by a half-crazy and foolish sov-
ereign, was constantly bickering over all sorts of sec-
ondary matters and finally brought about a rupture
with Russia. War followed and the Russians defeated
the Swedes without much difficulty, drove them out
of Finland and concluded a victorious peace, signed at
Frederickshamn in September 1809. According to the
provisions of this treaty Sweden ceded her province
of Finland to Russia, the Finns themselves, with few
exceptions, hailing this cession with sincere delight.
The mere conquest of Finland, however, was evidently
not sufficient for Alexander's purpose; the change of
sovereignty over the territory of Finland did not
destroy the danger of an invasion by Napoleon's troops.

It was the realization of such a danger which
prompted the Tsar to what was probably his greatest
political achievement, namely, the granting of a con-
stitution to conquered Finland. His purpose was to
foster among the Finnish people feelings of gratitude
towards Russia and thus alienate their sympathies from
Sweden. In a number of acts, speeches and promises.

SWEDEN 173

Alexander secured constitutional liberty to the Grand
Duchy of Finland, thus binding the Finnish people to
the Russian Empire, not by mere force of conquest,
but by sincere and well deserved friendship and grati-
tude.

Thus was created an ideal buffer-state on Russia's
northern frontier, where the Russians acquired devoted
friends, ready to help them in protecting their Baltic
possessions from inimical intrusion. The whole situa-
tion was changed at a stroke of the pen, when the
Russian and Swedish plenipotentiaries signed the
Frederickshamn treaty. Russia could not be attacked
directly. Napoleon would have first to cross an enemy
country, easily protected against foreign invasion by
its topographic peculiarities.

Twice in the course of the nineteenth century did
Finland successfully play the role of such a buffer, pro-
tecting and defending Russia's northwestern frontier;
once as early as 1811, when the long awaited attack by
Napoleon finally took place, as Alexander had antici-
pated, and the second time, during the Crimean war
with England and France, when these allies unsuccess-
fully attacked the Finnish coast.

But this clever policy of Alexander was only the
first step of his general plan. Next came the effort to
smooth out the troubles with Sweden, make her for-
get her historic enmity towards Russia, as well as her
recent defeat and loss of the Finnish province.

In that matter too, Alexander adopted an extremely
clever course and was, consequently, very successful.
The Swedish throne was soon to become vacant, the
king having no male descendants. Alexander helped

174' RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

one of Napoleon's ambitious and unscrupulous
marshals, Bemadotte, to be elected, Heir Apparent,
later to succeed as king of Sweden. Alexander knew
that for the gift of a crown, Bernadotte would abandon
his former master, and therefore, urged and helped
him in the realization of his ambition.^

Thus, when Napoleon's attack came, Alexander had
in Sweden a good friend and not an enemy, and in ad-
dition, a man of great military talent, one of Napoleon's
best generals, thoroughly acquainted with Napoleon's
strategy and ready to meet him with his own weapons
of warfare.

This stroke of Alexander's genius was one of the first
serious diplomatic reverses of Napoleon, which opened
the way to his final defeat on the frozen plains of Rus-
sia.

For a long time the Finns were well satisfied with
their national existence ; Russia practically never inter-
fered, leaving them alone to develop their political and
social institutions, not forcing them to take any part
whatever in the burdens of the Russian state, in taxa-
tion or recruiting. Finland had her own legislation,
her own administration and her own courts of law.
The Russian Governor-General seldom interfered in
the local administration.

This happy state of affairs lasted up to the end of
the nineteenth century, when some Russian national-
ists started the most dangerous and shortsighted policy

*As a territorial compensation for the loss of Finland, Sweden
was promised the annexation of Norway, which led to the Moss
Convention of 1814, when, by the efforts of Alexander, Bernadotte
and some others, a special .form of ixnion between Sweden and
Norway was established, which lasted for nearly a century, up to
1905.

SWEDEN 175

of russification, attempting gradually to take away
from Finland her constitutional privileges and thus
necessarily creating a national conflict of vast political
importance.

Germany was not slow in realizing the great possible
advantage of such a nationalistic struggle. Her Gen-
eral Staff, always alert and so well informed, had
studied the lessons of the Napoleonic and Crimean
wars and knew very well how vulnerable this north-
western comer of the Russian empire was.

Germany now began to make strenuous efforts to
alienate Sweden from Russia. German propaganda
made great capital out of the russification of Fin-
land, trying to prove to Sweden how dangerous this
was to the Swedes themselves — that it was merely
meant by the Russian imperialists as a first step to-
wards threatening Sweden proper and then attacking
her and conquering still more Swedish territory. Espe-
cially did this propaganda harp on the idea of Russia
wanting an ice-free harbor on the northern coast of
Scandinavia, for the purpose of getting a firm foot on
the Arctic Sea. There was even invented a special
story about an apocryphal testament of Peter the
Great, who entrusted his successors with the task of
securing such a northern harbor for Russia, as a neces-
sary complement to his newly built port, St. Peters-
burg. Needless to say this was pure fiction, but it had
the desired effect on Sweden ; the Swedes were greatly
alarmed and not without good reason.

One must add that unfortunately some Russian gov-
ernment officials were also much at fault in this case.
There lived in Stockholm a Russian colonel, whom the

176 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Swedes caught red-handed, spying on the Swedish mili-
tary activities. A great noise was made of this incident
by the chauvinists of both countries, which necessarily
increased the national friction on both sides. But
worst of all for the Swedes was the reorganization of
the Russian army, undertaken by the minister of war,
General Kuropatkin. His plans were first put in
action in May 1901. He had in view Germany only
and in particular the fact mentioned above of the great
advantages of Finland's territory for strategic pur-
poses of attack against Russia — shaving an army there
and threatening at the same time the Russian naval
bases. Here again, the events of the Great War amply
justified Kuropatkin's anxiety about Russia's northern
frontier, but in Sweden, under the influence of German
propaganda, all this was taken to mean military prepa-
rations for an invasion of Scandinavia and as purely
imperialistic designs of the Russian reactionaries.
Nothing could convince the Swedes to the contrary,
neither the Tsar's personal assurances nor the repeated
notes and acts of the Russian government. The Stock-
holm government, as well as the Swedish nation at
large, were absolutely sure that Russia seriously con-
templated an aggression against Sweden and Norway
and that she was preparing her way to reach the Arctic
Ocean by gathering before hand a very strong army in
Finland. In order to pave the way for such a conquest,
Russia wanted, so most of the Swedes thought, to
avoid any impediments from the side of the Finns, by
subduing them by force.

Berlin naturally looked at this increasing friction
between Russia and Sweden with pleasure and joy; it

SWEDEN 177

was just what Germany wanted. On the one side, she
knew that Russia was much too weak for such aggres-
sion and that the foolish policy of the russification of
Finland would only further increase this weakness, by
creating hatred on the part of the Finnish nation,
and on the other hand, the Germans were counting on
the increase of enmity towards Russia among the Swed-
ish nation in order to bring the latter into an alliance
with the Teutonic powers or at least to create there
such hostility against Russia that it would end any
possible understanding between Sweden and the En-
tente powers. In these endeavors, in both ways, Ger-
many scored a brilliant success. Though Sweden never
dared join Germany openly during the Great War, her
government was favoring the Teuton powers by every
possible means and was inimical to Russia and her
Allies.

There were two short breaks in this feeling of mutual
suspicions and hostility between Russia and Sweden;
one in 1908, the other in 1912, but both proved very
short lived. The first case happened in 1908, when at
the instigation of the St. Petersburg cabinet the ques-
tion of the Baltic Sea was taken up by the neighboring
powers. The more liberal and farseeing members of'
the Russian government were rather alarmed by the
absolutely unnecessary irritation of Sweden and tried
their best to obliterate the mutual pressure. Among
those most anxious for a peaceful solution of this
trouble was Russia's foreign minister, A. Iswolsky,
who initiated the negotiations concerning the Baltic
Sea and finally succeeded in bringing about the signing
in St. Petersburg of a convention (1908) by Russia,

178 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Germany, Sweden and Denmark, confirming the status
quo ante of that sea and its coasts. A visit to Stock-
hohn of the Tsar of Russia followed in the summer of
1909, which tended to persuade the Swedish govern-
ment of the friendly intentions of Russia, but as I said,
for a very short while only. Russia's policy in Finland
was too much in contravention of her verbal assur-
ances.

The year 1912 saw the second attempt at reconcilia-
tion in the Russo-Swedish relations, when the Swedish
king returned the Tsar's visit and came to see him in
the Finnish fjords. The Tsar and king Gustav
were accompanied by their ministers of foreign affairs,
Sazonoff and Ehrensvard, and long conversations took
place concerning the mutual relations of the two coun-
tries, as well as the Baltic Sea and the Finnish question.
This seemed to satisfy the Swedes for the time being,
but again, unfortunately, it did not last. It helped
however to create a distinct line of cleavage among the
Swedes. The Swedish liberals, then in power, with
Staaff as prime minister and Ehrensvard as minister
of foreign affairs, were now convinced of the absence
on the part of Russia of any aggressive designs against
Sweden or Scandinavia. They quite evidently realized
that the army reforms and changes of garrisons were
not directed in any way against Sweden and that on
the other hand, the Russian policy in Finland was only
the result of a handful of criminally shortsighted in-
dividuals among the Russian ruling class, who were
striving to take from Finland, by any possible means,
mostly by coercion, her constitutional autonomy, as it

SWEDEN 179

was too much of a contradiction to their beloved prin-
ciples of autocracy.

Unfortunately, however, the liberals at that time
were not in the majority among the Swedish ruling
classes, though they always had the support of the
masses. The conservatives and the reactionaries were
constantly much stronger among the ruling bureau-
cracy and military class and they tenaciously held to
quite opposite views concerning the "Russian danger."
It is difl&cult to say how much sincerity there was in
their anxiety about Russian aggression, but outwardly
they certainly made a great show of it and found hearty
support in the German propaganda and secret in-
fluences.

As usual, the Swedish reactionaries made a great
case for themselves and their policy, mostly out of
the question of national defence. This matter is al-
ways and everywhere the choice subject for conserva-
tive and chauvinistic propaganda. The liberals had
to withstand repeated and rabid attacks and though
they often had a strong majority in the Riksdag (as for
instance in 1911, when the liberals disposed of 101
votes, while the Socialists had 63 and the conservatives
only 70), nevertheless their position was made insecure
by the energetic antagonism of the ruling classes, the
Court, the bureaucracy and the military.

During the months preceding the Great War much
activity was displayed by the German propagandists
in Sweden; the Swedish conservatives lent a willing
ear to these intrigues, with the object of getting even
with the liberals and to wrest the government power

180 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

from them. Quite exceptional methods were employed
by them to oust the liberals, who were reluctant to add
any new elements of strain to the trouble with Russia.
The conservative papers were making a terrific outcry
about Russia's treacherous designs. First, the con-
servatives began a private collection, raising a fund for
the building of a warship, as the government declined
to make the necessary appropriations; twenty-five mil-
lion kronas were raised in this way. I think there can
hardly be found any other example in the history of
the whole modern world, of a man-of-war being built
by private subscription. Its military significance was
certainly not important to the Russian fleet, which was
about ten times stronger than the Swedish naval
forces, but its political meaning was enormous, as a
demonstration of hostility towards Russia. Second
must be mentioned the great peasant-pageant also
staged by the conservatives, in order to prove that their
views were not only the policy of one or two ruling
classes, but that they were backed by the nation. The
conservatives induced some thirty-two thousand peas-
ants to form in procession in Stockholm and petition
the king to devote more efforts to national defence.
There cannot be found many examples of such a case in
modern history, where a political party, representing a
small minority of the people, succeeded in staging such
a demonstration. Gustav, whose sympathies were with
the conservatives, graciously received the peasant pro-
cession and promised them that the Government would
devote its attention to the matters of defence. The lib-
eral ministry had to exert a tremendous pressure on
the king in order to lessen the impression made by this

SWEDEN 181

foolish demonstration. Worst of all was the fact that
the liberals could not simply resign, for that would
have meant playing into the hands of the conservatives,
who were eagerly looking for the chance of getting into
oflSce. The latter could not succeed by any other
means, as the parliament majority was against them.

The Russian conservative and reactionary press nat-
urally answered this demonstration of hostility and
many other minor ones that followed, by very vituper-
ative and vicious attacks on Sweden and Finland, and
these were hailed in Sweden as the desired "Gefundenes
Fressen" and proof of Russian enmity and aggression,
whereas the liberal and moderate press of Russia was
effectively gagged by the reactionary government and
had no chance whatever to counteract all this artificial
propaganda. The most curious fact about it is, that
Russians never even noticed, until it was too late, the
role that the German propaganda played in the case.
Neither did most of them realize the harm done in the
matter by the Russian policy of coercion in Finland.

Finally there happened a very unfortunate Court
incident which also greatly helped to intensify the mu-
tual hostility of the two countries. We mean the di-
vorce of the Russian Grand Duchess, Maria Pavlovna,
from the Swedish prince. She was married only a short
time, but her conduct in Stockholm and at the Swed-
ish Court made an extremely bad impression on the
prudish Swedes. After having had great freedom in
Russia, the Grand Duchess Maria found the Swedish
Court life dull and slow and tried in every way to show
her superiority and contempt, hurting the feelings of
the Swedes repeatedly. The Russian minister in

182 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH

Stockholm, Savinsky, was also very much to blame for
her most extraordinary conduct. The Tsar tried to
shield his unruly cousin and j&nally sanctioned her di-
vorce, which created a great scandal in Sweden and
hurt the Swedish national pride, thereby pouring more
oil on the already spreading fire of national hatred.

Thus in the summer of 1914, when the Great War
broke out, the Germans had a well and carefully pre-
pared case in Sweden and only the frantic efforts of the
Swedish liberals and the thoroughly peace loving ten-
dencies of the Swedish people saved that country from
the disasters of taking part in the war.

In western Europe and America many people won-
dered why Sweden seemed so hostile to the Entente
and so friendly to Germany, helping her by thought
and act. This was not the case, however; it was purely
and simply distrust and even hatred of Russia which
actuated the Swedes, but these feelings were confined
to the reactionary and conservative elements exclu-
sively. Those feelings were created artificially and
cleverly fostered and strengthened by the German
propaganda, because Berlin realized better than any-
one else the weak point of Russia, her northern defence.

Sweden was saved from the disasters of becoming a
belligerent power by two facts, first, because her re-
actionaries and conservatives were after all only a small
minority and were never backed by the mass of the
people; and second, on account of tlie freedom of the
press, publicity and public discussion that existed at
the time Armageddon first swept over Europe. As
long as a liberal ministry kept the power in their hands,
backed by a strong parliamentary majority, the con-

SWEDEN 183

servatives could not achieve their avowed aim of drag-
ging Sweden into the war. As long as the liberals were
in power they did not allow any secret diplomacy to
prevail and thus they saved Sweden from a great na-
tional calamity. When the conservatives finally came
into power, after the war was already under way, it
was too late for them to find any enthusiasm among
the masses and even among the staunchest supporters
of their own party for any participation in the horrors
of warfare.

This is probably one of the best examples of the
advantages to be gained by discarding secret diplomacy.

\

I
I tt

CHAPTER IX.
SOME ITEMS.

A FEW conclusions from the preceding pages
might not be amiss. We have seen that in the case
of France the relations were growing slowly but stead-
ily better, and finally a friendly alliance with France
was established to the great satisfaction of Russia.
This really meant that Russia was definitely bound
with the west, western culture and western political
ideals, and at the same time, it meant a break sooner
or later in her relations with Germany, a break that
liberal Russia was hailing with enthusiasm on account
of the support that autocracy steadily received from
Berlin.

In the history of Russia's relations with France un-
fortunately the French loans played a decisive role.
One cannot help feeling that France in this respect had
a very good means of influencing the Russian govern-
ment and forcing them to bring about constitutional re-
forms. This especially was true at the critical moment
after the Japanese war when the first rumblings of
the revolutionary thunder were heard all over Russia.

This might be also a lesson as to the great dangers of
government inter-State loans, of one government sup-
porting another with selfish motives, and not minding
the interests of the people at large. One might wish

184

SOME ITEMS 185

that in the future governments would not recur to
such means.

With England we saw the opposite process develop-
ing, of a long established policy of mutual distrust be-
tween the two countries, an antagonism that lasted up
to 1907, and then suddenly^clmnged^jaly_on account of
the realization by the English government of the grow-
ing German danger. German expansion, in particular
in the Balkans and the Near East, became a very real
threat to England, so much so that her statesmen pre-
ferred to reverse her traditional policy and first ap-
proach France and then conclude a friendly entente
with Russia.

Here, I think, are hidden the real roots of the Great >,
War. The change that came over England between 1
1903 and 1908 necessarily reversed the whole European y^
situation. ''"^''

During the last decades, the far-sighted English
statesmanship was badly handicapped by the old
methods of procedure of Downing Street. It is diffi-
cult to say if it was simply a matter of routine or the
deeply rooted psychology of the men in the foreign
office that prevented them from employing a more
liberal foreign policy. The action of Sir Edward Grey
in the question of Persia, as we have seen, might be
cited as the best possible example. In other words, the
British government realized very well the tremendous
dangers that threatened Europe on account of Ger-
many's aggression, and yet they failed to impart their
knowledge of the situation to their own people. A
direct consequence of that policy was that the English \
people could not up to the last understand the motives ,

\

186 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

of the change of policy that had come over Great Brit-
ain when she started to work for a rapprochement with
Russia. Exactly the same argument applies to the
Russian government, only in a much stronger way.
The Russian government, deficient as it was, never
had the confidence of their people. As a general con-
sequence of that situation we might say that Great
Britain also lost a remarkable chance during those
years of influencing the Russian government and forc-
ing upon it constitutional concessions.

There might possibly be one excuse for it: namely,
that the British statesmen, reahzing the imminence
of a clash with Germany, considered that it was too
late to attempt to support any Russian reforms, that
the needs of the moment were so pressing that they
could not wait for the necessarily slow development
of Russian constitutionalism.

As to Russia's relations with the Far East we saw
that the events of the decade preceding the Japanese
war were so very artificial and unnatural and brought
upon Russia such disastrous consequences only on ac-
count of the short-sightedness of the Tsar's surround-
ings. Russia's interests ought to have been concen-
trated upon her own development and in the Near
East, leaving the Far East to a more hopeful future.

Describing the Austro-Russian relations, I wanted
to emphasize their complex and contradictory ten-
dencies as a typical example of European diplomatic
entanglements. The interests of both countries cen-
tered in the Balkans, and necessarily clashed at the
time of the German intrusion.

In the Balkans, we witnessed the struggle between

SOME ITEMS 187

Slavism and Teutonism, the one inwardly weakened by
a deficient government order and mutual suspicion,
the other one much too aggressive and impulsive to be
able to stop for a moment and consider the rights and
interests of its opponents. The Russian policy in the
Balkans was from the beginning very inconsistent and
unsatisfactory, which can be explained exclusively by
the short-comings of the government system of the
former Russian Empire.

Pan-Slavism as a national movement, uniting all
the Slav peoples into one big family, was bound to fail,
as we have seen, for two main reasons, because, first,
the smaller nations could not trust the larger one,
Russia, as long as the latter had such a deficient gov-
ernment system, and second, because the smaller
states were themselves constantly at odds, fighting and
bickering over selfish and foolish personal claims and
aspirations. In the future, we can hope, that these dis-
tracting factors will gradually disappear and the Slav
nations will unite in some form of alliance for mutual
support and friendship. The smaller nations can only
gain by such mutual assistance in the stern modern
struggle for existence. It can be accomplished as soon
as Russia develops some stable form of government.

As to the relations with Germany, two facts stand
out: first, the constant aggression of Bismarck, who
tried to satisfy his political ambitions, relying exclu-
sively oh Russia's weakness; not wanting any break
with Russia and trying to keep outward friendship, he
still succeeded in antagonizing the Russian government
as well as the people. Later on, William II tried to
carry on the same policy, only much less successfully

188 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

because of the evident duplicity of his methods. The
little success he had was possibly due to the weakness
of Nicholas II, who never found moral courage to with-
stand the apparently friendly counsels of the Kaiser.
In other words, the most significant meaning of the
Russo-German relations was constantly the upholding
and strengthening of the monarchical principle in all
its glory and in contravention to the pressing needs
of the time.

The consequence of this German policy was that
only a very few Russians and only those who belonged
to the extreme reactionary camp were advocating an
alliance between Russia and Germany. This is pos-
sibly the most striking example of the way Russian
foreign policy was influenced by the internal political
and social conditions. The Russian reactionaries and
conservatives constantly advocated a close friendship
with Berlin, hoping to find there the much needed sup-
port for their own defence of dying autocracy, whereas
liberal and progressive Russia looked further west and
tried to establish firm connections with the western
constitutionalism of France. And it was in this last
respect that the Franco-Russian alliance had its great-
est historical meaning.

The study of the history of Russia's foreign rela-
tions is most instructive in this respect, as it gives such
a vivid picture of the developments of modern times
and of the interrelations and involved connections of
the historical forces, binding all civilized nations into
one huge family.

As to the future, one can be sure that Russia's for-
eign policy will not be complex. She will have to con-

SOME ITEMS 189

centrato her forces and all her attention, of necessity,
on her own internal development and on establishing
again lasting social stability. Fortunately in this re-
spect, Russia is absolutely self-sufficient; she possesses
vast natural resources, hardly surpassed by any other
country; she needs no colonies, she easily can avoid
outward aggression, she will never need to fight for "a
place in the sun," being well satisfied with what she
has, as long as she retains her free connections with
the outside world.

In this last respect the most important question will
always remain Russia's free access to the warm seas,
through the Black Sea and the Baltic. As soon as these
outlets will be satisfactorily guaranteed, Russia will
not have any trouble in building up friendly relations
with the other powers and nations. This serves to
explain the importance for Russia of Constantinople,
on one side, and of the future relations with Baltic
peoples, on the other. It will also remain the key to
Russia's intercourse with the Balkan nations in par-
ticular and with the world at large, in general.

It was said long ago and, I think, it is realized by
most people at the present moment, that without Rus-
sia there is no peace in Europe and that the progress
of civilization depends very much on the return of the
great Slav nation to normal life and international
intercourse.

Finally, the history of Russia's foreign relations
during the last half century can be used as a poignant
example of the evils of the former methods of Euro-
pean diplomacy, which brought so much harm to so
many nations.

CHAPTER X.

SECRET DIPLOMACY.

I.

During the preceding course of lectures I have often
had to point out cases of secret diplomatic transactions
and the evils they invariably brought upon Russia and
the other powers. The history of the foreign rela-
tions of Russia gives convincing evidence of how much
harm secret diplomatic intercourse between nations
can bring in its train. This, however, is fortunately
well realized at the present day by all educated people.
Very much scientific material has been accumulated
lately on this question ; we know quite well that many
of the causes of the Great War are due to the methods
used by the European foreign offices. I find that per-
haps even too much stress is laid upon the study of
examples, illustrating these methods and too little at-
tention is paid to the ways and means of eradicating
the evil. Thus, not long ago, I heard an interesting
valedictory address by the President of the American
Association of Political Science, giving his audience a
frightful array of facts concerning secret diplomacy.
If we go back a century, we can find cases that are
truly amazing from our point of view, of kings and

potentates playing their private little game of dispos-

190

SECRET DIPLOMACY 191

ing of the fate of "their" peoples, "their" territory,
"their" states. Not much was said, however, by the
orator, as to why this evil still persists in our day,
when so many efforts are made to make the world
safe for democracy.

This is more important for political science espe-
cially, as it is intrinsically connected with some of the
basic political problems of the modern state. We find
that both the fundamental institutions of democracy
are closely bound up with it, namely, parliament and
public opinion. But with this difference, whereas
the latter seems to increase constantly its powers and
influence, the former is unmistakably and yet so un-
justly losing its popularity.

Take for example the writings of a contemporary
school of political science and you will find there most
abusive language applied to parliamentary institutions.
To these writers everything seems wrong with the
modern parliament; some of them even try to build
up systems of government without any parliaments.
One must acknowledge that the great number of at-
tacks are perfectly justified, the evils painted are real
ones, not mere inventions of sensational reformers.
Further, such criticism applies not only to the Anglo-
Saxon countries, but even in a greater measure to most
of the other countries. There is little to chose between
the French Chamber and the Italian, to cite only one
example.

Yet there seems to be no substitute suggested; all
the systems which are constructed without the parlia-
mentary institutions are not really worth mentioning
or taking seriously. Then too, it is quite a remarkable

192 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

fact that nearly all criticism of parliaments is negative.
All reformers are satisfied to point out the evils; hardly
one of them, who has studied the origins and causes of
these evils, suggests any possible ways to eradicate or
avoid them. It is in this latter field alone, that scien-
tific investigation ought really to center.

In the domain that we have just been studying, viz.,
foreign relations, we can easily notice two very im-
portant developments, first, the gradual and steady
growth of parliamentary influence as the best and
most powerful channel of control by public opinion,
expressing the will of the nation, and second, paralyz-
ing or minimizing this control, an abundant remnant
of ancient ideas and institutions dating back to those
days, when foreign relations were the private (pos-
sibly the most private) business of kings and em-
perors, their own, personal or dynastic property, so to
speak, their dower or gift, their inheritance or their
purchase.^

This applies not only to such unusual personalities
as Louis XIV or George III, Frederick the Great or
Tsar Peter, but to aU the lesser crowned heads as well,
and reaches far down into the nineteenth century. In
many a German textbook of the middle of that cen-
tury one can find numerous examples, taken from ex-
isting constitutions (no mere pia desideria of worship-
pers of autocracy), of rights and privileges of monarchs

^The history of extradition probably is the best possible ex-
ample of the changes brought about in this domain; in former
times the extradition of criminals was a personal matter with the
monarchs. They cared very little about the criminals themselves
and still less did they consider the welfare of the nation. Only
gradually did the institution of extradition become a national mat-
ter, controlled by international law and public interests.

SECRET DIPLOMACY 193

in matters of foreign relations, when the nation as such
counted for little or nothing. This is perhaps the most
doleful and certainly the most pernicious inheritance
of autocracy, which prevailed in Europe in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries.

Only very slowly and at the cost of great efforts did
the individual parliaments succeed in gradually estab-
lishing their right of participation to a slight degree at
least in this important state function. And it might
be looked at as one of the great victories of constitu-
tionalism, when the principle of such parliamentary
participation was recognized, first by political science
and later by constitutional practice. We must qualify
this statement, however, by saying that though this
principle seems to be accepted everywhere unani-
mously, the parliamentary practice is still very uncer-
tain and in many ways deficient.

The means by which the parliaments of different
countries established their participation in foreign af-
fairs were usually the ones already tried many times,
namely, by holding the strings of the purse and thus
forcing the governments, kings and ministers to seek
the consent of the nation's representatives "in Parlia-
ment assembled" for the contracting of international
obligations. As soon as the latter necessitated any
expenditure, parliaments had to be consulted and this
gave the representatives their chance to learn something
of and investigate the questions of foreign relations.

In exactly the same way parliaments secured another
means of participation, namely, in controlling the re-
cruiting system of a state and thus taking part in the
composition of the armed forces of the nation. The

194 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

contingent of the army could hence be established only
with the consent of parliament.

Finally, two very important questions, taken from
the domain of foreign relations, received special at-
tention in this respect and soon became the exclusive
function of parliament — all matters concerning the
territory of the state and the final ratification of inter-
national treaties. The former could no longer be con-
sidered as the private property of a monarch, which
he could give away as a present to his friend or a dowry
to his daughter, slicing off a part "of his people." The
most recent examples of such methods are the policy
of Napoleon, when he was distributing conquered ter-
ritory among his relatives and supporters and of the
Congress of Vienna, in 1815, which practically did the
same thing. The inhabitants of such "distributed"
territories counted for little or nothing in those days
and it was only towards the middle of the century
that those ideas began to die out.^

As to the second principle, of the participation of
parliament in the ratification of international treaties
this became recognized by international and constitu-
tional law only towards the middle of the nineteenth
century. It developed very gradually. At first, foreign
relations were still looked at as the personal privilege
of the monarch, but it was considered as advantageous
for him to have "his" people consulted, providing
greater weight to his agreements and policies. Only
much later was this additional participation of parlia-

*In the United States this is less realized for the very simple
reason that Americans never had to deal with autocracy as a
form of government and from the start of their national life
considered the territory of their States, as their national property.

SECRET DIPLOMACY 195

ments transformed into a conditio sine qua non of
ratifying international treaties. Monarchs were forced
to adopt such a method of ratification of treaties in
order to satisfy their people; the latter rightly insisted
on it in order to safeguard their interests, as a nation,
and finally, the counter-agents, the other contracting
nations, required it in order to secure better guarantees
of the fulfillment of such treaties.

One must state, however, that the theory of political
science was very reluctant to accept and register these
changes. Some schools, especially some German ones,
tenaciously clung to the old ideas, making every pos-
sible effort to save the dying principle of the exclusive
powers of the Head of the State. Thus for example,
some of the most brilliant German jurists, Laband
among others, insisted on the distinction of the force of
the act of ratification inside the State and outside,
relating to the other contracting powers.^

II.

If the theory of political science was slow in accept-
ing the new idea, practical life and legislation were still

^BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Jellinek, G., Gesetz und Verordnung, Heidelberg, 1908.

Korjf, S. A., Parlement et affaires exterieures, Revue de Politique

Internationale, VII, 1914.
Meier, E., Abschluss von Staatsvertragen, Leipzig, 1874.
Michon, L., Traites intemationaux devant les Chambres, Paris, 1901.
Crandall, Treaties, their making and enforcement. New York, 1904.
Ehren, Droit de traiter, considere dans ses rapports avec la forme

d'etat.
Dauzat, A., Role des Chambres en matiere des traites intemationaux,

Paris, 1899.
Merignhac, A., Traite de droit public international, Paris, 1907.
Weil, B., Mitwirkung der Volksvertretung bei Staatsvertragen, Strass-

burg, 1906.

196 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

less impressed by such a movement. The constitutions
of the different European countries began to be in-.
fluenced very slowly indeed and thus kept up for a
long time the old fiction, that foreign relations and
diplomacy were the exclusive function or even the
privilege of the Head of the State, emperor, king or
president, the minister of foreign affairs being his
dependent agent, whereas parliament or the parlia-
mentary committees were still looked upon as un-
pleasant intruders or bothersome meddlers, who had
to be constantly pacified by concessions.

Some constitutions, however, were an exception, ac-
cepting the principle of necessary cooperation between
the executive and legislative branches of government
in foreign affairs, granting the parliament a share in
the ratification of treaties and by this means opening
the door to the influence of public opinion on the
diplomatic relations of the respective countries.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century the world's
constitutions could be classified into three groups. To
the one belonged a few constitutions, which still rigidly
kept to the old idea, that foreign affairs were the
exclusive domain of executive activity, not admitting
of any cooperation of legislative authorities.

The second group, numerically also very small, con-
tained the few constitutions which assured the legisla-
tive branch full equality or at least ample rights of co-
operation in foreign affairs. Finally the third group,
composed of the vast majority of constitutions con-
tained only half-hearted attempts at providing some
means, usually very limited, of parliamentary coopera-
tion in certain questions, concerning the foreign rela-

SECRET DIPLOMACY 197

tions of a nation. The most frequent cases in this
respect were the requirement of parliamentary sanc-
tion of financial burdens put upon the country by an
international treaty, or of the most vital questions of
war and peace.^ But just in this latter respect we will
see how easy it was for the executive to avoid coopera-
tion or even to deceive parliament.

To sum up : the forward movement during the nine-
teenth century, as often happens, was very slow, where-
as some principles seemed to have been finally well
established and generally accepted, their practical
working was still very much limited and restricted.

But also, as is usual in such cases, it is only the first
step that is difficult and once the door is opened, the
new ideas develop of their own force and power and
conquer new fields. The cooperation of parliaments
in certain questions opened the door and gradually
public opinion began to increase its influence. One
must remember in this respect, that in other domains
of political and social life of the modem nations public
opinion has only very lately won its permanent in-
fluential position. It is not so very long ago that public
opinion hardly played any role worth mentioning.
Thus the achievements in the domain of foreign rela-
tions were not so very far behind the rest in develop-
ment.

The main trouble lay with the parliaments them-
selves; in other words the first means of influence,
which public opinion had adopted (by which, figura-

^ BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Leoni, Beitrag zur Lehre von der Giiltigkeit der Staatsvertrage.

Rivier, A., Principes du droit des Gens, II, Paris, 1896.

Textbooks on international law by UUman, Nippold, Merignhac.

198 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

lively speaking, it had opened the door to wider in-
fluence) were deficient. The parliamentary system,,
toward the end of the century began itself to deterior-
ate and in many respects did not work satisfactorily.
Contemporary literature on the subject of parliament-
ary deficiencies affords overwhelming testimony. As
mentioned above there grew up even a whole school,
that is at present questioning the main subject, the
necessity of retaining parliaments as a conditio sine
qua non of the modern state. I do not consider that
the attacks on the modern parliament are without any
foundation. On the contrary, one must admit that the
parliamentary systems do not work well, that they ar*^
honeycombed with defects and even with some evils,
and urgently call for reform and revision. Again, in
the domain of foreign relations this seems to be more
evident and conspicuous than anywhere else.

The plenary sessions of parliaments do not work
well anywhere. They are usually overcrowded with
work, selfishly interested in politics, apt to devote most
of their time to bickering with the executive, prating
or obstructive, impractical or else too much absorbed
in local and petty questions, which restrict their na-
tional horizon and in many other ways make them
lose touch with the public opinion of their own coun-
try, not to mention the wider field of international
relations and world politics.

All this necessitated the introduction of remedies,
in most cases by substituting committee work for the
plenary sessions. Thus it happened that in many
countries all over the world, not alone in Europe, the
burden of serious work slowly gravitated into the secret

SECRET DIPLOMACY 199

sessions of all sorts of parliamentary committees. The
executive authorities too, much preferred dealing with
such committees; they are eager everywhere to attain
practical results, to push through the legislation that is
necessary for their policies, and naturally find it much
easier and more agreeable to have to deal with a com-
mittee, which usually represents the pick of the most
capable parliamentarians, than with a turbulent and
unruly plenary session, bent on bitter criticism of the
government, and yet unwilling to share the respon-
sibilities.

This tendency to devolve the serious work upon the
parliamentary committees has however one grave
drawback. The work of the committees is everywhere
strictly secret, the committees are nowhere in direct
touch with public opinion, neither do they seem to be
influenced by the latter to any appreciable degree.^
In the domain that interests us at the present time
this drawback proved most pernicious, as it tended
to neutralize the achievements of parliamentary co-
operation in foreign affairs. By this means, the execu-
tives and foreign ofl&ces could keep the influential
members of parliament informed of their foreign
policies, thereby satisfying their personal ambitions
and yet have the transactions as safely secret as ever
before. As we have just said, public opinion did not
seem to be able to reach behind the closed doors of
committee-rooms.

Thus there was created a circulus vitiosus: parlia-
ments did not work well in their plenary sessions, com-

*This does not apply however to the United States Congress, as
in most cases the Congressional committees are working publicly,
and hardly ever close their doors.

200 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

mittees had to be substituted/ but the latter excluded
publicity, the main merit of the parliamentary system
of the nineteenth century. The executive ministers re-
verted with pleasure to the old system of impenetrable
secrecy. The recent enemies of the parliamentary sys-
tem find no small amount of material for attack just in
these facts. They rightly point out the easy way of es-
tablishing collusion between the committee members
and the government officials, the former being
influenced and sometimes even perverted by the
methods and ideas of the latter, and usually as a re-
sult, the nation is cheated out of its influence or par-
ticipation in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Thus, new ways have to be found to remedy the
situation ; it will not do to simply decree the abolition
of parliaments. The increase of committee work was
unavoidable and in other ways proved beneficial. For
instance, it certainly improved the methods of legis-
lation and increased its efficiency. The most vital and
necessary remedy would seem to be the introduction of
some forms of publicity into committee work and the
creation of ways and means of influencing this work
by the public opinion of the country. What has been
won for parliaments, must now bei established for
parliamentary committees and their work with the
executive ministers.

* There existed once a very strong movement among specialists
in political science advocating the increase and strengthening of
parliamentary committee work. Some writers saw salvation from
the superficial prating of parliaments only in the creation of special
committees of foreign affairs, which would be able to control the
executives, but at whose expense? This applies especially to Great
Britaiu.

SECRET DIPLOMACY 201

III.

If we examine closely the domain of foreign rela-
tions, we can easily notice that they have a double
function. Locke was the first to point this out, when
he defined his "federative power"; but at that time
it hardly had any practical meaning, all the executive
functions being united in the hands of the irresponsible
king. Thus it passed unnoticed in the theory of
political science and acquired its significance only in
the nineteenth century.

One of these two functions consists in acts that
create a legal obligation for the state (or nation). All
treaties, obligations, understandings and agreements
would come under this head. The other function is
constituted by the daily intercourse of states (or na-
tions), the transactions which do not create any legal
obligation, diplomacy in the technical meaning of the
word, conversations between foreign secretaries and
diplomatic representatives. The first function in-
variably binds the state in some way or other, the
second one does not affect its legal obligations, but
usually prepares the way for the acts of the first group.

It is very hard in some cases to draw the line between
the two functions, which is easily explained by their
past history. In former days, as we have said, both
functions were in the hands of the head of the state
and his ministers and only too often a mere word, a
promise, the vague utterance of a monarch or his am-
bassador created a legal obligation for the state. That
is why diplomacy in those days was such a dangerous

202 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

game and such a wily craft. Transactions were usually
couched in such vague terms, that governments could
construe them as they chose and all of them were built
on purely personal relations and mutual trickery.
Much of this has certainly disappeared in the modern
state and yet some of the obnoxious consequences still
linger on, hampering the smooth sailing of the ship
of state, as unseen reefs and rocks under a seemingly
safe surface of the ocean of life.

Two great changes have been effected in the modem
state concerning these functions, and both tend to-
ward establishing a line of marked distinction between
them, enhancing the meaning of the first and dimin-
ishing the role of the second.

The introduction of compulsory participation in the
first function of other institutions, for example par-
liaments, and not leaving it exclusively to the head of
the state; through such participation and also because
of greater publicity, the people of a state know much
better the details of international relations of the pres-
ent day. Second, modern international relations
have become the business of central governments, the
diplomatic agents having lost their former significance.
As soon as any international question becomes of some
importance, it is taken out of the hands of ambassa-
dors and settled directly by the ministers of foreign
affairs. The great facilities of modern communica-
tions, the telegraph and the wireless, have made this
possible and established direct ties between the respec-
tive foreign offices. The personal "talks," conversa-
tions and "assurances" of ambassadors have lost much
of their former meaning; every word of theirs can be

SECRET DIPLOMACY 203

easily checked up by their governments and is also
watched and controlled by public opinion, informed
and often advised by the daily press.

Thus the second function tends to become gradually
a purely preparatory one; at present it can be looked
upon as an established principle, that this function
must not create any legal obligation for a state, or at
least when such an obligation arises (in very excep-
tional cases) the onus probandi weighs heavily on the
state which admits such a possibility.

One of the axiomatic principles of modern political
science is the theory that a state can be bound only
by its own will; for every legal obligation of a state
there must exist the sanction of the sovereign
authority of that state. Nothing can be legally im-
posed from without. This is the meaning, for example,
of the peace treaties, signed by the vanquished na-
tions. Germany was forced to sign the Versailles
Treaty in order that the victorious Allies could get
from her the necessary legal sanction of the conditions
of peace, imposed upon the vanquished nation. The
Allies could have occupied Berlin, crushed the German
nation, if they had so wished, but they could not im-
pose legal obligations on the German state without
getting the legal sanction in the form of consent from
Germany.

In former days the head of a state was perfectly free
to impose whatever obligations he deemed best upon a
nation; at present, such sovereign power is vested in
other institutions, usually the parliament, as th3 sole
representative of the nation.^

*This is axiomatically accepted by most of the writers on inter-

204 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

This axiom gives us the clue to the legal explanation
of the participation of the different state institutions
in the above mentioned functions. The first creates
legal obligations for the state^ or binds it in its inter-
national relations and the participation of parliament
is absolutely necessary, whereas in the second function,
though in some cases possibly desirable, is not neces-
sary and can be left in the hands of the government,
the diplomatic representatives and foreign offices.

The same distinction of these two functions leads us
to a better understanding of the present day antagon-
ism between publicity and secrecy. In former days
when that distinction was purely theoretical, and both
functions alike were looked upon as a personal right
or rather privilege of the head of the state, the whole
field of international relations was enshrouded in ab-
solute secrecy. All international transactions were per-
sonal and secret and under that fatal cover of secrecy,
the methods employed by the transacting heads of
states, were only too often based on trickery and dis-
honesty. At the present time all this has changed and
though many of the old elements still influence modem
international relations, their improvement is great and
quite evident.

As we have seen, with the participation of parlia-
ments came publicity. At least as a principle it be-
came recognized that in the domain of the first func-
tion (where legal obligations were being created for a
state) publicity ought to prevail and secrecy ought

national law. See, Nys, E., Droit international, vol. Ill; M. Lie,
Legitimation des Traktat. Heilborn, Der Staatsvertrag, Archiv fiir
off. Recht, Bd. 12, 1897; Dauzat, Le role des Chambres en matiere
de traites intemationaux, Paris, 1899.

SECRET DIPLOMACY 205

to be eradicated. The ideal is not yet attained, many
of the old evils still exist, but modern states are on the
right path and publicity will some day win its final
victory. This is what former President Wilson so
brilliantly formulated in his famous phrase, "open cove-
nants, openly arrived at."

In the domain of the other function, secrecy can
still persist and probably always will remain the domin-
ant factor and usual method. There is no danger in
this case, as long as this function is merely a prepara-
tory one, consisting of introductory negotiations, mak-
ing ready for future obligations. In fact these prepara-
tory negotiations often gain from being kept secret;
publicity usually only harms them in arousing mutual
jealousies, competition or strife. And there is no dan-
ger, so long as the first principle is firmly established,
namely, that as soon as it comes to creating a legal
obligation of a state, other organs or institutions than
the foreign office must participate and secrecy there-
after must stop.

Unfortunately there exists one difficulty of no mean
significance. On account of their historical past these
two functions are in many cases not easily distinguished
from each other. This tells chiefly in one respect ; the
second function is in some cases, not merely a prepara-
tory one, as it ought to be, but tends to bind the state
legally, or at least its transacting government agents.
The foreign offices are very apt to take upon them-
selves more responsibility than they ought to have and
thus give their counter-agents, the governments of
other countries, assurances and promises, which be-
come binding upon a state, without having called for

206 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

the necessary participation either of parliamentary
representatives or of the public opinion of a nation.

One must say that of all the modern branches of
government, the foreign offices are most apt to make
use of this method of circumventing the constitutional
principle of publicity. Other ministries dare it very
seldom and when they do, they are in most cases forced
to account for it by parliamentary control whereas the
foreign offices somehow escape this control.

The explanation is also a historical one. It is
closely bound up with the old idea of national honor
and dates back to the time when a mere word of a
monarch or foreign minister was deemed sufficient to
put any obligation upon a nation. That psychological
point of view, in contradiction to the described political
principles, still exists among many peoples. Some na-
tions still consider that their head of state, foreign
minister or ambassador can "bind them in honor" to
a certain policy or a certain promise, no matter how
secretly given or in what flagrant violation of or con-
tradiction to their national policy or constitutional
ideals.

Most often it is done by the method of "fait accom-
pli"; the government agent, the head of state, the
foreign minister or ambassador (extremely rarely the
latter, however) has long and elaborate negotiations
with a like government agent of another country,
makes promises, establishes certain lines of policy, ac-
cepts certain international obligations and thus spins
a whole web of international relations, which tend to
create legal obligations. When the plan or policy is
ready, the agent bluntly puts it before his nation or

SECRET DIPLOMACY 207

parliament and forces them to accept it, because his
acts have "bound in honor" the state, he represents,
the fiction being that his counter-agent, the represen-
tative of another nation could expect him to have the
full authority and right to deal in this way and not
to suspect any constitutional requirement of coopera-
tion on the part of some other organ or institution.

Very much mischief has been done by the use of this
method and unfortunately, it must be said that not
only the reactionary agents of the old regimes
made use of it, those men who are always ready to
revert to ancient methods, but even most liberal repre-
sentatives among enlightened statesmen. The two
most prominent examples in this respect are Presi-
dent Wilson and Lord Grey, the first using the method
of "fait accompli" in his endeavor to force upon the
United States Senate the agreements he signed with
his European allies, the second making use of the same
method during his negotiations with France concern-
ing Belgium prior to the Great War, which forced upon
Great Britain (not only England, but the whole British
Empire, Canada, Australia and the other Dominions)
the participation in a war against Germany.^

The possible dangers of this method are so great
and so very evident that they hardly need any further
elucidation.

The history of Russia's foreign relations affords
a good lesson in this respect. We can easily establish
the following summary of evils brought forth by Rus-
sia's secret diplomacy.

1. Secrecy did much harm to the Franco-Rus-
^Loreburn, Earl, How War Came, London, 1919.

208 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

sian alliance because it prevented public opinion in
both countries from supporting the Russian constitu-
tional movement; a constitutional Russia would
have been an infinitely stronger and better ally
and friend to France and no one would realize that
better than the French nation itself. Secrecy in the
mutual relations of France and Russia made two mis-
takes on the part of France possible, the loaning of
money to the Russian autocracy and worse still the
assistance in the persecution of the Russian revolution-
aries, radicals and liberals, which France never would
have tolerated had she known it in time. The same
arguments apply in an identical manner to Russia, with
this difference, that public opinion in Russia had far
less influence under the Tsar's regime than in repub-
lican France.

2. Secrecy is much to blame for the constant fric-
tion and enmity which existed between Russia and
England. The history of the Persian question is pos-
sibly the best example. How much trouble could have
been avoided if both countries had had a chance to
publicly discuss in full detail the pending Anglo-Per-
sian agrement in 1906-1907!

3. The methods of secret diplomacy were a potent
cause of the Russo-Japanese conflict. There would not
have been a war between Russia and Japan had the
Russian government acted openly and fairly in the
decade preceding 1904. Beginning with the aggres-
sion against China in 1895-1898, through the occupa-
tion of Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula, the
refusal to withdraw the troops from Manchuria and
finally ending in the criminal enterprise on the Yalu,

SECRET DIPLOMACY 209

where Besobrasoff was exploiting the private conces-
sions of the Romanoff family; all that long list of inter-
national abuses, which irritated not only Japan, but
even the rest of the civilized world, was possible only
because of the secrecy which enshrouded the actions
of the Tsar's government.

4. Finally, it was again secret diplomacy which
proved to be one of the most dangerous causes of the
Great War with Germany. It was the secret urgings
of the Kaiser, pushing the Tsar towards a war with
Japan, it was Germany's secret efforts to create a
quarrel between Russia and England, it was the
mischievous treaty of Bjorko, which was meant to
undermine the Franco-Russian alliance, it was the
secret negotiations and promises, given by Nicholas
at Potsdam in 1910, and finally, it was the secret in-
trigues of Russian diplomacy in the Balkans, which
slowly but unavoidably created the atmosphere of mu-
tual distrust, competition and suspicion, which led to
the general conflagration. Here again one can be ab-
solutely sure, that had publicity of these negotiations
existed, had the nations of Europe had the chance of
discussing freely their international relations, war could
have been avoided. Least of all did the nations at large
want a war. Their preference for peace was clearly
evident; only certain classes and governments desired
a conflict, while some others were criminally indiffer-
ent. But the fight against these belligerent classes and
governments was possible only in one way, namely,
by publicity, by divulging their secret policies and
negotiations.

210 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

IV.

When the evil is once determined it is much easier
to find a remedy for it.

The defence of secrecy in diplomatic negotiations is
usually based on one or several of the following argu-
ments.

The most important one consists in the pointing out
of the fact that secrecy always insures rapidity of nego-
tiations; the more publicity is given, the more there is
discussion of them and the longer time it takes to arrive
at any decision. This is very true, but rapidity comes
invariably at the expense of public satisfaction and
international stability.

Secrecy, it is asserted, lessens competition and some-
times even eliminates competitors entirely to the great
advantage of the secretly negotiating powers. This is
also quite true, but it also comes at the great expense
of international instability and creates all kinds of
dangers as we have seen above.

Less frequently does one meet with the argument
that secrecy of negotiations abates national enmities
and hatreds, not giving free play to such ill feelings.
Examples are usually cited in such cases concerning
the damage done by the so-called yellow press in differ-
ent countries.

Further it is asserted, we can still find many prej-
udices and misconceptions in international relations as
elsewhere and the free discussion of such prejudices
only helps to magnify them, further distorting the
truth. Thus at times of chauvinistic revivals the dis-

SECRET DIPLOMACY 211

cussion of international relations invariably tends to
strengthen the iU will of nations towards one another
or at least prevents any possible amicable settlement.

Then it is often pointed out that public opinion
everywhere is a very unstable factor. It might be
easily swung one way or another and each change is
apt to upset the equilibrium, sometimes achieved with
great effort and by overcoming many difficulties.
There is no doubt that secret negotiations, kept
from public opinion, are much easier to conduct for
statesmen, officials and bureaucrats, and public opin-
ion, fickle as it is, often does upset their best laid plans.
One can easily imagine their grief and annoyance at
such occurrences.

Finally, the shortcomings of modem parliamentary
proceedings are also cited as an argument against pub-
licity and in defence of secrecy. Thus for instance, it
is pointed out that the present-day parliamentary elo-
quence in no way helps diplomacy. The members of
parliament only too often want their opinion registered
for their own electorates and prate, most inconsider-
ately, of the diplomatic usages or the needs of
the nation. There is, alas, very much truth in such
criticism.

However, all these arguments lose their force and
miss the point as soon as we confront them with the
above mentioned division of functions. When legal ob-
ligations are being created for a nation, the latter has a
full right to know about them, discuss them at length
and take up as much time as is needed, no matter what
impediments this may place in the way of diplomatic
negotiations. As to enmities and ill-feelings between

212 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

nations, publicity and free discussion of international
relations is really the only means to fight them. Secrecy
only helps to increase prejudices and misconceptions
and in no case alleviates these evils. The argument
concerning rapidity of negotiations has certainly no
meaning whatever in these cases.

It is quite different with the second function, the
diplomatic negotiations in the strict meaning of the
word. Secrecy in these cases can be and usually is es-
sential to success. As long as publicity of the first func-
tion is assured and the responsibility of the govern-
ment to the people is firmly established, there is no
danger whatever in secret diplomatic negotiations, be-
cause the latter, in such cases, cannot have any bind-
ing force upon the nations and are merely preparatory
to the final stage of negotiations, when the legal obliga-
tions are really created and established.

Thus we come to the first necessary conclusion : the
pressing need of carrying into practice the mentioned
division of functions, the introduction of as much pub-
licity as possible into the- first case, concerning those
international negotiations which create legal obliga-
tions between the states and the establishment of ac-
tual responsibility of government officials (ministers
and diplomats) for their work as international agents.
When this is well assured, secrecy can be admitted con-
cerning the diplomatic negotiations in all the prepara-
tory stages, such as "conversations," "talks" and "nego-
tiations."

The second conclusion relates to the need of reform-
ing the foreign offices and the system of diplomatic
representation among the nations. It is a well known

SECRET DIPLOMACY 213

fact that in the present day systems of government,
the ministers of foreign affairs are invariably the
least responsible branch of thq administration and
least affected by the modern ideas of responsibility and
efficiency. Their methods of work are usually quite
archaic,^ They are the very last ones to be reformed,
for their methods have hardly changed since the down-
fall of autocracies. Then too, as life became more com-
plex, the work of the foreign offices also became much
more diversified and complicated, the burden of work
became much heavier and the tasks to be achieved more
delicate and involved. This differentiation of work
necessarily lessened the possibilities of control. As
time went on the foreign offices in most countries be-
came very independent, running their business on their
own responsibility and according to their own methods.
Not only was it hard for parliament to keep a watchful
eye on them, but even the other branches of govern-
ment tended to stand off. This is easily noticeable in
the cabinet system; other ministers invariably try
their best not to interfere with their colleague, who is
in charge of the foreign office. They have usually no
time and no desire for such interference, leaving the
minister of foreign affairs a free hand. Only in ex-
ceptional cases, for instance, at the time of discussions
concerning the general budget or some important treaty
and international policy or finally at the personal re-
quest of the foreign secretary or the head of the state
does the cabinet take part in the discussion of matters
concerning the foreign office.

*Some writers even point out that the foreign offices and
diplomatic services have developed a language of their own in
their mutual intercourse.

214 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

We can discern the same tendency in some parlia-
ments, to shun the close control of foreign offices on
account of the great technical complications which such
a control calls for. And all this augments the dangers
of secret diplomacy, lessening the responsibility of the
minister of foreign affairs.^

In other words the whole machinery of diplomacy
needs overhauling and calls for urgent reform. This
is our second important conclusion.

The diplomatic service, first, needs unification. The
complexity of modern international intercourse calls
into service many kinds of agents, attaches, consuls and
other men. The army and the navy have their own,
the commercial departments have theirs, the colonial
offices also often maintain agents, sometimes the gov-
ernment railroads, shipping offices and other depart-
ments have agents. Most of them try to outdo one
another, have their own policy and conduct their own
negotiations. This is as a rule very detrimental to the
general policy of the state; especially dangerous are
the military attaches, who are at times entrusted with
purely diplomatic negotiations, preparatory to all sorts
of military alliances. Such agents ought to retain their
independence only concerning purely technical matters
and in all other questions must be absolutely sub-
ordinated to the chief diplomatic representative, am-
bassador or minister, of their country. This is the first
necessary reform; the Russian, as well as the German
systems were most deficient in this respect, due to

^Compare for example: Morrell, Ph., The Control of Foreign
Affairs, The Contemporary Review, Nov., 1912, and Ponsomby, A.,
Democracy and Diplomacy, London, 1915. Both authors take
an extreme point of view.

SECRET DIPLOMACY 215

autocracy which always prefers personal influences
and commissions.

Second, the reform must reach £he diplomatic
agents themselves. The professional caste system has
certain advantages, but it is very harmful in many
other ways. The diplomatic haughtiness, aloofness
and secretive methods are proverbial. The best means
of eradicating these evils seem to be, the opening of the
diplomatic profession to all educated men, selected by
competition and abolishing once and for all the class
privileges of this service. This is realized in most
countries at the present day. The ambassadorial
oflSces must be filled exclusively by men, specially
chosen or by means of promotion, as a reward to the
man who was the longest in office and not for political
pull or for reason of wealth. Such a reform is made
easier by the fact that the diplomatic agent has lost in
our day his former importance, as the main negotiations
are usually conducted directly between the foreign
offices; any way the diplomatic agent has always the
wire at his disposal and can ask for instructions with
the least possible difficulty and get an answer in a few
hours, no matter how distant he is from his govern-
ment.

Third, the reform must concern the central foreign
offices themselves; this is the most difficult question.
They must be not only modernized but better
controlled, as to their general policies. Publicity, again,
is one of the best means. Better and more constant
relations should exist between the foreign office and
the press, so that the nation may better keep in touch
wiih the international relations of its government.

216 RUSSIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

All these reforms are urgently needed in most coun-
tries. The details can be elaborated only in connection
with the local constitutions. The evils of secret
diplomacy and the defects of the systems of diplomatic
representation and foreign offices were made evident
by the Great War and cannot be passed over lightly.
The best and latest example of secret diplomacy were
the allied treaties of 1915. I will never forget the con-
sternation of the Russian Provisional Government,
when in 1917 the foreign minister, P. Miliukov, com-
municated to them the contents of these treaties. Most
of these enlightened Russian statesmen suspected some
such agreements, but not one of them had any idea
of the real purport of the arrangements of 1915. One
can absolutely affirm that not one of those arrange-
ments would have been possible if the light of pub-
licity had been thrown on them at their inception.

On the other hand we can cite several cases, when
modem governments had recourse to publicity in
settling their international disputes and in every case
only advantages were gained by this means. Concern-
ing Russia for instance, it was the case several times
in the Balkan question, relating to Russian aggression
in China and finally in the unfortunate Dogger Bank
incident, which nearly brought upon Russia a war with
England and which was averted only by the fact that
the contending powers were willing to arbitrate and
that full publicity was given the incident in both
countries.

What a powerful weapon publicity and the participa-
tion of public opinion are in international relations we
can judge by the fact that recently instances occurred,

SECRET DIPLOMACY 217

when a chief of state and a member of a government
tried to reach the public of a country above the head
of their governments. In former days this was some-
times done, but invariably in an anonymous form.
(Bismarck used the Hamburger Nachrichten and other
governments — their so-called official or semi-official
press) . As Professor Hyde ^ points out, it was recently
done openly in two cases; first, when President
Wilson appealed to the Italian people in the Fiume
dispute, in April 1919, and second, when Lord Grey
tried, in January 1920, to enlist the sympathies of the
English nation with the reservations to the treaty of
Versailles, drawn up by the United States Senate.
Both cases are a good illustration of the above men-
tioned tendency to enlarge the influence of public
opinion in international relations.

Consequently, I believe that we may look forward
to a far greater knowledge of foreign relations on the
part of the public at large, to an increasing control by
public opinion and to a gradual drawing together of
all civilized nations and the recognition of certain basic
principles of equity and justice which wiU lead event-
ually to the achievements of a Court of Justice and a
successful League of Nations.

* International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States, 1922.

INDEX

Abaza, Russian admiral and ad-
venturer in Korea, 82, 83.

Adrianople, Treaty of (1829), 127.

Afghanistan, made a buffer-state
by England, against Russian
aggression, 32; English rule es-
tablished over, 33; Russian
recognition of British influence
in, 36; results of role as buffer-
state, 47.

Africa, German imperialistic de-
signs in, 43.

Alexander I of Russia, annexa-
tion of Finland by, 171-172.

Alexander II of Russia, 4; com-
plains to Kaiser of attitude of
Bismarck and German govern-
ment, 146.

Alexander III of Russia, 2; acces-
sion of, 5; policy of isolation
preferred by, for Russia, 5;
early dislike of, for France, 6-7 ;
reasons for change in policy
regarding French and German
relations, 7-12; difficulties with
Bismarck, 10-11; pleasant im-
pression made upon, by Wil-
helm II, 11; relations with and
policy toward Bulgaria, 118-
120; e,arly disposition of, to-
ward Germany, 146-147; quar-
rel between Bismarck and, over
forged Bulgarian letters, 147;
"Wilhelm's early friendly feel-
ings toward, 151, 152-154;
Kaiser's attempted renewal of
friendship with, in 1910-1911,
162.

Alexander of Battenberg, 2, 118;
deputation in interests of, in
England and in France, 8;
sides with Bulgarians against

Tsar Alexander III, 118-119;
deposition of, 120.

Alexeiev, Admiral, in Korea, 83.

Algeziras incident, support of
France by England and Russia
in, 41.

Andrassy, Count, premier of Aus-
tria-Hungary, 94-95.

Appert, General, incident of the
recall of, from St. Petersburg,
6-7.

Armenian massacres of the '90's,
36.

Asia, Central, troubles between
Russia and England over, 32-
33.

Austria, support given by, to
Bulgaria, 31 ; Anglo-Russian
secret agreement concerning,
45; given preference by Bis-
marck over Russia in matter of
alliance, 146.

Austria-Hungary, account of rela-
tions between Russia and, 93-
113.

Autocracy, secret diplomacy a
weapon of, 51.

Avellan, Admiral, in command
of Russian squadron on visit
to France (1893), 16.

Badmaieff, Russian adventurer,
60.

Balkans, effects of wars in, on
Russian and Austrian policies,
44, 111-112; account of Russia's
relations with, 114-144; alliance
of countries of (1912), 124.

Baltic Sea, convention of 1908
concerning status of, 177-178;
importance to Russia of free
access through, 189.

219

220

INDEX

Barclay, Sir George, English rep-
resentative in Persia, 48.

Beaconsfield, Lord, 4; aid given
by, to Turkey against Russia,
28; annihilation of, in 1880, 29.

Belgium, documents taken from,
published by German govern-
ment (1918), 12; early loans to
Russia by, 17.

Beresford, Lord Charles, exposure
of Chinese affairs by, 62.

Berlin-Bagdad Railroad, 43, 138.

Berlin Congress of 1878, 4, 145;
humiliation of Russia by, 4, 28,
134; effects on Austro-Hungar-
ian affairs, 94.

Bernadotte, Marshal, elected
King of Sweden, 173-174.

Besobrasoff, General, Russian ad-
venturer, 82, 83.

Bismarck, 2, 5, 7; erroneous tac-
tics of, toward Russia, 8, 9;
stormy interview between Alex-
ander III and (1887), 10-11,
147; accession of Wilhelm II
and resignation of, 11; poor
diplomacy of, 32; as "an hon-
est broker," 49 ; policy and for-
eign relations of Austria-Hun-
gary dictated by, 94-96; paci-
fication of Russia by, 96-98;
blamed by Russia for disap-
pointing results of Berlin Con-
gress (1878), 145-146; builds up
alliance with Austria rather
than Russia, 146; increasingly
unfriendly attitude toward Rus-
sia, 149-150; plans of, due to
underrating of Russia's mili-
tary strength, 150-151 ; reported
change in feelings toward Rus-
sia prior to resignation, 151-
152 ; results of policy, 152 ; chief
characteristics of policy of, to-
ward Russia, 187-188.

Bjorko Treaty, 2, 25, 39, 110-111;
enforced by Kaiser during
Russo-Japanese war, 159-160;
an example of evils of secret
diplomacy, 209.

Black Sea, importance of Rus-
sia's free access through, 189.

Boer War, effect of, on relations
of European powers, 37-38.

Boisdeffre, General, mission of,
to Russia, 14-15.

Bokhara, occupied by Russia, 33.

Bolsheviki, publication of secret
treaties by, 140, 141.

Boris, Bulgarian Crown Prince,
124.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexed to
Austria-Hungary, 103, 105, 137;
sensation created in Europe by
annexation, 108; effect on
Serbia, 129.

Bosphorus, Russia claims con-
cerning, 5; Russia's interest in
freedom of, 134, 143; signifi-
cance of question of, 143-144,
189.

Boxer uprising, and effects, 68-67,
76.

Bratianu, Rumanian statesman,
132.

Brest-Litovsk peace, 151.

Browne, E. G., criticism by, of
English policy in Persia, 47;
quoted on the conception of a
peaceful Russia and a bellig-
erent Germany, 52.

Bucharest, Treaty of, 126, 139,
164, 166.

Bulgaria, French coolness toward
deputation from, 8; Russia's
relations with, 31-32, 114-127;
joins Central Powers in Great
War, 127.

Cadets, Russian Constitutional
Democrats called, 21.

Carnot, President, Russo-French
agreement promoted by, 9;
visit of Grand Duke Constan-
tine to, 16.

Carol, Rumanian King, 132.

Cassini, Count, Russian Minister
in China, 56.

Cassini convention, the, 56.

Chang-Ing-Huan, Chinese states-
man, 65.

China, activities of Russia and
other European Powers in, 54-
61; European loans to, 55;

INDEX

221

open door policy promoted by
United States in, 61-62; Boxer
uprising, 66-67; convention of
1902 with Russia, 67; arrange-
ment with Russia concerning
Mongolia, 70-74.

Chinese Eastern railroad, build-
ing of, 56-57, 59.

Committee system in parlia-
ments, 198-199.

Constans, first French minister
to persecute Russian revolu-
tionaries, 13.

Constantine, Grand Duke, visit
of, to President Carnot, 16.

Constantinople, Anglo-Russian
secret agreement concerning
(1915), 45, 141; Russia's aim
the conquest of, 133-134; ques-
tion of, still unsettled, 141-
143.

Cowen, Joseph, conversation with
Kropotkine, 35.

Curzon, Lord, in Persia, 41.

D'Aehrenthal, Count, Austrian
ambassador to Russia, 102
policy and aims of, 103-104
ability as a diplomat, 104
plans of, for spreading Aus-
trian administrative system
over Balkans, 107-108; manip-
ulation of Austrian press by,
111.

Dalmatian coast, Anglo-Russian
secret agreement concerning,
45.

Dalny. See Talienwan.

Danef, Bulgarian ambassador to
Russia, 123.

Delcasse, French foreign minister,
39; creator of Anglo-French
Entente, 44; appointed ambas-
sador to St. Petersburg, 44.

Diplomatic service, suggested re-
form of, 214-216. See Secret
diplomacy.

Dogger Bank, incident, 38, 216.

Dondoukoff, Russian general in
Bulgaria, 118.

Doubassoff, Russian Admiral, at
Port Arthur, 63,

Eastern Rumelia, annexation of,
by Bulgaria, 31 n., 119.

Edward VII of England, a great
factor in European diplomacy,
40; arrangement of Triple En-
tente by, 40-44.

Ehrensvard, Swedish minister of
foreign affairs, 178.

Ehrnroot, Russian general in Bul-
garia, 118.

"Encirclement of Germany"
theory, 40.

England, early enmity of, to-
ward Russia, 4, 5; account of
relations between Russia and,
27 ff.; troubles over Turkey,
due to fears of British imperi-
alists, 28-30; support given
Bulgaria by, 31; difficulties
over Central Asia, 32-33; ef-
forts of, to stop Armenian
atrocities thwarted by Russia,
36; alliance with Japan, 38,
78-81; naval agreement be-
tween Russia and, 45; activ-
ities in Persia as affected by
Russian relations, 46-51.

Entente of the Three Emperors,
97, 147, 148.

Enver Bey, leader among Young
Turks, 135-136.

Europe, future danger to, from
peaceful penetration of Russia
by Germany, 167-170.

Ferdinand of Bulgaria, policy of,
of balancing Russia against
Austria, 122.

Finland, Russian fortification of,
to exert pressure on Sweden,
85; annexation of, to Russia,
171-172; granting of constitu-
tion to, 172-173; role as a buf-
fer-state, 173; policy of russi-
fication started by Russian na-
tionalists, 174-175.

Fiume, Anglo-Russian secret
agreement concerning (1915),
45.

Flourens, French foreign minister,
8.

222

INDEX

Foreign offices, need of reform-
ing methods of, 212-216. See
Secret diplomacy,

Forgatch, Count, Austrian minis-
ter in Serbia, 130.

France, friendship of Russia
sought by, 5; account of rela-
tions between Russia and, 6 ff.,
149; persecution of Russian
revolutionaries begun by
(1890), 13; heavy price paid by,
for Russia's official friendship,
13-14; formal announcement of
Russian alliance (1895), 16;
loans to Russia by, 16-24; help
given Russia during war with
Japan, 19; arguments for and
against "loan which saved
Russia" (1906), 19-23; close
bonds with Russia after loan of
1906, 24-25; historical meaning
of Russian alliance, 25; grave
miscalculations of, 25-26 ;
strengthening of bonds with
Russia due to Anglo-Russian
hostility, 35.

Francis Ferdinand, Archduke,
105-106; so-called "Trialism"
sponsored by, 106.

Francis Joseph, Emperor, at St.
Petersburg, 100.

Freycinet, French foreign secre-
tary, 9, 16.

Friedjung, historian and assistant
of Count d'Aehrenthal, 111;
part played by, in forged Bul-
garian letters, 130; a "preven-
tive" war against Russia fa-
vored by, 10.

Germany, clumsy foreign policy
of, 8; origins of agreement be-
tween France and Russia as
defence against, 9; constant ir-
ritation of Russia by, 11; not
willing to participate in loans
to Russia, 17; refuses to par-
ticipate in Russian loan of
1906, 24; bungling diplomacy
of, 32; understanding between
Witte and, 37; formation of
^Triple Entente against, 40-44;

view taken by, of Russian deal-
ings with China, 59-60, 63, 78-
79, 84; Japanese alliance not
sought by, 78-79; relations be-
tween Austria-Hungary and,
after 1867, 93-111; disturbed
over alliance of Balkan coun-
tries, 124 ; reasons for Bulgaria's
leaning toward, 126 ; Rumanian
alliance with (1883), 132; es-
tablishment of influence of, in
Turkey, 134-140; attitude to-
ward Balkan wars, 138-139;
Turkey sides with, in Great
War, 141 ; account of relations
with Russia after 1878, 145-166;
future danger to Europe, from
peaceful penetration of Russia
by, 167-170; Sweden estranged
from Russia by propaganda of,
171, 175-177, 179, 181; Sweden
favorable to, in Great War, 177.

Gervais, Admiral, in command of
French fleet at Kronstadt, 15.

Giers, Count de, Russian for-
eign minister, 15-16.

Gladstone, W. E., reforms in Tur-
key demanded by, 28 ; moderat-
ing influences of, in troubles
between Russia and England,
30.

Grey, Sir Edward, letter to Sir
Arthur Nicholson, 42; policy in
Persia, 47 ; a victim of methods
of secret diplomacy, 51; meth-
od of "fait accompli" used by,
207.

Gustav, King of Sweden, 178,
180.

Harden, Maximilian, articles by,
42.

Hart, Sir Robert, adviser of
China, 54.

Hartmann, Russian revolution-
ary, 7.

Hartwig, Russian minister to
Persia, 48.

Hay, John, U. S. Secretary of
State, 62.

Hayashi, Baron, as a statesman,
78.

INDEX

223

Hungarians, similarity to Prus-
sians, 94.
Hyde, Professor, cited, 217.

Ikdam, The, organ of Young
Turks, 135.

Iswolsky, A., Russian minister of
foreign affairs, 91, 102-103,
156 n.; deception of, by Count
d'Aehrenthal, 107-108; protest
of, against annexation of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, 109; negotia-
tions concerning Baltic Sea ini-
tiated by (1908), 177-178.

Italy, secret treaty between Eng-
land and Russia concerning,
45; Triple Alliance entered into
by, 98; estrangement of, from
Austria by Russia, 110; treaty
between Rumania and (1888),
132.

Ito, Marquis, Japanese states-
man, 78.

Japan, help of France to Russia
in war with, 19 ; events leading
to English alliance with, 38-39,
78-81; significance of victory
over Russia, 41 ; enmity of, in-
curred by Russia, 57-58; war
between Russia and, 69; chap-
ter on Russia's relations with,
since 1895, 75-92.

Joffre, General, at St. Peters-
burg, 44.

Karageorgievitch dynasty in
Serbia, 128.

Kaulbars, Russian general in Bul-
garia, 118.

Khiva, occupied by Russia, 33.

Kiao-chow, acquired by Ger-
many, 43.

Kokand, occupied by Russia, 33.

Komura, Japanese minister of
foreign affairs, 79-80.

Korea, a center of troubles in
Far East, 61; first difiiculties
between Russia and Japan over
(1895-1896), 77; Russian de-
signs on, 82-85.

Kramarz, Bohemian leader, 108.

Krasnovodsk, occupied by Rus-
sia, 33.

Kronstadt, visit of French fleet
to, 15.

Kropotkine, Russian revolution-
ary, 7; memoirs of, cited, 34-35,
38.

Kruger telegram, incident of the,
38.

Kuangchouwan, occupied by
French, 65.

Kuropatkin, General, 58, 64; re-
sponsibility of, for Russo-Jap-
anese war, 84-85; fate of, 86;
reorganization of Russian army
by, started in 1901, 176.

Kwantung peninsula, German
force landed on, 63.

Laboulaye, French ambassador to
Russia, 8; responsibility of, for
Russo-French alliance, 8-9 ;
success of French policy toward
Russia due to, 10.

Lamsdorff, Count, Russian for-
eign minister, 3, 101 ; mistakes
of, in treatment of Japanese
negotiators, 79-81.

Lansdowne, Lord, letter to Hard-
inge, 41; active in forming
Anglo-Japanese alliance, 79.

League of Nations, lack of suc-
cess dependent on absence of
good understanding among
great powers, 169-170.

Liakhof, Cossack Colonel in
Persia, 48-50.

Liao-tung peninsula, Russian
plans concerning, 57; leasing
of, by Russia, 65; returned to
Japan by Portsmouth Peace
Treaty, 89.

Li Hung Chang, Chinese states-
man, 55 ; transactions with Rus-
sia, 55-61.

Loans, dangers of government
inter-state, 184-185.

Lobanoff, Prince, Russian foreign
minister, 3, 36; ignorance of,
60.

Lobanoff- Yamagata Protocol, 77.

224

INDEX

Macedonia, the storm center of
the Balkans, 101 ; Bulgarian ac-
tivities in (1896-1910), 121.

Manchuria, Russian plans con-
cerning, 56-57; spread of Rus-
sian influence in, 68-69; Japa-
nese influence in, after Ports-
mouth Peace Treaty, 89-90.

Maria Pavlovna, divorce of, 181.

Marie, Empress, wife of Alexan-
der III of Russia, 149.

Marling, English representative
in Persia, 48.

Masaryk, Professor, Serbian lead-
er, now President of Czecho-
slovakia, 130.

Merv, occupied by Russia, 33.

Milan, King of Serbia, 120; ab-
dication of, 128.

Miliukov, P., Russian foreign
minister, 141, 2r6.

Mohrenheim, Russian ambassa-
dor recalled from Paris, 7; re-
turn of, as ambassador to
France, 8.

Moltke, General, 150.

Mongolia, Russia's designs in,
70-73; tripartite agreement of
1915 regarding, 73-74.

Montebello, Count, French am-
bassador to St. Petersburg, 16.

Montenegro, friendship of, sought
by Serbia, 130; relations be-
tween Russia and, 131-132.

Morgan, J. P., & Co., withdrawal
of, from Russian loan of 1906,
24.

Morocco, incident, the, 43; Rus-
sian support of France in, 24.

Moss Convention of 1814, 174 n.

Motono, Japanese ambassador to
Russia, 91.

Muraviev, Count, Russian for-
eign minister, 3, 63, 158.

Murgab, occupied by Russia, 3d.

Napoleon, Alexander I's fight

against, 171-172.
Nelidoff, Russian ambassador to

Turkey, 114.
Neutzlin, French banker, 22.
Nicholas II of Russia, 2; blame

placed on, for Russian policy
toward Japan, 92 ; meeting with
Francis Joseph at Miirzsteg, .
102; attitude taken by Wilhelm
II toward, 156; dislike of, for
Kaiser, 156.
Nicholas of Montenegro, Prince,
131-132.

Obrenovich dynasty in Serbia,

120; under Austrian control,

128.
Obroutcheff, General, Russian

Chief of Staff, 15, 16.
Open door policy in China, 62,

69; effect of Russo-Japanese

war on, 91.

Pan-Slav movement, 5, 96, 98,
114, 127; study of, 115-118; at
its best in 1877-1878, 117; two
main reasons why certain to
fail, 187.

Parliamentary institutions, dis-
cussion and criticism of, in con-
nection with secret diplomacy,
191-200; shortcomings of, a
chief argument for secret di-
plomacy, 211.

Persia, Russian bank in, 37;
Russian plans in, thwarted by
England, 41; effect of Anglo-
Russian relations on, 46-51.

Peter I, King of Serbia, 128-129.

Plehve, Minister von, 58; re-
sponsibility of, for Russo-Japa-
nese war, 84-85; fate of, 86.

Poklevsky-Kozell, Russian min-
ister in Persia, 50.

Port Arthur, Russian plans con-
cerning, 57; occupied by Rus-
sians, 63 ; returned to China by
Japan, 75; events following
Japan's loss of, 76 ; returned to
Japan by Portsmouth Peace
Treaty, 89.

Portsmouth Peace Conference,
41, 87-89.

Potsdam conference (1910), 111.

Public opinion, influence of, on
foreign policy, 52; parliamen-
tary government the best chan-

INDEX

225

nel of control by, 192; hamper-
ing of expression of, by par-
liamentary committees, 199;
power as a weapon of partici-
pation in international rela-
tions, 216-217.

Rasputin, the monk, 132.

Reval meeting between Nicholas
II and Edward VII, 42, 105,
136.

Ribot, French prime minister, 9,
16; formal announcement of
Franco-Russian alliance by
(1895), 16.

Roberts, General, 33.

Roosevelt, President, and Russo-
Japanese peace, 87-89.

Rothschilds, story of, and French
loan of 1891, 18; decline to
take part in loan of 1906, 23.

Rumania, coolness of relations
with Russia, 132-133.

Russia, results to, of Berlin
Congress of 1878, 4, 28, 134 ; im-
possibility of policy of isola-
tion for, 5; account of rela-
tions of, with France, 6 ff.;
policies of years 1886-1890 to-
ward Germany and France, 11-
12; formal announcement of
French alliance (1895), 16;
French loans to, 16-24; close
relations with France after
loan of 1906, 24-25; historical
meaning of French alliance,
25; mistakes in French policy
toward, 25-26; relations with
England, 27 ff.; open enmity
with England in 70's, 28; diffi-
culties over Bulgaria, 31 ; crisis
over Central Asia, 32-33; ad-
vance of, into Central Asia,
33; activities in the '90's, 36-39;
bank founded in Persia by, 37 ;
naval agreement with England,
45 ; relations with England over
Persia, 46-51 ; relations with
China, 54-61; convention of
1902 with China, 67; account
of relations with Japan since
1895, 75-92 ; reasons for Japan's

choice of England as an ally
rather than, 78-81; chapter on
relations with Austria-Hun-
gary, 93-113; relations with
Bulgaria, 114-127; and Pan-
Slavism, 116-118; present-day
help given to, by Bulgarian
people, 127; account of rela-
tions with Serbia, 127-130; be-
comes protector of Serbia, 130-
131 ; relations with Montenegro,
131-132; relations with Ru-
mania, 132-133; the long quar-
rel with Turkey, 133; relations
with Germany after Berlin
Congress of 1878, 145-166; dan-
ger to Europe foreseen in fu-
ture relations of Germany and,
167-170; account of relations
with Sweden, 171-183; lessons
from study of foreign relations
of, 188-189; summary of evils
produced by secret diplomacy
of, 207-209.

Russo-Chinese bank, founding of,
by Witte, 58-59; an aid in
spread of Russian influence in
China, 68.

Russo-Japanese war, 38-39, 86-89;
artificial and wholly unneces-
sary, 92.

Samarkand, occupied by Russia,
33.

Sanders, General Liman von, ap-
pointed to Constantinople, 166.

San Stefano, Treaty of, 28, 134.

Sazonoff, 3; efforts of, to settle
Bulgarian troubles, 123-124;
efforts at counteracting policy
of Germany in Turkey, 140.

Secret diplomacy, ill effects of, in
Persia, 50-51, 185-186; a weap-
on of autocracy, 51; dangers
of, shown by Russo-Japanese
difficulties, 92 ; advantage
gained from discarding of,
shown by case of Sweden, 183;
evils of, shown by history of
Russia's foreign relations, 189;
the origins of, 201-203; discus-
sion of operation of, 205-207;

226

INDEX

summary of evils resulting
from Russia's, 207-209; argu-
ments for and against, and
search for remedy for, 210-217.

Serbia, sides with Russia against
Bulgaria (1885), 119-120; de-
feat of Bulgaria by (1913), 125;
account of relations between
Russia and, 127-131 ; Russia be-
comes avowed protector of,
130-131 ; increasing strength of,
in 1913, a drawback for Ger-
many, 164.

Sevres, Treaty of, 141 ; provisions
of, regarding Turkey, 142.

Shimonoseki treaty of 1895, 57.

Shuster, Morgan, American
Treasurer-General in Persia,
48-50.

Skierniewice, meeting of three
Emperors at, 147.

Slavs. See Pan-Slav movement.

Slivnitsa, Serbians defeated by
Bulgarians at, 120.

Soboleff, Russian general in Bul-
garia, 118.

Staaf, Swedish premier, 178.

Stokes, Major C. B., English rep-
resentative in Persia, 48, 49.

Sweden, pressure exerted by Rus-
sia upon, by fortifying Finland,
85; account of relations be-
tween Russia and, 171-183;
government of, favorable to
Germany in Great War, 177.

Taalat, leader among Young

Turks, 135-136.
Talienwan, leasing of, by Russia,

65; returned to Japan by

Portsmouth Peace Treaty, 89-

90.
Tashkent, occupied by Russia, 33.
Testament of Peter the Great,

175.
Thomas, Albert, French socialist

minister, 45.
Three Emperors, alliance of the,

97, 147; end of, 148.
Tibet, English influences assured

in, 41.

Tisza, Count, Hungarian premier,
166.

"Trialism," political scheme,
called, 105-106.

Triple Entente, formation of, 40-
44.

Turkey, trouble between Russia
and England over, 27, 28-31;
revolution in, 42, 44, 136; An-
glo-Russian secret treaty con-
cerning, 45; alliance of Balkan
countries against, and defeat of
(1912), 124-125, 138; account
of long-standing quarrel and
troubled relations with Russia,
133-144 ; Germany's influence
in, 134-140; question of future
of, 141-144.

United States, attitude of, toward
China, 61-62; "open door" pol-
icy of, for China, 62; bad im-
pression made in, by Russian
activities in China, 66.

Vannowsky, General, Russian

minister of war, 16.
Victoria, Queen, death of, 40 n.
Vishnegradsky, Russian finance

minister, 17.
Vladimir, Grand Duke, visit of,

to Paris, 15.

Washburn, W. D., proposes loan
to Cliina by American com-
pany, 58.

Waldersee, General, 150.

Wei-Ha-Wei, occupied by Eng-
lish, 65.

Wilhelm I of Germany, 10; death
of, 11, 151.

Wilhelm II of Germany, acces-
sion of, 11; sending of mother
to Paris by, 14; early friendly
feelings toward Russia, 151,
162-154; advantage gained by,
in death of Alexander III and
accession of Nicholas, 155-156;
attempts at renewed friendship
with Tsar in 1910-1911, 162.

"Willy-Nicky" correspondence,
162 n.

INDEX

227

Wilson, President, method of
"fait accompli" used by, 207.

Witte, S. J., Russian finance min-
ister, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22; an out-
standing figure in the '90 's, 36-
37; policy in Persia, 47-48;
plans of, for railroad construc-
tion and peaceful penetration
in China, 56-58; responsibility
of, for enmity of Japan, 58;
mismanagement of proposed
Japanese alliance by, 79-81 ; not
chiefly to blame, for Russo-
Japanese War, 84; representa-
tive of Russia at Portsmouth
peace negotiations, 87-88; suc-
cessful resistance by, to un-
profitable commercial treaty
with Germany, 154-155.

Yalu River, Russian concession
on, 82-83.

Younghusband, Colonel, Tibetan
expedition of (1906), 41.

Young Turks, influence of Ger-
many on, 43, 135-136; revolu-
tion of 1908 brought about by
136; independence of, 137
hatred of foreigners by, 138
defeat of, by Balkan countries,
138.

Yuan Shi-Kai, Chinese states-
man, 73.

Zagreb, Austrian court-martial in,

130.
Zankoff, Bulgarian premier, 119.
Zukunft, Harden's articles in, 42.

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